Summary

Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations

(This is not an official statement of policy by the Department of State; it is intended only as a guide to the contents of this volume.)

Since 1861, the Department of State’s documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States has constituted the official record of the foreign policy and diplomacy of the United States. Historians in the Office of the Historian collect, arrange, and annotate the principal documents comprising the record of American foreign policy. The standards for the preparation of the series and the general deadlines for its publication are established by the Foreign Relations of the United States statute of October 28, 1991 (22 USC 4351, et seq.). Volumes in the Foreign Relations series are published when all the necessary editing, declassification, and printing steps have been completed.

The documents in this volume are drawn from the centralized indexed files of the Department of State and the decentralized Bureau, Office, and other lot files of the relevant Departmental units. The editors also make extensive use of Presidential and other papers at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, as well as recordings of President Johnson’s telephone conversations. In addition, the volume includes records of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Almost all of the documents printed here were originally classified. The Information Response Branch of the Office of IRM Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, in concert with the appropriate offices in other agencies or governments, carried out the declassification of the selected documents.

Volume XXXIII consists of two parts. The first part deals with the Organization and Management of Foreign Policy and the second with U.S. policy toward the United Nations. The following is a summary of the most important issues covered in each part. Parenthetical citations are to numbered documents in the text.

Summary: Organization and Management of Foreign Policy

The portion of volume XXXIII concerning the Organization and Management of Foreign Policy is divided into three chapters: The Department of State and the Coordination and Supervision of Foreign Policy; The National Security Council and the President; and The Director of Central Intelligence, the Intelligence Community and the White House. Major issues include: efforts to improve the management of the Department of State and strengthen its overall direction and coordination of U.S. foreign policy; the increasingly informal operation of the National Security Council and the enhanced role of the National Security Adviser and his staff, despite the consideration given to downgrading his function; problems confronted by the Director of Central Intelligence in coordinating the intelligence community, exercising influence over the National Reconnaissance Office, and advising the President; and the reexamination of the approval process for covert actions.

The Department of State and the Coordination and Supervision of Foreign Policy

Women and African-Americans in the State Department

In conversations with top Department of State officials and with National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) leader Roy Wilkins, President Johnson made it clear from the outset of his administration that one of his goals was to appoint more women and African-Americans to ambassadorial and other high-level positions. “Have you got any good women that you can appoint as an ambassador?” the President asked Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann in February 1964, much the same question he pointedly put to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Under Secretary George Ball on other occasions during early 1964. (2, 3, 4, 35, 61) By July the President had appointed two women as ambassadors; he appointed two more before leaving office. Johnson also sought high positions for African-Americans but without much success. He encountered stiff resistance from Senator William Fulbright, for example, when he proposed appointing a black as Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. (40) Nor did Deputy Under Secretary for Administration William Crockett see much progress in the Department’s broader program to recruit African-Americans into the Foreign Service. (54, 66, 72)

Improving the Effectiveness of the Department of State

During the summer of 1964 Rusk expressed concern that reaction time in the Department was too slow and that problems were not adequately anticipated and dealt with, deficiencies he thought were tied in part to excessive “layering,” including the seemingly unnecessary position of Office Director. Management consultants, however, blamed poor communication between Rusk and his assistant secretaries and recommended regular meetings and much clearer delineation by Rusk of what he expected of his assistant secretaries. (12) Following President Johnson’s election in November both Rusk and Crockett proposed a number of organizational and managerial changes to enhance the effectiveness of foreign policy operations. Both emphasized the importance of freeing up Under Secretary Ball’s time to enable him to act as Rusk’s “alter ego” and the “operating head” of the Department. (13, 15, 16)

In a 6-page memorandum to the President written the day following Johnson’s inauguration (January 21, 1965), McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, provided his own diagnosis of the Department’s managerial problems. (17) “The Department of State probably has more talented men incompletely used than any other department of government,” Bundy wrote. There remained a “great opportunity for effective management,” but first one must recognize that Rusk was not a manager and had “little sense of effective operation,” while Ball was “a lone wolf” who was “unable to administer the department” and “consistently made it impossible for anyone else to do so.” Bundy proposed appointing a third person directly responsible to Rusk for the political and administrative management of the Department, and he spelled out a series of improvements that stronger leadership could bring about.

