Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

165. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to Acting Secretary of State Ball ¹

Washington, June 29, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Proposal for an “Asian Peace Offensive”

1. In Asia it is generally felt that our peace offensives concerning Vietnam are not sincere. This feeling derives from the fact that we have generally directed our efforts toward a Geneva-type conference which would include the Chinese Communists. The Asians understand that the Chinese Communists will not go to such a conference. They also assume that we understand it. Therefore, they feel that we are proposing a political arrangement which we know is a non-starter. Consequently, they doubt our sincerity in seeking a political understanding.

2. I believe there is a need for new political action which will make clear that our interest in a peaceful settlement is genuine and which will provide some feasible means for permitting the North Vietnamese to extricate themselves from the military and political situation in which they now find themselves. In the military field, I feel they are hurting badly and would be interested in seeking some way out of their current predicament. However, in the political sense, they cannot do this unless they are provided some assurances with respect to their future.

3. These assurances revolve fundamentally around their need to have a guarantor of their political and military continuance as a communist state and of their economic development to a tolerable level of existence. They are considerably dependent upon the Chinese Communists for both political and economic support in the current circumstances. However, this support is contingent upon the North Vietnamese continuing to carry out a line of disruptive action in Southeast Asia which is compatible with Chinese interests and tactics. If the North Vietnamese were to change their line of action, this support would doubtless shrivel and they would have to turn elsewhere for guarantors. Since they could not ideologically depend upon any Western country or upon the UN, they would obviously have to turn to the Soviet Union as their guarantor.

4. The Soviet Union, however, cannot be expected to be entranced by the prospect of assuming these responsibilities with respect to North Vietnam. They would in effect be buying a sort of Asian Albania or Asian Cuba and a rather expensive one at that. Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Soviet Union, if it were to agree to take on the responsibility of supporting North Vietnam in a state of peaceful coexistence in Southeast Asia, would charge some price for these services. In short, they would wish to bargain with us and the Western world for the service of taking the North Vietnamese plague off our backs.

5. The problem is how to become engaged in a discussion with the Soviet Union on this subject. It seems clear that neither the Soviets nor the North Vietnamese wish to enter into blunt negotiations in this context. Therefore, an indirect, more oriental approach seems indicated. I would like to suggest such an approach in this memorandum and would submit that it has certain other values both in a domestic and an international context.

6. The approach I would suggest involves the public proposal that both North and South Vietnam become members of the UN and that the UN mechanism be engaged to help settle the problem of Vietnam. There are several by-products of UN membership, of which I shall mention only a few. First, it would enable the Soviets and others to recognize the accredited existence in Saigon of a government which is chosen by means acceptable to the membership of the UN. This absolves them of their responsibility to seek only a Viet Cong dominated government. Secondly, it could address itself to the ultimate goal of unification and stipulate that goal as part of the purpose of membership. Thirdly, it would provide us with a quid pro quo against which we could suspend bombing operations in the North. Fourthly, it would represent a clear break with China and Chinese policies but in a manner not so violent as to induce Chinese Communist retaliation. Fifthly, it would be a revival of an old Soviet proposal and therefore presumably difficult for them to ignore.

7. I would further suggest that we take advantage of the proposal for North Vietnamese membership to extend our “peace offensive” to all East Asia. That is to say, I would include also dual membership for North and South Korea and dual reception in the General Assembly for Communist and Nationalist China. In other words, I would propose wrapping all three of these into one large and rather impressive initiative which would capture public imagination and at the same time give a positive thrust to our inevitable change of policy on the question of Chinese representation.

8. This device would, in my opinion, bring us for the first time into serious negotiations with the Soviets on the price which they will demand for some initiatives with respect to Vietnam. Because of the nature of the proposal, I think it is clear that we can expect their price to be expressed in some similar terms: namely membership applications for East and West Germany. This may not be the case, but it would seem logical to anticipate and they have already given some indication of this by their recent proposal of East Germany for UN membership. In any event, I think we must assume that the Soviet price would somehow or other be associated with the European area and the questions of military confrontation in Europe which are paramount in their relations with the U.S.

9. I do not believe that we need to accept the Soviet proposal for East German membership, and perhaps we could even give West Germany an assurance that we would not accept it. However, since it would probably be the opening Soviet bargaining counter, we would at least have to discuss it in the context of moving toward an acceptable price for Soviet services. It is conceivable that the price could be in some related field such as MLF, nuclear proliferation, etc. etc. Nevertheless, I do not feel that we should preclude the possibilities of opening discussions in this vein merely because the subject which the Russians will wish to discuss would be offensive to our German allies and unacceptable to our national interests.

10. It would be my suggestion that this blanket proposal be discussed with a limited number of countries to sound-out not only their points of view but also the possibilities of various tactics. For example, we might conclude that it would be the better part of valor to have the Canadians take the initiative on this whole proposal and have ourselves become involved only in bilateral discussions with the Russians to determine how much the traffic will bear.

11. I end where I began with the conclusion that we have not yet offered a practicable political route of escape for the North Vietnamese to use under our increasing military pressure. I would suggest, therefore, that this proposal be examined in that light and that discussion of it at an appropriate level within the U.S. Government begin immediately.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Sullivan was in Washington for consultations.
2. In a memorandum of July 1 to Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel called Sullivanʼs proposal a “non-starter and one we cannot afford, particularly at the risk of paying the price with no return whatsoever.” Stoessel contended that the steps proposed by Sullivan to get the negotiations started were unnecessary and would give the Soviet Union a political victory over Communist China “worth ten times the price of Soviet assistance in the rehabilitation of North Vietnam.” Moreover, the proposal would impair relations with West Germany and fuel suspicions in Europe that “we might be willing to sell European security interests for a solution to our problems in the Far East.” (Ibid.)