120. Statement Prepared by the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) for President
Johnson1
Washington, June 27, 1967.
I issued in March 1966 NSAM 341, after a
thoroughgoing review of governmental organization in the field of
foreign affairs conducted by General Taylor.
My decision was to assign responsibility for the direction, coordination
and supervision of overseas interdepartmental activities to the
Secretary of State. A key part of that decision was to activate the
Senior Interdepartmental Group, which was to be chaired by the Under
Secretary of State and to include those at the Under Secretary level
from the various departments and from the White House.
The simple fact is that for 15 months now NSAM 341 has not been implemented.
I have felt the lack on many issues; for example, the Middle East, Viet
Nam, counterinsurgency problems in Latin America.
I have come to the conclusion that either the Department of State must
now energetically and effectively implement NSAM 341—and, especially, make the Senior Interdepartmental
Group perform its functions—or I shall have to organize this kind of
leadership and coordination out of the White House.
Attachment2
Washington, May 20, 1967, 11:40
a.m.
Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to President Johnson
Mr. President:
Herewith Gen. Taylor raises a real and serious
problem.
[Page 278]
We thought we had it solved with the Schelling appointment—after
great delay. But he’s bailed out.
Gene tells me he has recommended Franklin Lindsay for the Schelling
job; but action apparently awaits Nick’s return.
I believe it essential that Sec. Rusk understand your personal concern that NSAM 341 has not been effectively
implemented.
Attachment3
Washington, May 17, 1967.
Memorandum From the President’s Special Consultant
(Taylor) to President Johnson
SUBJECT
- Implementation of NSAM-341,
dated March 2, 1966
Shortly after my return from Saigon in 1965, you directed me to
review all governmental activities in the field of counterinsurgency
and to make appropriate recommendations to assure our readiness to
cope with other situations similar to that in South Viet-Nam. The
principal outcome of this review was the promulgation of NSAM-341 in March, 1966.
The effect of this decision on your part was to assign responsibility
for the direction, coordination and supervision of overseas
interdepartmental activities to the Secretary of State as your agent
who was to be assisted by the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) chaired by the Under Secretary of
State and including as members the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Administrator, AID, Chairman, JCS, Director, USIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. The SIG
was to absorb the responsibility in the field of counterinsurgency
which, since 1962, had been concentrated in the Special Group
(CI) and, in addition, was to
serve as a focal point for decisions on all important
interdepartmental matters arising overseas.
During the past year, I have naturally watched the implementation of
this decision with great interest, hoping that the procedures
directed by NSAM-341 would bring
method and flexibility into the conduct of our overseas business and
remove our dependence on the initiative of individual officials or
on ad hoc committees which, in the past, have often been improvised
to deal with critical overseas issues.
[Page 279]
I regret to say that it is my opinion as a bystander that the SIG and the supporting
interdepartmental committees at the level of the Assistant
Secretaries of State have not fulfilled the hopes which we had for
them more than a year ago. Far from being a forum regularly used by
senior officials to discharge expeditiously their interrelated
overseas problems, the SIG has met
with decreasing frequency during the last year. In the last six
months of 1966, the SIG met three
times and has met only twice in 1967. It is significant that it has
taken no part in the conduct of our most serious and complicated
overseas operation-Viet-Nam. I find little indication on the agenda
of its infrequent meetings of any serious attention to
counterinsurgency and matters related to “Wars of Liberation,” a
task which required almost weekly meetings on the part of the old
Special Group (CI). My overall
impression is that the intent of NSAM-341 has been only partially fulfilled and that
whatever vitality the new system had at the outset is apparently on
the decline.
Rather than allow the NSAM concept
to die from atrophy as it seems to be doing, I would suggest at
least one final look to see whether we should formally abandon it,
try again to set it in motion, or seek a better alternative. There
are several courses you might consider. (1) One would be to ask the
heads of all departments and agencies represented on the SIG to comment to you on the
effectiveness of the NSAM-341
concept, the desirability of its retention, and the possibility for
improved implementation. (2) Another would be to ask only the
Secretary of State to make such a report. (3) A third would be to
ask some outsider with government experience to review the situation
for you. Personally, I would be inclined to recommend the first
course with Walt Rostow
charged with getting the views of the SIG members.
I prepared a memorandum for you of this nature in March of this
year4 but withheld it because of
information which I had received that Dr. Tom Schelling of Harvard
was being sought by State to become an Assistant Secretary with the
primary mission of assisting in the implementation of NSAM-341. As I am now informed that
Dr. Schelling has declined
the position, I would feel remiss in not calling this situation to
your attention.
Alternative______approved5
No action now
See me
