Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations

449. Intelligence Information Cable¹

Washington, January 31, 1964.

COUNTRY

• Cyprus

DATE OF INFO.

• 30 January 1964

SUBJECT

• Views of Patriotic Front Official on Archbishop Makarios’ Stand Regarding NATO Involvement

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] DATE ACQ.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (31 January 1964)

REF

• IN 10061

TDCS–3/571,670

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

1. Archbishop Makarios will find it very difficult to accept the involvement of NATO in the Cyprus crisis either with troops on the ground or in the search for a political solution. This is because articulate opinion among the Greek Cypriots and among the masses insofar as this can be ascertained has taken a sharp turn towards reliance on the Soviet Union. This is particularly true of right-wing nationalist opinion, formerly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, which has undergone an emotional trauma under the fear of Turkish invasion and the official pronouncements of Soviet support for the Greek Cypriot cause. Many prominent and representative Greek Cypriot nationalists assert that now that the Soviet Union has stepped in, Cyprus has no need for NATO, which has done nothing to restrain the Turks. Calling in NATO will thus be strenuously opposed by Greek Cypriot Communists, nationalists, and even right-wing extremists.

2. Even if Makarios feels that a solution through NATO is called for, his psychological make-up is such that he will not press for it against virtually unanimous opposition. Makarios still smarts under the accusation that he is responsible for the London-Zurich agreements² and is thus a traitor to the Greek Cypriot cause. He has often stated he will not bear this taint indefinitely and that he would upset the agreements at the first possible moment. To protect himself from a similar charge in the future, Makarios’ current attitude is not to take the initiative for a solution at all but to call meetings of representative people so that they can recommend to him the course the Greek Cypriot side should adopt. He thus intends to follow public opinion rather than try to form it. In the current state of anti-Western feeling in all strata of the Greek Cypriot population no demand whatever will be heard for a solution through NATO or for calling in NATO forces.

3. Some formerly Western-oriented leaders are so virulently opposed to the involvement of NATO that, should he assent to it, they are capable of turning on Makarios and trying to depose him. He is aware that this is a possibility. It is conceivable also that, barring a turn of public opinion, some irreconcilables who are sufficiently well armed will provoke incidents against elements of the NATO forces if they do come to Cyprus.

4. (Field Comment: The above analysis predates the meeting with Makarios on 31 January of U.S. Ambassador Wilkins and U.K. Acting High Commisioner Cyril Pickard to propose the use on Cyprus of forces from NATO countries.)³

5. Field Dissem: State, Army, EUCOM, CINCSOUTH (personal) and CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCMEAFSA.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret: No Foreign Dissem.
2. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 765–775.
3. Reported in telegram 579 from Nicosia, January 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP)