118. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
138. For President and Sec State from Harriman. I had three hours and a quarter talk with Kosygin this morning in Stalin-Khrushchev old office in Kremlin. He was alone except for Smirnovsky, head of USA section Foreign Office and a notetaker. Sukhodrev interpreted for both of us. Kohler and Emb Off Brement accompanied me.
Kosygin was completely negative, in fact at times insulting though occasionally with a smile.
I told him I had no message or authority to negotiate but would gladly explain US position on any subject he wished and answer any questions. It was important to avoid any misunderstanding of each other’s intentions. For example, I gathered from Soviet press that they thought President Johnson had changed President Kennedy’s policies, whereas the fact was President Johnson was carrying on the same policies and objectives. I explained that President Johnson had sincerely desired to come to Soviet Union, meet and talk with him and his colleagues, that he believed in values of personal discussions and that he was anxious strengthen objective of peace by finding ways to overcome differences and settle disputes.
Kosygin commented that if I was finished with my statement, he would expound the Soviet positions in confidence and with expectation his remarks would not reach press. They had voted for Johnson against Goldwater although their ballots could not be counted, as they had hoped President Johnson’s election would make possible progress in our relations. Our bilateral relations, he maintained, were the most important subject in maintaining peace. He then listed six points which he considered most important (1) non-proliferation; (2) ending all nuclear tests; (3) reduction nuclear weapons; (4) reduction overall military expenditures; (5) increase in our commercial transactions; and (6) [Page 307] closer personal contacts. These problems were difficult of solution, but they had been hoping for progress and that trust and confidence between our two countries could be developed. Frankly they had lost confidence and he would state why. He said there were dangerous forces at work and mentioned West German revanchism. He also stated that there were others who want to bring our two nations at loggerheads.
Since President Johnson’s election antagonism had grown. The multilateral nuclear force in Europe was aimed at Soviet Union and US was thereby protecting German revanchism.
He went so far as to say the US had become a symbol of revanch-ism in Europe, (possibly having Eastern Europe in mind).
Furthermore the United States was trying to strangle national liberation movements everywhere in world. In this we would fail as attempts to strangle NLM’s had never been successful. Another factor, he said, is that unlike US, Soviet Govt always strictly abides by all understandings even informal and mentioned as example understanding with President Kennedy on voluntary arms reduction by mutual example. USSR had done its part in accordance with statement of Dobrynin to Secretary Rusk in cutting expenditures by 500,000,000 rubles, whereas we had increased our expenditures $700,000,000 to pay for “your war in Vietnam.” President Johnson had also made statements against the Soviet Union (he mentioned that I had done so also) and had ignored the Soviet Govt wishes in regard to MLF and other matters. He concluded this part of this statement by saying US cannot dictate to others by force.
I refuted his charges emphasizing MLF as a means of preventing proliferation in Europe of individual national nuclear capability. I tediously went through post war history of Soviet aggressive attitude in Europe under Stalin as basis for formation NATO.
A lighter touch arose when I pointed out MLF was a method by which a number of fingers had to pull the nuclear trigger. Kosygin asked why arrangement should not be truly multilateral thereby including the Soviet Union as well. I agreed that was an objective to which we could well address ourselves.
I underlined the dangerous situation that arose in Latin America and other areas where the Soviets support NLM’s that were in no sense indigenous but imported from outside. I referred specifically to Venezuela where terrorists were trained outside the country and were sent back with arms to attempt to overthrow a democratically elected government. This led at last to Vietnam. Kosygin asked if I truly believed there was a legitimate government in Saigon. I countered by asking him if he truly believed the NLF was an independent movement or aided and abetted by North Vietnam.
[Page 308]This led to another prolonged discussion in which he accused first me and then President Johnson of pretense contending “you can’t believe what you say.” I explained the hard information gained over last three and half years of Viet Cong direction and support by North Vietnam and questioned the validity of the sources of his information. He maintained that he knew the facts. At this point he indicated he had another engagement and had nothing more to say unless I had some constructive proposal. I referred to the fact that we hadn’t discussed our bilateral problems he had mentioned, including normalization of our commercial relations. He responded to this and asked how long I was remaining in the Soviet Union explaining he would be away till Monday evening on visit to Riga. It was arranged I would see Matskevich, new Agricultural Minister, whom I had known in 1959 and possibly take a trip outside Moscow. He agreed to see me on his return-hopefully Wednesday.
The conversation was tense at some moments and Kohler and I gained impression he was following a line agreed upon with his colleagues in advance.
I emphasized several times that he must understand President Johnson had overwhelming support of the Congress and the American people and that he would stand firm on the commitment taken by President Eisenhower a decade ago to the people of South Vietnam to protect their right to determine their own future and that North Vietnam would not be permitted to take over SVN by force. President Johnson was ready to undertake discussions without preconditions. Kosygin, however, said they could not influence this question. Hanoi was the responsible party and that we should approach them. He added “of course people with the noise of bombs in their ears are not anxious to negotiate.” He also complained that our actions are helping Peiping in its dispute against the Soviet Union.
More detailed blow by blow account follows.2
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- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL US–USSR. Secret; Immediate. According to another copy this telegram was drafted by Harriman, initialed by Kohler, and transmitted at 7:55 p.m. (Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Telegrams) Bundy forwarded the text of the telegram to the President under cover of a July 15 memorandum that stated: “What is striking is the rather routine character of Kosygin’s comments: a standard list of disarmament objectives, a standard attack on the MLF, a standard speech in favor of national liberation movements, and a standard exchange on Vietnam. I fully concur with Harriman’s judgment that Kosygin was working from an agreed Soviet line.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12)↩
- The more detailed account was transmitted in telegram 139 from Moscow, July 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL US–USSR) A memorandum of the conversation was transmitted in airgram A–120 from Moscow, July 22. (Ibid., POL 1 US–USSR)↩