Within days the President selected Assistant Secretary for Administration Thomas Mann for the “number three” position (Under Secretary for Economic Affairs), and in a several telephone conversations during the next month Mann and the President discussed strengthening management at the assistant secretary level through better people and better communication, including regular meetings of the regional assistant secretaries with Ball. (18, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27) The President informed Rusk that Mann was taking over the assistant secretaries to “see that they give the President some good ideas” and “some good appointments.” (25) During the same period Crockett developed proposals for a number of organizational reforms in the Department’s administrative efforts, including the creation of a single, integrated and unified foreign affairs personnel system, a reform that eventually failed of passage in Congress following a lengthy struggle. (29, 38, 135)

Overall Supervision and Coordination of Foreign Policy

In National Security Action Memorandum 281, February 11, 1964, the President vested the Secretary of State with responsibility for promulgating National Policy Papers, which Rusk defined as “comprehensive, authoritative and unifying statements of US policy” for each country. (6) In the view of Crockett and Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, the National Policy Papers, together with the Department’s new Comprehensive Country Programming System (CCPS), provided the Department with a mechanism for supervising and coordinating the overall U.S. effort in each country. (11, 22) As Crockett explained to Rusk in February 1965, the National Policy Papers would specify the policy objectives and lines of action for each country. The program-budgeting system (CCPS) would monitor implementation of those goals by measuring the effort (dollars, materials, people) committed to each line of action by all the agencies involved in a particular country. (22) Through such a mechanism, the Department of State could regain control over U.S. activities overseas that had eroded since World War II with the proliferation of other agencies with major programs abroad, like CIA, the Agency for International Development, the Defense Department, and the Peace Corps. Crockett suggested to White House Special Assistant Horace Busby that the “final solution probably lies in an all-encompassing Department of Foreign Affairs.” (32)

Following an experimental program review in 13 countries using CCPS, called the Executive Review of Overseas Programs, the Department in December 1965 drafted a report proposing that the President instruct Rusk to develop a comprehensive, country-based program-budgeting system for all foreign affairs activities. But several agencies objected, with the Bureau of the Budget in the lead. In August 1965 the President had given BOB authority to implement an agency-based Planning-Programming-Budgeting System in which each foreign affairs agency would develop its own system rather than one foreign affairs agency (State) applying a comprehensive system to each country. (33, 39, 45, 49).

As it turned out, in early 1966 the Department of State did succeed in gaining greater authority for supervising and coordinating U.S. activities abroad but not through the Comprehensive Country Programming System. The system that emerged was foreshadowed in a paper prepared in the Department of State in August 1965 that addressed, once again, the issue of improving Department of State leadership, especially at the assistant secretary level. The paper proposed establishing interdepartmental regional policy committees, each chaired by a regional assistant secretary, and a high-level interdepartmental State-chaired coordinating committee. (42) By November Ball, Mann, and Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson had endorsed the idea. (48) During the same period General Maxwell Taylor, at the President’s request, undertook a sweeping review of governmental activities in the counter-insurgency field that resulted in his proposing a similar but more comprehensive reorganization plan to the President in January 1966. (50) Taylor’s plan underwent substantial revision during February and was promulgated as National Security Action Memorandum 341 on March 2. (51, 53, 55, 56)

NSAM 341 assigned the Secretary of State responsibility “for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of U.S. interdepartmental activities overseas” and, to carry out the responsibility, established a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), chaired by the Under Secretary, and Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs), chaired by the assistant secretaries. (56) In implementing NSAM 341 the Department replaced two levels of desk officers and Office Directors within each regional bureau with Country Directors, who were to be the “focal point for interdepartmental leadership at the intrabureau level.” (55, 59, 86) In addition, Rostow and Crockett sought, as essential steps to effective implementation of NSAM 341, Rusk’s approval of an accelerated National Policy Paper program and the installation of a State-administered, comprehensive foreign affairs program-budgeting system (like CCPS). When BOB again objected, the Department agreed to continue pursuing its programming system on an experimental basis but informed all posts that such a system would be installed region-by-region following its development and approval. (62, 70, 80)

