129. Memorandum of Conversation1
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE NINTH COUNCIL MEETING OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION
Manila, April 13–15, 1964
PARTICIPANTS
-
United States
- The Secretary of State
- William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
- Carl F. Salans, Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs
-
France
- Maurice Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Jacques de Beaumarchais, Director of the Ministerʼs Cabinet
- Robert Gillet, Assistant Director of Political Affairs
SUBJECT
- Cambodia
Couve said Cambodia was the only country in Southeast Asia that had national leadership, was not divided, had no Communist party and was sincerely trying to be noncommitted. [1 line of source text not declassified] He said Sihanouk has an obsession that the Chinese Communists are going to extend their power to one side or another of Cambodia. He therefore wants a “guarantee” of Cambodiaʼs neutrality—which means a guarantee by the United States and China.
In substance, Couve continued, there are two problems: 1) “guaranteed neutrality,” and 2) settlement of boundaries with Viet-Nam and Thailand. With respect to Cambodia-Thai borders, there seemed to be no question of substance because there was no dispute. The Secretary agreed. Regarding the Vietnamese-Cambodian border, the disputes over certain islands and the Khmer Krom problems were not insoluble.
Couve informed the Secretary that Sihanouk had sent DeGaulle another letter (Couve received a copy in Tokyo), the substance of which he would relate to the Secretary. In the letter Sihanouk said his aim remained the convening of a conference of nine powers of the 1954 Geneva type. But, he continued, the opposition of the United States, Viet-Nam and Thailand to a Geneva conference where they feared to be criticized had led him to look to the conclusion of an agreement with those [Page 298] powers. Today, he believed, such a restricted meeting was impossible. Sihanouk said he would facilitate DeGaulleʼs task by making a new attempt to reach bilateral agreements with Cambodiaʼs two neighbors if the French can obtain the agreement of the United States to get the Thais to agree to bilateral talks either at Phnom Penh or Bangkok. There can be no question, Sihanouk continued, of contesting Thai-Cambodian boundaries as established by relevant treaties and the decision of the International Court of Justice. Sihanouk suggested that in the agreement to be negotiated between Thailand and Cambodia, the two countries could affirm mutual respect for present frontiers which are immutable. (The Secretary and Mr. Bundy suggested that these words used in Sihanoukʼs letter might be acceptable to Thailand. Couve said it was not clear from Sihanoukʼs letter whether the Prince was suggesting a precise formula of words to be put in an agreement and abandoning his position that all the treaties and the ICJ decision must be cited in any such agreement.) With respect to Viet-Nam, Sihanouk reiterated in his letter his desire for boundary regulation and for a resumption of normal relations. However, he said, he must take into account the precarious situation of the Saigon Government. He could not mortgage the future of Cambodia by an agreement with that government unless such agreement is rapidly confirmed by a Geneva conference (i.e., by North Viet-Nam and the Communists). Negotiations with Saigon are thus dependent on the fixing of a date for a Geneva conference.
Couve thought it would be a good thing to keep the dialogue going with Sihanouk. Couve said that when he saw Thanat he was going to discuss this with him, if the Secretary thought it would be useful, in the hope that Thailand could do something to this end, apart from a conference. Couve added that a conference without the United States, Thailand and Viet-Nam would be meaningless.
The Secretary said one of our problems has been that we donʼt know what to expect from Sihanouk from week to week. Another has been that we canʼt have private conversations with Sihanouk; everything is public. Sihanouk thinks that we control the Thais and Vietnamese and can tell them what to do. Of course, this is not the case. Cambodiaʼs problems are with its neighbors; but they are not insurmountable. The Thais are reluctant in an agreement to cite treaties which they say the French imposed on them. The Secretary thought it would be good for Couve to talk to Thanat about Cambodia. With respect to Viet-Nam the problem is control of the borders and the use by the Viet Cong of Cambodian territory. Cambodia and Viet-Nam must work out joint border controls. The Secretary thought the prospect of Viet-Nam and Cambodia getting together was good.
The Secretary said the United States had responded favorably to Sihanoukʼs quadripartite proposal 1) because the problem was primarily [Page 299] between Cambodia and its neighbors and 2) to satisfy Sihanoukʼs desire for some assurance from us regarding Thai and Vietnamese behavior. If bilateral agreements were reached, Thai and Vietnamese presence at Geneva would become unimportant. In no event will Viet-Nam go to Geneva; and we canʼt make them. The Vietnamese are afraid that a Geneva conference would get involved in the discussion of the “neutralization” of South Viet-Nam. They donʼt know what that means and neither do we, said the Secretary. Unless we know what the result is going to be, we canʼt go to a Geneva conference for fear that the Thais and Vietnamese will think we let them down in a very important way.
Couve thought it essential that the United States attend a Geneva conference or at least sign a Geneva agreement, which is the same thing. The Secretary replied that if Sihanouk was really interested in substance, he could cover the various countries concerned in different ways. He could have a Geneva conference and the United States might stay away from Geneva.
The Secretary said we have no problem with the end in view for Cambodia, namely, neutrality. But we are not going to guarantee Cambodian neutrality. The Secretary asked Couve whether France was prepared to put three divisions into Cambodia to guarantee Cambodiaʼs neutrality. Couve replied that France didnʼt have three divisions. He said a guarantee is not necessarily undertaken by a commitment of military forces. The value of an agreement guaranteeing Cambodiaʼs neutrality, Couve thought, was that if China violated Cambodian neutrality in the future, it would be an international matter which the parties could raise rather than resorting to the use of military force.
The Secretary said that we have a formal agreement regarding Laotian neutrality. Still the Viet Minh keep troops in Laos and use Laos as a corridor to South Viet-Nam. What good is such an agreement?
Couve said the situation in Laos was dominated by the situation in Viet-Nam; as long as the latter remained unsettled, so would the former. Secondly, Couve stated, the Geneva settlement didnʼt change much on the Pathet Lao side or on Phoumiʼs side. (The Secretary interjected that it changed the United Statesʼ side. We got almost completely out of Laos, but the Viet Minh didnʼt.) Thirdly, Laos was divided into three factions. Cambodia is not so divided.
The Secretary thought a very constructive next step would be bilateral talks. The United States would do what it could to assure success of such talks. Couve agreed that for the time we could stop at that. We would see later about any further developments. However, Couve warned that Sihanouk had put a condition on bilateral talks—that there be prior agreement to hold a Geneva conference.
[Page 300]The Secretary asked Couve whether he considered Sihanoukʼs talk about security arrangements with China a bluff. [1 line of source text not declassified]
Couve indicated that Sihanoukʼs visit to Paris was set for June 23.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, SEATO 3. Secret. This memorandum, part I of a two-part conversation, was drafted by Salans and approved by S on April 16. The meeting was held at the Embassy chancery.↩