Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

471. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 13, 1967, 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

At breakfast this morning, Sect. Rusk and Arthur Goldberg agreed that we should shift off our present position on to a draft like the attached.² This draft, while stating certain broad principles would, operationally, take the issue of negotiations out of the hands of the U.S. and USSR and put it in the hands of a mediator. There is quiet agreement that the mediator would be Ambassador Jarring, now Swedish Ambassador to Moscow.

The reasons are the following:

1. The Soviet Union has been trying to achieve an interpretation of our earlier Joint Resolution which would lean heavily favorable to the Arabs, unfavorable to Israel; that is, it would lean heavily on troop withdrawals and will have everything else fuzzy.

2. Arthur, on the other hand, has been trying to get everything so clear beforehand that in fact it would pretty nearly constitute a settlement.

3. In the face of this situation, Sect. Rusk and Arthur want to put in the attached new resolution which calls for no act at the beginning; reiterates your 5 points; contains basic language incorporating Arab as well as Israeli principles; but throws the work into the hands of a mediator.

4. The resolution would be introduced not by the U.S. but by some other party; perhaps the Finns and Swedes would float it, or the British.

5. Arthur would have the task of talking with the Russians about this and explaining that this resolution, in effect, is a way of doing what they have urged; namely, to have a resolution which each party could, for the time being, interpret in his own way until they became gripped of a negotiating process via an intermediary.

6. Your 5 principles are put into this draft because Riad, the Egyptian, has said that they “have no objection” to your 5 principles. We think the Israelis will buy this; and it may be that the Arabs will also, because they have been saying that the U.S. position has been hardening;” but we shall see.

My own feeling is that if we were to pursue the US/USSR resolution on Arthur’s track of making it explicit, this could only be done if the US/USSR were, in fact, the mediators in this crisis, getting into all details, and especially into the sequence of negotiation of the various issues in the Middle East. It may be the part of wisdom to get the U.S. and USSR out of that position, working on the flanks of a mediator, if we can get a consensus on this procedure.

With respect to detail, it is unlikely that the “arms race” phrase will survive; and the paragraph on the second page beginning with “affirming” may be either modified, or go.

Walt

Attachment

The Security Council.

Having further considered the grave situation in the Middle East,

Affirming that the Security Council has an obligation to bring about a just and durable peace in which every state in the area can be assured security,

Bearing in mind the resolutions adopted and proposals considered by the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, and the resolutions adopted and actions taken by the Security Council in considering this matter.

Considering that the Charter calls upon all member states to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors;

Recalling the Charter requirement that a member state act in accordance with the following principles:

1. That the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members;

2. That member states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

3. That they shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any states or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the Charter;

Declaring that these principles require for their full implementation a context of peace, based on the recognized right of national life for all states, justice for refugees, free and innocent maritime passage, limits on a wasteful and destructive arms race, and political independence and territorial integrity for all,

Affirming, in light of the foregoing, that none of the states in the area should maintain forces on the territory of another state against its will or persist in refusing to withdraw them, or claim the right to assert or pursue a state of belligerency against another state or persist in refusing to recognize its sovereign existence and right to live in security.

1. Requests the Secretary General to designate a special representative to work with the parties concerned with a view to assisting them in the implementation of this resolution and establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

2. Requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council advised of the progress and results of the efforts of the representative.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 7. Secret. The handwritten notation “For 11 a.m. meeting” appears at the top of the page. The President met from 11:05 to 11:32 a.m. on October 13 with Bundy, Rusk, Goldberg, Rostow, Battle, Sisco, and Pedersen to discuss a possible draft resolution on the Middle East. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found.
2. In addition to the attached draft resolution, an unsigned, undated memorandum from Rusk to the President is also attached. It recommended that he authorize Goldberg to initiate consultations with the United Kingdom and with other delegations on the basis of the draft resolution.