Selecting a New Leadership Team

In May 1966 the Johnson administration commenced giving serious and extended attention to new leadership for the Department of State following decisions by Mann and Ball to step down (Mann left on May 31, Ball on September 30). The President queried Walt Rostow, his newly-appointed national security adviser, about candidates to replace Rusk (Rostow favored McNamara), but for the next four months Johnson and his advisers concentrated on recruiting and installing a new leadership team under Rusk. (73, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87) In August the President asked Douglas Dillon to take over Ball’s job and help “remake that department over there,” and when Dillon declined, he sounded out Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. “They got no imagination. They got no initiative. They got no ideas,” the President complained to Katzenbach. (88, 90) Chief White House talent scout John Macy outlined six different leadership teams for the President to consider, depending on his goals. (91) By mid-September Johnson had settled on Katzenbach as Under Secretary with Eugene Rostow in the number three slot and Foy Kohler as Rostow’s deputy. (90, 93, 94, 96)

Making NSAM 341 Work

In December 1966 Harry Schwartz, Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, was asked for his assessment of the SIG’s effectiveness. Schwartz explained that it had not met since July because the previous chairman, Ball, had felt he could not put in the required time, while the new chairman, Katzenbach, had deferred taking up SIG matters until he became better acquainted with the organization and functioning of the Department. (103) Nor was State’s country-based program-budgeting system, expected to put some muscle on the skeleton of NSAM 341, faring any better. A prestigious advisory group recommended moving ahead, but resistance was strong, among other places in CIA and a good many embassies, and Katzenbach’s attempt in early 1967 to drive the effort forward by hiring a dynamic leader proved fruitless. (95, 97, 99, 104, 113, 117, 120, 122) By then Crockett, a leading advocate of programming and other managerial innovations in the Department, had retired. In July 1967 the foreign affairs programming office at State was formally disestablished. (115, 122)

As late as June 1967 it appeared that NSAM 341 was expiring, too. The SIG had met only three times since August 1966. A month later, however, Walt Rostow reported to the President that Katzenbach “is now making SIG move,” apparently in response to direct pressure from Johnson. The SIG met 14 times during the next 6 months and operated in a “decidedly activist manner,” according to a SIG staff member, seeking out interagency problems and assuming an increasing role in the management of foreign affairs. Two of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups had continued to meet regularly all along and now Katzenbach pressed the others into action. (120, 123, 131, 136) The new Country Director system was credited with improving the timely and effective handling of some operational problems, although overall assessments were mixed. (116, 126) In October 1967 the President’s Task Force on Foreign Affairs Organization strongly endorsed the goal of having the Secretary of State coordinate the programs of all U.S. agencies abroad but contended that an organizational “transformation” of the Department of State was still required to achieve it. (127) A SIG staff study of the implementation of NSAM 341, produced shortly before the close of the Johnson Presidency, concluded that the SIG/IRG structure could function effectively as “an important instrument of policy control, both intra- and interdepartmentally,” provided it had unambiguous support from the highest levels of government as well as the Department leadership that could “adjust its vision to the problem of decision-making at the Presidential level.” (137)

The National Security Council and the White House

Changes in NSC Operation Under President Johnson

While NSAM 341 gave the Secretary of State a mandate and mechanism to supervise and coordinate foreign policy, the new system was subordinate to the President and the National Security Council. (60) Johnson made it clear early in his administration, however, that he did not intend to resurrect the formal NSC committees for planning and implementing policy that President Kennedy had dismantled. (146) Moreover, Johnson dropped the NSC Standing Group, which dealt with planning and operations problems, issued National Security Action Memorandums with decreasing frequency, and convened the formal Council irregularly. (144, 147, 152)

