Office of the Historian
  1. Home
  2. Historical Documents
  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967
  4. Document 524

524. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1

Washington, November 13, 1967.

SUBJECT

  • The Situation in New York, November 13–4:00 P.M.

It is increasingly unlikely we can forestall the introduction of the Latin American’s resolution. Their present plans are to put it in tomorrow. (Text at Tab A.)2 The withdrawal clause is identical to the LA resolution in the GA last summer—which we voted for (“Israel to withdraw all its forces from all territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict”).3

It is pretty clear the Israelis won’t buy the LA resolution. Its withdrawal phraseology is even worse from their point of view than the Indian one.

We have just talked to Lord Caradon, who has his own compromise resolution (Tab B).4 The Israelis don’t like this resolution either, but it is beginning to look increasingly attractive when compared to the viable alternatives. We are encouraging Lord Caradon—without committing ourselves on the text—to talk with the parties and see if he can get some measure of Israeli cooperation. He will have to make changes in text to accomplish this, as the Israelis strongly oppose his present formulation.

Discussion of the Japanese text (Tab C)5 does not seem very active at the moment—probably because the Arabs are climbing onto the LA draft (with its history of U.S. support). The Japanese draft is not substantially different in its withdrawal clause from the LA text.

We expect to make one more effort to hold off the Latin Americans. The problem is that their resolution would have nine votes. Its weakness is that Israeli non-cooperation would make it extremely difficult for the UN representative to be useful and effective. [Page 1033] If the members of the Security Council can be convinced of this, the LA’s might be prevailed upon not to press their resolution to a vote and withdraw in favor of a modified British draft.

Both the Indian and U.S. drafts are fading. If the LA’s really push their draft, we shall have a difficult decision on how to vote. The prospects are for furious maneuvering between now and Wednesday,6 when the Security Council next meets. Our efforts will be directed at convincing the parties that Israeli cooperation (and our own) are worth compromising for.

ND
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Vol. 7. Secret. A copy was sent to Saunders.↩
  2. The tabs are attached but not printed. Tab A is telegram 2200 from USUN, November 13. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN.↩
  3. See footnote 4, Document 340.↩
  4. Telegram 2178 from USUN, November 11; see footnote 2, Document 517.↩
  5. The relevant portion of telegram 2027 from USUN, November 7; see footnote 2, Document 511.↩
  6. November 15.↩