119. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1

216. For President and SecState from Harriman. I met with Kosygin for one hour forty minutes this afternoon with same group except Troyanovsky was present as well as Smirnovsky.

He first asked me what I had been doing since we last met. I took this opportunity to explain my discussions with Matskevich and Rudnev,2 emphasizing mutual desire to expand exchanges. I added that they had told me of the areas in which they would like to increase trade. I mentioned also my talk with Plotnikov of Economic Institute.3

I then stated the following: “I am glad to be able to inform you that the President has read with great care my report on our conversation. The President shares your view that the US and USSR have heavy responsibilities for peace. You may be assured that US action in Vietnam will be what is necessary but only what is necessary to stop the armed attacks which have been mounted under the direction of Hanoi against the people and government of South Vietnam. The President agrees with your emphasis on (1) the tasks of disarmament; (2) the importance of direct bilateral relations between our two countries; and (3) the advantage of personal contact in appropriate circumstances. The President is now making a final review of our disarmament position for the meeting in Geneva. He hopes very much that the Soviet Union will join in a constructive approach to these problems and he agrees with the Chairman as to the special importance of non-proliferation”.4 As you see, I did not state the above as a message from the President.

In this connection, I told him that Mr. Foster would head the US Delegation at Geneva and asked him whether he could inform me who would head theirs. He said he couldn’t because the decision had not [Page 310] been reached but he could assure us that it would be a responsible official fully empowered to act and report and “not just sit on the fence”. Commenting on my statement as a whole, he said he was pleased to learn President is concerned about same problems that bothered him. He was personally convinced progress could be made on the questions which we had discussed and to which President had reacted if it were not for Vietnam. The Vietnamese problem is an impediment to the solution of many important problems such as disarmament, nuclear weapons and the like. It was his personal opinion that if it were not for Vietnam issue many approaches could be found to disarmament, possibly by a high level meeting, not necessarily in the Soviet Union or the United States, prior to a disarmament conference-a meeting of two or more heads of states or governments might reach prior understanding in principle and make conference more productive. On questions relating to nuclear arms and disarmament, no side can be dishonest since the truth will come out and destroy mutual confidence. Naturally, progress could be made by conventional methods but faster progress might be made by unconventional methods. The Vietnam problem which is a small problem in itself thus becomes large and influences all important issues.

In answer to my query as respects meeting, he replied his ideas were not worked out but he would not exclude either bilateral or multilateral high level meetings. For example, in connection with non-proliferation both forums could be useful. He emphasized real relief throughout the world if agreement in these fields could be reached.

I referred to the fact that UK, France and unfortunately Peiping now involved in nuclear question and asked him whether the problem of dealing with Chinese might be discussed bilaterally. Kosygin replied the Chinese were not the major issue. It was correct to say US and USSR are only real owners of nuclear weapons. Others are not now important. Today, however, science is developing inexpensive methods which will enable many to make nuclear weapons and then there will be no guarantees that a mad man like Hitler could not come along. This is why steps must be taken to prevent any proliferation and that is why American proposal to pool nuclear weapons which amounts to giving weapons to Germans, arouses such emotional opposition in USSR. Soviets would be forced to respond by sharing weapons with their own allies.

I commented President would fully share first part of his statement. But as respects MLF Secretary Rusk had pointed out to Gromyko Soviets should sign non-proliferation treaty and thus prevent forever independent possession nuclear weapons by Germany. Kosygin must believe that we do not want Germany to possess independent nuclear weapons, as we, like Soviets, had twice suffered from aggressive German leadership.

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Kosygin replied that we are mistaken when we say our policy would prevent acquisition nuclear weapons by Germany. He was convinced we are profoundly wrong and our policy has its effects in France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and indeed all over Europe. He stated: “The US pretends GDR does not exist. But it does exist and develops and a whole new generation has grown up which does not even know West Germany. US sets West Germans against East Germans and this puts us into conflict. US is particularly active in supporting West Germans against us, saying you do not wish offend the West Germans. I know many leaders in Western Europe; they are absolutely not interested or concerned about reunification of Germany.” He concluded that US support to this non-existent problem generates tensions. Question of Germany cannot be solved in a day. However, it could be handled in such a way so as to create difficulties or it could be handled so as to preserve quiet until the Germans themselves get together.

I pointed out US policy in support of unification of Germany had been established in 1946 and had not been changed since. We agreed this was matter that could not be settled at today’s meeting.

I then inquired just when he thought a high level meeting could be held on nuclear questions. Kosygin replied this would only take place when Vietnam issue leaves the scene. It would not be possible earlier since everybody would think meeting only discussing Vietnam. He believed such a meeting possible and necessary but only after achievement of political solution of Vietnam. What is immediately necessary is to end war in Vietnam as soon as possible.

I replied this is exactly what President wants as he has frequently stated. However, I had gathered from Kosygin Soviets would not consider this a matter in their hands but rather for Hanoi. I stressed again President does not consider US in conflict with USSR on Vietnam but only with aggression from North Vietnam against South Vietnam and hopes this issue will not interfere with progress in bilateral relations. I agreed meeting before Vietnam settlement would probably bring about world reaction he described, but stressed it was thus all the more important to get Vietnam issue to conference table as soon as possible.

