Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

295. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 15, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Minutes, NSC Special Committee

6:30 p.m., Thursday, 15 June, Cabinet Room

1. In response to the Libyan Government’s request that we withdraw from Wheelus Base, the Committee approved instructing Ambassador Newsom to reply that, in accordance with our position in 1964, we are prepared to resume discussions leading to withdrawal—no timetable to be specified. The consensus was that if King Idris wants us to leave, we have no choice.

2. The Committee noted progress made in readying equipment for a water drop to Egyptian stragglers in the Sinai Desert and agreed that we should make public our offer to the International Committee of the Red Cross to make planes available. The Committee also agreed to expedite our reply to a plea from the Vatican on this subject.

3. The Committee revised and approved messages instructing approaches to the Foreign Ministers of Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon before the proposed meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers.² A separate response to King Hussein’s request for assurance of future arms supplies was also approved, explaining our hope to avoid another arms race.³

4. The Committee instructed Assistant Secretary Solomon to discuss with Aramco officials their interpretation of Saudi Arabian oil export limitations to include jet fuel for Vietnam. The consensus was that we should not acquiesce.

McG. B.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Minutes and Notes. Secret.
2. See Document 296. Telegrams 211605 to Beirut, 211610 to Rabat, and 211611 to Jidda, all dated June 14, are similar but not identical. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR)
3. Telegram 211613 to Amman, June 15, stated that the United States hoped to avoid a new arms race in the Middle East and therefore was not approving any export licenses or any further shipments under the Military Assistance Program to any of the participants in the conflict “at this time.” It also instructed the Embassy to assure King Hussein of U.S. concern with Jordan’s security and to tell him there had been no U.S. decision in principle against supplying arms to Jordan. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 US–JORDAN)