Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

113. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State ¹

Paris, August 6, 1965, 8:50 p.m.

718. Literally eyes only for Ball from Ambassador. X made contact with Rupert ² without intermediaries and had two hour preliminary conversation with him this afternoon with no others present. Following are principal points:

1. Rupert took line similar to that he has used with previous interlocutors. This interesting to degree that he was aware on basis Rupert’s introduction that report would probably go straight to official quarters. X believes that Rupert’s comments to him were made on instructions.

2. X adhered to script, points 1 through 15,³ at which point Rupert obviously ready to say little until other shoe dropped. Confirmed that situation was as X described it but problem was what to do about it. His country wanted only peace, had been obliged to fight against foreign domination for twenty years and had maintained its independence for thousands of years with only slight interruptions. He did not agree or disagree with X’s direr predictions but appeared depressed by prospects.

3. Before continuing per script and discussing conceivable variants Dong’s four points X asked whether Hanoi ready to consider discussions or negotiations touching not only on these but also on other points; whether withdrawal of forces was pre-condition of negotiations or discussions (in which case X judged no chance); what modalities Rupert could envisage for re-unification; whether and when the UN could be accepted as “interlocuteur valable”; and if not who would be acceptable. X noted that the “four points” referred several times to the “zones” of Vietnam, seeming to envisage separation for longer or shorter time. X also claimed that Peking originally broadcast four points without the conjoint declaration and always gave Hanoi’s position a harder line aspect than Hanoi did. X did not raise question of representation of Liberation Front.

4. Rupert seemed to see this as getting down to cases, appeared slightly agitated, went to his office and brought back notes from which he spoke (from instructions?). Re troop withdrawal he stressed that any “solution” must of course include it, but confirmed that there would be “modalities” including staging and timing. Even convening of discussions should stipulate withdrawal as one of objects.

5. As to UN, Rupert said Conference of Geneva was “a valid international instance” and the accords “a valid base”. The Geneva mechanism brought together the interested countries, which was absolutely necessary to a settlement. Rupert said categorically that his country rejected any intervention of the UN despite X’s suggestion that U Thant or member states might limit their activities to good offices.

6. With respect to unification Rupert said Geneva Accords themselves provided for “zones” but accords also recognized Vietnam as constituted by a single people. Rupert contemplated short or considerably longer interval before reunification but stressed latter could only be on basis of free decision and consultation between Vietnamese people; charged that Ngo Dinh Diem backed by U.S. had blocked elections. This couldn’t be allowed to happen again, said Rupert, but he gave no sign that elections had to occur soon. Pending reunification Rupert said they wanted freer movement between zones, more trade, etc. (X infers that there are differences possibly existing between north and south which might influence attitude of north, which would not however drop its insistence on long term unification and would be confident of achieving it.)

7. Rupert raised question of representation of national front, declared it solely qualified to represent the south. X merely cited public statements this point by Secretary and President.

8. Re Pham Van Dong’s four points, Rupert betrayed interest in X’s allegations concerning Chinese treatment of them. (Documentation on this would be useful; Rupert also nodded head once or twice in response to references by X to China in his opening discourse.) He was, however, much less clear on relation of four points as a package to convening of a possible conference than he was on other points cited above. (X believes there may be semantic confusion in Rupert’s mind or between Paris and Hanoi, or perhaps more substantive disagreement between factions of Hanoi Government on this point.) Rupert said that principles incorporated in the four points “must be recognized as creating the possibilities for a solution.” However, he also called them the only “right base for a correct solution”. X pointed out that Rupert had referred to Geneva Accords and Geneva Conference as “a” possible machinery or basis, but that he seemed to be stipulating acceptance of the four points as “the” (i.e., exclusive) base. Rupert finally said there was a difference between what was required for a discussion (or negotiation) and what was required for a settlement. There couldn’t be a settlement without recognition of the principles within the four points.

9. Re “interlocuteur valable”, Rupert refused to pick up references to either Ghana or France; or the Commonwealth; he referred solely to Geneva machinery; he also claimed to be confused by President Johnson’s total of fifteen efforts to negotiate and the interest of some “forty” countries in a settlement.⁴ X took occasion review many of these orally. He observed that Rupert seemed slightly discomfited by particular reference to abortive Cambodian and Laotian conferences.

10. At this point, and speaking from a handwritten text,⁵ Rupert said he wished to ask X, “who seemed to be in position to know U.S. Government thinking”, what its reaction would be to whole series of questions. X judged best to reply by citing possible variation on four points which he said had been written only by him but on basis his appreciation of what might be in minds of his friends in Department; he again stressed this not official but might help to clarify. Rupert took note of many of these points but X left no text.⁶

12. In conclusion, Rupert said his views were those of “Vietnamese Government” taking occasion to point out X’s not necessarily those of U.S. Government. Rupert said his policy to try to insure understanding his government’s views and indicated contacts with X “could” be continued. When X replied he going out of town Rupert asked when he would return and suggested Wednesday or Thursday⁷ for possible next contact. He advised meeting be arranged by leaving note rather than through telephone or intermediaries.

13. General impression: Rupert is serious and appears professionally reliable contact. He aware that follow-up might be pursued by persons other than X. Latter believes discussions could be moved or would be moved to negotiating level, if that is desired, in degree that variations on four points are introduced with increasing degree of official standing.

14. Time of next meeting with Rupert could be advanced but it will probably take him several days to hear from his principals.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; XYZ. Drafted by Gullion and cleared by Bohlen. See Document 112 for background information on the “XYZ” contacts.
2. “X” refers to Edmund Gullion and “Rupert” to Mai Van Bo.
3. Presumably a reference to Gullion’s instructions; see Document 112.
4. In his July 28 press conference, President Johnson stated: “Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions with the help of 40 nations throughout the world, but there has been no answer.” See Document 98.
5. Not further identified.
6. For text of Sturm’s version of the four points, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 97.
7. August 11 or 12.
8. The source text bears no signature. See Document 120 for the record of the next meeting.