Kosygin commented we had different approaches to Vietnam and he did not want to rehearse last talk. He was sure however that US was to blame for whole issue and all that is happening in Southeast Asia. He cited my reference to danger of conflict from miscalculations and said maybe this is exactly what is happening in Vietnam. I repeated that President would take necessary action—but only necessary action—to stop aggression. I respected Kosygin’s sincerity and supposed necessary let time and events and possibly intervention of mutual friends work matter out. However, I again stressed hope everything would be [Page 312] done to minimize influence this issue on our bilateral relations. I then referred to his observations in previous talk re military budget and presented statement giving figures in Deptel 190.5 (For record am submitting full text statement as made in septel.)6 Some discussion followed with Kosygin trying to insist $700 million Vietnam appropriation was an increase. I asked him to study carefully figures and he would see that Secretary Rusk’s statement to Gromyko of December 5 was valid.7 During discussion he claimed US and Soviet systems different since funds not expended by end fiscal year are terminated in USSR whereas US funds continue available. I immediately said Secretary McNamara was ready to appoint expert to meet either in Moscow or Washington to consult with Soviet expert re budgetary structure and practices, in order that there could be mutual understanding of each other’s methods. Kosygin responded that if issue were connected with disarmament measures then need might arise to examine each other’s procedures.

I then turned to questions of commercial and other bilateral relations. I pointed out progress in Congress on consideration of Consular Convention with hope for Civil Air Agreement to follow. I quoted from President’s May 7 statement that he plans recommend measures to Congress to increase flow peaceful trade.8 I said bill had been drafted and is now in the White House and I hope it will soon be sent to Congress. I then briefly described provisions of legislation, including authority to accord MFN in connection with trade agreements. I added President had authorized review of licensing policies. I then said if legislation were attained at this session it would make possible have serious negotiations which we hope would lead to an increase in trade between us.

I stated that we quite satisfied exchanges in space and desalination and hoped that this kind of cooperation could be expanded. In general, I hoped we could move ahead in scientific and cultural exchanges in all areas, regardless of unfortunate differences on Vietnam.

Kosygin replied he was grateful for what I had to say about status of such issues as Consular Convention, Civil Air Agreement and trade legislation. He said “we do want to develop cooperation and have no wish to restrict or limit it.” However, Vietnam issue cannot but have its reflection on all these matters. This is inevitable as situation “hamstrings us and you as well all along the line.” Soviets would like to do [Page 313] all they can to broaden and expand cooperation and hope US will do everything possible to end conflict in Vietnam.

I assured him President’s efforts were in that direction. While Soviet Union not responsible for Vietnam, President would welcome any quiet help to bring question to conference table, even though not publicized and Soviets not even able to speak about it. Kosygin reiterated Soviets are not authorized negotiate re Vietnam but again stressed “Vietnamese comrades would not exclude political settlement, bypassing the Chinese” (pomimo kitaitsev). He advised us to think over and study Pham Van Dong’s four points and if we wish, make counter-proposals to these (“think them over, turn them around, and send them to the North Vietnamese”). However, you will never settle the question by force, he said. You will only have more bloodshed and in end Vietnamese will finally liberate themselves from dependence on US, as people have elsewhere. It would be a blot on US and responsibility would inescapably lie on your President who by force of circumstances is responsible for all American actions. This would not be in his interest or in interest of American people.

I picked up his references to China and asked whether he could enlighten us further on Chinese attitudes towards settlement. He replied he could only repeat Vietnamese comrades do not rule out political settlement, but that is important, and naturally it would be on basis of retention 17th parallel. I asked whether he thought Peiping encouraged Hanoi to continue conflict. He replied, at first “Ask the Vietnamese.” Then, after prompting by his associates, added, “Or ask the Chinese yourselves in these talks you have in Warsaw, about which we know nothing.” I replied I could easily tell him about our talks with Chinese as they amounted to so little, and briefly described character of discussions.

As we were parting I thanked him for his reception and his frank talk. I stated it had always been my belief that with good will we could find solutions between us to difficult problems. To this he said he completely agreed, and added he believed that President felt same way. He asked me to convey his personal regards to President and state that if President could “extract himself from Vietnam” then he believed real progress could be made on the important problems between us.

Kohler
  1. Source: Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Telegrams. Secret; Immediate;Exdis. Initialed by Harriman and Kohler.
  2. A memorandum of the conversation with Vladimir V. Matskevich, Soviet Minister of Agriculture, July 17, was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A–143, July 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 USUSSR) A memorandum of Harriman’s conversation with Deputy Prime Minister Konstantin N. Rudnev, July 19, was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A–157 from Moscow, July 27. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN)
  3. A memorandum of the conversation with V.N. Plotnikov was transmitted as an attachment to airgram A–161 from Moscow, July 30. (Ibid.)
  4. A guidance along these lines was transmitted to Harriman in telegram 227 to Moscow, July 20, for the talk with Kosygin. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. X)
  5. Dated July 17. (Department of State, S/S-I Limdis/Exdis Microfilm, Reel 96)
  6. Dated July 21. (Ibid., Reel 97)
  7. See footnote 6, Document 76.
  8. For text of the statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 505–509.