Attached is a brief assessment of Communist views of the present state of
the conflict in Vietnam. Attached also are compilations of selected
Communist statements on the current US diplomatic campaign and the lull
in bombing North Vietnam.2
Attachment
COMMUNIST VIEWS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE CONFLICT IN
VIETNAM
North Vietnam
The halt in US air strikes on North Vietnam, coupled with intensive
US efforts to elicit a positive response from Hanoi on negotiating
an end to the war, have thus far produced only biting denunciations
of US motives by the North Vietnamese and a stiffening of previously
stated North Vietnamese demands. Hanoiʼs failure to show interest in
discussions with the US on any but its own terms probably stems
largely from its belief that the military situation in South Vietnam
is still in its favor. Based on this belief, the North Vietnamese
apparently feel that ultimately the US will be forced to accept
Communist demands.
The North Vietnamese apparently see the current standdown in US air
attacks mainly as a welcome opportunity to repair bomb damage and to
step up the shipment of supplies to depots which support Communist
operations in South Vietnam. Hanoi probably hopes that by delaying
an official response to the US peace overtures it can prolong the
lull in air strikes.
The North Vietnamese public response to the US “peace offensive” also
appears to be calculated to reassure the Chinese Communists and [Page 93] the Viet Cong of Hanoiʼs
determination to continue the fight. To this end a series of
propaganda statements out of Hanoi during the past three weeks have
set forth three “actual deeds” which the US must perform to “prove”
its acceptance of North Vietnamʼs “four points.” These deeds are:
unconditional cessation of air strikes on North Vietnam,
unconditional withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam, and US
recognition of the National Front for the Liberation of South
Vietnam (NFLSV) as the representative of the South Vietnamese
people. In its propaganda statements, Hanoi has come closer than
ever before to suggesting that these “actual deeds” are
preconditions for negotiations.
Hanoi is doubtless also concerned over the success of the US peace
effort in convincing world opinion of US willingness to seek a quick
and reasonable end to the war. To counter this, Hanoi has attempted
to impugn US motives. A constant stream of propaganda since the
standdown in air strikes began has stressed the theme that the
bombing lull and the “peace offensive” are only a “cover up” for
further US escalation of the war.
NFLSV
The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam has largely
ignored the US moves. In its limited response, it has echoed Hanoiʼs
attacks on the US peace effort, characterizing it as a “trick”
designed to cover up further escalation of the war. Front spokesmen
have defiantly reaffirmed the determination of the Viet Cong to
continue fighting. The Front central committee has voiced its full
support for Hanoiʼs position on the US peace moves.
Communist China
Peking has responded to the US peace campaign and suspension of
bombing with a mounting propaganda attack which suggests that the
Chinese are uneasy about the possibility that their position is
being undercut in the non-aligned world—and perhaps also in Hanoi.
The Chinese have pumped out a flood of caustic editorials denouncing
the US effort as a “peace hoax” designed to prepare for further
escalation of the war if the Vietnamese Communists do not knuckle
under to US “blackmail.” Hanoi is repeatedly urged to continue the
fight until victory, and to reject any negotiated settlement except
on Communist terms.
This public position which is almost certainly being conveyed
privately to Hanoi, reflects Pekingʼs view that if the Communists
press on resolutely, the war in Vietnam can only end in victory.
Such a victory would take the Chinese a long way toward their
ultimate goal of driving the US out of Asia, and at the same time
strike a heavy blow at Moscow—Pekingʼs other principal enemy—by
validating Maoʼs formula for world revolution through “peopleʼs
war.”
[Page 94]
USSR
Moscow has assumed a notably cautious attitude with regard to the US
“peace offensive.” Soviet party secretary Shelepinʼs speeches during his
recent visit to Hanoi provide a good illustration of Soviet reserve
on this point. Despite the North Vietnamese leadersʼ repeated and
virulent denunciation of Washingtonʼs diplomatic efforts as
“deceitful,” Shelepin let
pass the opportunity to echo this view. He did point out, however,
in keeping with standard Soviet propaganda treatment, that the
“so-called peace initiative” coincides with a continued US buildup
in South Vietnam.
If, as seems likely, Shelepin encouraged the North Vietnamese to give
more serious consideration to recent US moves toward a political
solution, he was apparently unable to persuade them to modify their
tactics. The lack of any reference in the communique following
Shelepinʼs visit to
recent US probes is a sign that the two parties were unable to
achieve a consensus or even a compromise.
Soviet party chief Brezhnev, at a 15 January rally in Ulan Bator,
expressed doubt over Washingtonʼs “sincerity” and maintained that if
the US really wanted to end the war in Vietnam, it need only agree
to the “just demands” of the Vietnamese people.
Soviet propaganda has generally avoided any extensive commentary on
US diplomatic efforts, but has accompanied factual reportage of the
travels of US envoys with a moderate amount of routine remarks
alleging they were “cover” for further “aggression.” In reporting
North Vietnamese statements on the US diplomatic offensive and the
bombing standdown, Moscow has toned down Hanoiʼs particularly
abusive commentary. Privately, Soviet leaders have adopted a
generally non-committal stance on US peace initiatives, avoiding the
sharp, negative reaction Moscow has expressed over such moves in the
past.
While reacting with caution and reserve to the “peace offensive,” the
Soviet leaders apparently have not been overly optimistic regarding
its chances for success. Soviet president Podgorny is reported to
have told the French ambassador on 30 December that he was skeptical
that current US diplomatic efforts would induce Hanoi to
negotiate.
