Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

65. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 28, 1964, 7 p.m.

1333. While too soon to draw firm conclusions, I would venture some tentative propositions which seem to emerge from ouster of Khrushchev fortnight ago.

I. Internally. As a political system, Soviet Communist Party rule has been weakened and has acquired a new kind of institutionalized instability. The principle that Central Committee of the Party is the custodian and source of legitimacy, established by Khrushchev (in self-defense) in 1957, has now been successfully used against him, and thus confirmed. The door is thus open for maneuver, intrigue and conspiracy among rivals for power within this 170-odd member body, as well as within the Presidium proper.

Brezhnev is presently in best power position as Party First Secretary, but has been there too short a time to be in full control of party personnel and machinery. He is vain and ambitious and, in due course, may well be tempted to follow Khrushchev’s example by combining top party and government roles. Strongest challenger presently visible within leadership is Podgorny, whose toughness and ambition are both evident. Younger aspirants, like Polyansky, Kirilenko and Voronov, will probably remain in wings while rivalry of older group is played out.

Both governmental and party organizations have been disrupted by Khrushchev’s tactics. As he groped for ways to make an increasingly complex society work, economic management was first decentralized, then partly recentralized and then reorganized. The party was split functionally into agricultural and industrial sectors, a reform which, though still not fully implemented, clearly involved extensive dislocation and disgruntlement of party personnel and will probably be abandoned by the new leadership.

The Soviet elite in general—bureaucrats, managers, scientists, intelligentsia—was practically unscathed by the changes. Indeed, the reaction of its membership ranged from indifference to pleasure. It is this elite which collectively keeps Soviet society ponderously rolling forward, and it will presumably continue to do so under almost any conceivable conditions.

Since the dismissal of Marshal Zhukov, the military seems to have been brought under firmer party control and they played no direct role in the Khrushchev ouster (other than as individual party figures). However, the marshals loom in the background, representing a power potential which must be satisfied and contained. In a condition of continuing struggle for party power, they might be called upon for support by one or the other aspirant. However, the military establishment is unlikely to play an independent political role unless the party situation should deteriorate beyond anything now foreseeable.

The Communist Party system of rule is farther removed from the people. The extent to which they were already conditioned by the de-Stalinization campaign was visible in the widespread apathy to recent events, and the ouster and obliteration of the image of Khrushchev can only increase popular skepticism, even cynicism, toward their Communist rulers. It is paradoxical that such should be the net result of the efforts of the first ruler in Russian history who actively sought public favor and support.

II. In the Communist World. In the Communist world, there is likely to be a truce in the Sino-Soviet conflict, but no real reconciliation. The conflict is basically national in nature, and in the struggle within the world Communist movement, the Soviet position has been weakened by the change. With the disappearance of Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung remains the only old-line world-known Communist figure, with no visible Russian rivals of significant stature. His works circulate everywhere, at a time when Khrushchev’s declarations are being withdrawn and discredited in his own country. It is not credible that Mao will offer terms for settlement of the conflict which the Soviet side could possibly accept.

While the main immediate purpose of Khrushchev’s ouster was to check the increasing loss of influence and support inside world communism, the new leadership has in fact only avoided a looming crisis at the cost of weakening the Soviet position for the continuing struggle. If Khrushchev could not exert authority over the Eastern and Western European parties, a Brezhnev or a Kosygin cannot be expected to deal successfully with the more prestigious figures in the Soviet family, such as Gomulka, Kadar, Tito, and even Gheorghi Dej. That this is the case seems already confirmed by current European Communist reaction to recent events here.

III. In the Outside World. I believe the fears of the Afro-Asians that the Soviets might shift from supporting “national, democratic” governments to supporting local Communist parties are unjustified. Not only has the new leadership reaffirmed its policies of a united front against “imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism”, but the dynamics of Moscow’s continuing struggle against Chinese orthodoxy requires the Sovs to continue along this line in practice. On the other hand, it is clear that one of the major charges against Khrushchev was his lavishness with foreign aid and his successors will examine much more carefully just what they can expect from their investments in such places as India, Egypt, Algeria and Cuba.

The immediate implications for us of the changed leadership seem fairly obvious; the long-range ones less so. The new regime will be more cautious in its approach to the West in the dual sense that it will eschew policies which may result in direct US-Soviet military confrontation and at the same time will be less enthusiastic than Khrushchev in finding areas of common interest, with the US in particular. Latter, of course, will be function of changed Sov tactics in their dispute with Peiping. In sum, there will be no 1962 Cuba, nor will there be any spirit of Camp David.

We do not envisage any substantive change in Sov positions on major issues, but style of diplomacy will be totally different, at least until collectivity phase runs its course. We have seen the last of personal, off-the-cuff remarks on major policy issues. Soviet spokesmen will follow carefully prepared briefs, whether in public or in private. Such more orthodox diplomacy may, in fact, be an advantage for us in that we should have a clearer understanding of Soviet positions, undiluted by Khrushchevian bombast.

IV. Far Horizons. If one dares look far into the future, the long-range prospect, after a period of temporizing and muddling, would seem to be for the evolution of Soviet society in the direction of a national socialist state in loose association with Communist Parties which have won power or lost their revolutionary elan, while the ChiComs develop a small but tight and expanding organization dedicated to perpetuating Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolutionary orthodoxy.

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.