Instead the President relied on his informal Tuesday luncheon get-togethers with his inner circle of senior foreign policy advisers and on his National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, and Bundy’s NSC staff. A staff officer’s function, contended NSC staffer David Klein in December 1964, was, first, to identify as early as possible those national security problems requiring Presidential attention and define alternative courses of action in a way that facilitated Presidential action; and second, to try, within limits, to insure that the president’s wishes were carried out the way he intended. (151) Bundy, however, advised the President in early 1965 that, if and when he got the Department of State organized to his satisfaction, the main function of Bundy’s office should be just “careful review, rather than the initiation or monitoring of operational policy.” (153)

Replacing McGeorge Bundy

Following Bundy’s decision in November 1965 to step down in February 1966, the President and his advisers considered who should replace him and whether to curtail his “shop.” Presidential Assistant Jack Valenti favored keeping it as is: “No matter how much the President relies on his Secretaries, he ought to have, indeed must have, a checking mechanism, a competitive force that gives him flexibility.” (157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163) In March the President, through NSAM 341, formally assigned the Secretary of State responsibility for the overall direction and supervision of U.S. interdepartmental activities overseas; Presidential adviser Clark Clifford remarked that Bundy’s successor would have responsibilities on a smaller scale. On March 31 the President named Walt Rostow to replace Bundy but gave him the title Special Assistant, not Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The President stated that Rostow would share some of Bundy’s former duties with other Special Assistants. (164)

The NSC Under Walt Rostow

It turned out, however, that Rostow’s NSC operation very much resembled Bundy’s. Despite strengthening State’s authority to coordinate foreign policy, the President kept “his own firm hand on the wheel” and thus his NSC staff remained strong, observed Harold Saunders of the NSC staff in early 1968. The great majority of decisions the President must make, continued Saunders, flowed through Rostow and his staff, who also presided over the dialogue between the President and the professionals at State and other agencies. (167, 180) Although Rostow sought to revitalize the formal Council through regular meetings and a redefined mission, the Tuesday lunch remained the centerpiece of the President’s advisory process-it was a “regular NSC meeting,” commented Rostow in December 1968. (168, 170, 172, 182)

The Director of Central Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, and the White House

DCI McCone and the President

A 1965 Bureau of the Budget staff paper on organizational problems of the intelligence community noted that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) wore three hats: 1) principal foreign intelligence adviser to the President; 2) coordinator of the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government; and 3) head of the CIA. From the beginning of the Johnson administration DCI John McCone found discharging the first responsibility a difficult task. McCone told Bundy in April 1964 that he was “highly dissatisfied” that Johnson did not get direct intelligence briefings from him as President Kennedy had. At least twice during 1964 McCone spoke directly to the President about his concern over “not seeing very much of him.” (199, 225) Nor did the President take readily to CIA’s written intelligence briefs, though after some experimentation CIA developed a successful format in the President’s Daily Brief, which was introduced in December 1964. (187, 214)

Coordination of the Intelligence Community

The DCI’s second hat, coordinator of the intelligence community, generated a good deal of discussion about organizational reform during the Johnson administration. The issue, DCI Richard Helms stated in 1966, was the “organizational dilemma created by the fact that in excess of 80% of the resources devoted to foreign intelligence purposes are not under my direct managerial control.” As result, the DCI “‘guides and coordinates’ the community but does not manage or command it.” (253) McCone vigorously opposed the solution of detaching the DCI from CIA and locating him closer to the President; the DCI could not function, he asserted, if separated from the many CIA specialists with whom he conferred regularly. McCone favored creating an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to improve coordination of the enormous intelligence assets under control of the Secretary of Defense, a reform that was finally instituted in 1971. (212) The Johnson years saw the establishment of the National Intelligence Resources Board, a coordinating mechanism that Helms created in 1968 to evaluate the responsiveness of individual programs to intelligence objectives and to recommend appropriate levels of funding (278)

