61. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson
1
Washington, May 25, 1967, 6 p.m.
[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not
declassified]
Also attached is a CIA appraisal of this
estimate which throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli
estimate.2
P.S. The two estimates—Israeli and CIA—both show how explosive are:
- —Israeli anxieties;
- —Nasser’s hopes of
picking up prestige;
- —USSR desires for gaining
prestige, short of a war.
[Page 104]
Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR
- Mr. Bromley Smith,
White House
- Mr. Rusk, State
- Mr. Eugene Rostow,
State
- Mr. Hughes,
State
- Mr. McNamara,
Defense
- General Carroll, Defense
SUBJECT
- Appraisal of an estimate of the Arab-Israeli Crisis by the
Israeli Intelligence Service
- 1.
- The Director has asked that an appraisal be made of the
“Israeli Intelligence Estimate of the Israeli-Arab Crisis,”
dated 25 May 1967, a copy of which has already been sent to
you.4 The
appraisal follows.
- 2.
- We do not believe that the Israeli appreciation presented [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] was a serious estimate of the sort they
would submit to their own high officials. We think it is
probably a gambit intended to influence the US to do one or more
of the following: (a) provide military supplies, (b) make more
public commitments to Israel, (c) approve Israeli military
initiatives, and (d) put more pressure on Nasser. The bases for our
disagreement with the Israeli view follow.
- 3.
-
Not all the statements in paragraph 2 are confirmed by what
we now know. According to our information:
Only the 3rd Brigade of the Fourth Armored Division is in
Sinai
- A.
- The Fifteenth Armored Brigade has been ordered to
leave Yemen.
- B.
- We have no information on the formation of a
Second Army Group.
- C.
- We are unaware of any message from the Iraqi
Ambassador in Cairo informing Baghdad of the UAR’s military
aims.
- D.
- We know of no UAR
naval vessels which have left the Red Sea and
entered the Mediterranean.
- E.
- The UAR Defense
Minister did go to Moscow, but we know nothing of
his plans.
In our view, UAR military
dispositions in Sinai are defensive in character.
- 4.
-
Nasser has already had
significant success in exploiting the crisis to restore his
influence and acceptance at home and abroad as leader of all the
Arabs. He probably realizes that these gains would be quickly
reversed if he were humiliated or suffered military defeat. He
probably calculates, however, that his interests would be
satisfied by any resolution of the crisis other than humiliation
or defeat. He may not regard military victory over Israel as
essential to his ends.
- 5.
- We believe that the UAR is
acting in this crisis essentially to put pressure on Israel
short of attack on Israeli soil. Whereas the UAR armed forces have improved in
capability during the past decade, Nasser still probably estimates that he does not
have—even with the support of the other Arabs—the capability to
destroy Israel by a military attack. On the other hand,
Nasser shows
increasing willingness to pursue a policy of high risk in
challenging Israeli interests, such as free access to the port
of Elath. Nasser may be
convinced that his armed forces are sufficiently strong to be
able successfully to hold off an Israeli attack at least for
long enough to get great power intervention. Nasser evidently estimates that
his ability to inflict damage through bombing on Israeli cities
would discourage an Israeli attack.
- 6.
- The steps taken thus far by Arab armies do not prove that the
Arabs intend an all-out attack on Israel. The Iraqis have long
been obliged to send troops to assist Israel’s Arab neighbors in
case of conflict. The Iraqis simply lack the ability to send
meaningful amounts of troops to fight against Israel. They are
not prepared to supply and maintain sizeable units in a
conflict. Lebanon’s military capability is insignificant and the
Lebanese are likely to participate in a conflict only to the
minimum extent consistent with maintaining relations with the
other Arab world. There have been no coordinated maneuvers by
the various Arab states and it would be difficult if not
impossible for the various Arab units cited in paragraph 3 of
the Israeli estimate to be used in concert. In sum we believe
these are merely gestures which all Arab states feel compelled
to make in the interests of the fiction of Arab unity, but have
little military utility in a conflict with Israel.
- 7.
- As for the report that the Egyptians are preparing to use
chemical warfare in the Sinai, the use of gas in this terrain
and in mobile engagement would be difficult if not entirely
counterproductive for the UAR.
And given Israeli air defense, we do not believe that the UAR has the capability to make
effective use of gas against urban concentrations.
- 8.
- We believe the Soviet aim is still to avoid military
involvement and to give the US a black eye among the Arabs by
identifying it with Israel. Once this is accomplished—and this
is happening fast—we think that the Soviets will not wish to
increase the crisis further. They probably fear an Israeli
victory over the Arabs and that it would damage their image as
defender of the Arabs. They probably could not openly help the
Arabs because of lack of capability, and probably would not for
fear of confrontation with the US.