The National Reconnaissance Office

The Johnson years also saw the resolution of a prolonged and bitter battle over the organization and control of the National Reconnaissance Office. NRO had “developed into an essentially Air Force owned and operated component,” asserted Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Marshall Carter in March 1964; its aim was to “get CIA out of the reconnaissance business.” McCone was insistent that the DCI have “a continuing and positive voice” in the entire reconnaissance operation. In its May 1964 report on the National Reconnaissance Program, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board maintained that it was essential that there be close and continuing collaboration between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI, but McGeorge Bundy contended that the Board’s recommendations would, in fact, seriously reduce the role of CIA in the program. (189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 197, 201, 206, 208, 211, 212, 217) Relations between CIA and the Air Force deteriorated over the course of 1964, but a compromise over the organization and management of NRO was worked out during 1965 and a new agreement signed in August. (230, 245)

DCI McCone’s Successors

John McCone indicated as early as November 1964 that he wanted to step down as DCI; he left office on April 28, 1965. (215) Carter confided to one PFIAB member that he thought it be would a grave error to put in a military man; CIA was 17 years old and “if it had not by now developed an in-house competence to provide a Director from its own resources, then they had best close up the place.” (222) During a long telephone conversation on April 6, however, the President persuaded Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., U.S. Navy (retired), to take the job. Johnson explained that, although Bundy and Rusk both favored Helms, he wanted a man with seasoned judgment to take the job until Helms, who would serve as Raborn’s deputy, was “ready.” (223) Johnson told Bundy ten months later, however, that Raborn was “totally oblivious to the fact that he is not highly regarded and he is not doing a good job.” (246) On June 30, 1966, Helms succeeded Raborn.

Ambassadors and the Coordination of CIA Activities Abroad

As questions arose about the role of ambassadors in the coordination of CIA activities in their respective countries, both the Department of State and CIA addressed the issue. In a March 1965 letter, Crockett assured one ambassador that a chief of mission’s authority not only permitted but required him to supervise CIA operations and programs in the country of his assignment. (28) CIA contended that in the area of covert actions there was an “almost intimate working relationship with an Ambassador although we reserve unto ourselves as a general rule the selection and the protection of sources and methods”; when misunderstandings did arise they were usually in the area of clandestine intelligence collection. (243) In the latter area, according to a 1967 Department of State assessment, field coordination was “not bad, although there is nearly always a current glaring exception.” (261) State also expressed concern that while ambassadors were informed of clandestine intelligence activities, the Department was not. (261, 267)

The Ramparts Exposé and the Approval of Covert Actions

Ramparts magazine’s exposé in February 1967 of covert CIA ties to the National Student Association spurred a reexamination not only of CIA’s relationships to private U.S. voluntary organizations but also of the process by which covert actions were approved. (260, 264, 269) CIA, State, and the NSC reviewed past procedures and developed recommendations for improving them. State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) concluded, following a survey of 87 covert actions considered during 1966, that proposals for covert action were “carefully weighed, and prudently decided upon” but that sometimes CIA made proposals to the 303 Committee on very short notice, with little or no opportunity for thorough staff work, and there was “very little review of on-going projects.” Sharing the latter concern, the Executive Secretary of the 303 Committee indicated he would reexamine all existing approvals and recommended that continuing projects be reviewed at least once a year. CIA emphasized to its staff chiefs and division chiefs that the political sensitivity of a proposed covert action and its consistency with U.S. foreign policy, not the amount of money involved, should be the controlling criterion in deciding whether a proposal needed to go to the 303 Committee for approval. At the request of the National Security Adviser, INR drafted a revision of NSC’s 1955 directives on covert operations, among other reasons to “deal more explicitly with the risks, consequences, and alternatives of covert operations,” but the revised directive was not issued. (261–263, 265–267, 269, 279)

Summary: United Nations

The portion of volume XXXIII covering the United Nations focuses principally on the Article 19 dispute over financing of United Nations peacekeeping efforts and on the creation of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force for Cyprus (UNFICYP). Other topics include the reelection of U Thant as UN Secretary General in 1966, developmental and trusteeship issues, the Celestial Bodies Treaty of 1967, and the appointment of U.S. Permanent Representatives by President Johnson. Several major issues considered by the United Nations during the Johnson Presidency are documented in other Foreign Relations volumes: the Vietnam War, volumes I–V; Arms Control and Disarmament, volume XI; the Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, volume XIX; South Asia, volume XXV; and China, volume XXX.

Article 19 Dispute

The Article 19 dispute with the Soviet Union was the most pressing problem that the Johnson administration faced in the United Nations at the beginning of 1964. The Soviet Union refused to pay its assessment for UN peacekeeping operations, arguing that operations like those in the Congo conflicted with its national interests. The United States, basing its position on the wording of Article 19 of the UN Charter, took the position that those states that did not pay were liable to losing their voting rights. (287, 288) American officials hoped that Soviet desires to strengthen the Security Council would leave an opening for an agreement on the financial issue. (289) In March and April meetings with U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson and with his British counterpart, the Soviets made clear their unwillingness to pay for UN peacekeeping missions. (291, 294, 296) Third party efforts also met with an unyielding Soviet stance. (297–299) As the fall session of the General Assembly approached, the United States faced a major crisis. Invoking Article 19 risked total paralysis of the United Nations, but failure to deal with the financial shortfall put at risk both the institution and its vital peacekeeping operations. After consideration of the options, the Johnson administration decided to pursue a confrontation with the Soviet Union and other non-dues-paying states, most notably France. (302–304)

The sudden overthrow of Soviet Prime Minister Nikita S. Khrushchev (October 15, 1964) sparked renewed U.S. efforts to seek some form of accommodation with the new Soviet leadership, but a meeting between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin on October 20 produced no positive results. (306) Meanwhile, the General Assembly moved forward, operating under a rule of consensus that severely limited its ability to act.

In mid-November Stevenson’s chief aide warned that the United States was losing the public relations battle over its Article 19 stance. The following day, Stevenson, Rusk, and the President met to discuss their options. The outcome of these talks was a further démarche to the Soviets that met a firm nyet. (310, 311, 313) In late November and early December Rusk discussed the Article 19 issue with his Soviet counterpart, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. No progress resulted. (315, 316, 319) Efforts by the Secretary General to craft a compromise were unavailing. The General Assembly staggered to a Christmas recess. (317, 318, 321–323)

During the recess, the Johnson administration attempted to firm up its congressional support while the Soviets offered to make “voluntary” contributions to support the UN’s finances. (325, 326, 328) Stevenson warned that the United States risked destroying its own creation if it pursued an inflexible line on the Article 19 issue. A similar warning from UN Under Secretary Ralph Bunche attracted the President’s attention. White House officials began studying ways to extract the United States from a position that threatened both the future of the UN and the political interests of the President. (330, 332, 334–337)

U.S. caution aided efforts by UN officials to bring the 1964 General Assembly session to a conclusion in February 1965 without direct confrontation. The United States then had a six-month breathing spell to reconsider its options. The reconsideration was accelerated by the decisions of both Canada and the United Kingdom to back off their formerly strong support of the U.S. position. (342, 346, 348, 351, 354–356) At a July 6 meeting with the President, Rusk stated that the United States had to avoid a confrontation on the Article 19 issue at the upcoming General Assembly session. (357)

Throughout 1964 and early 1965, U.S. policymaking was characterized by sharp differences between the Department of State and White House and between officials of both organizations and Stevenson. (323, 335, 350) The UN Ambassador’s death on July 14 while on a mission in London allowed the President to seek a dynamic successor who would hew more closely to administration policy on a number of issues, above all its Vietnam effort. Johnson’s choice for the UN post, Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, immediately paid dividends by shepherding a new Article 19 policy through Congressional approval. (363) Goldberg’s appointment allowed the administration to reconfigure its policy toward UN financing, avoiding another debilitating confrontation with the Soviet Union. (360, 370, 371) In a wide ranging September 18 telephone conversation with Goldberg, Johnson outlined his objectives for the UN. (368)

Re-Election of U Thant

The major UN issue facing U.S. policymakers in 1966 was the likelihood of the retirement of the Secretary General. U Thant had been openly critical of U.S. handling of the Article 19 dispute, and his efforts to secure a Vietnam settlement had frequently clashed with U.S. objectives. (348, 351, 385) Nevertheless, U.S. officials were less than pleased by the prospects of U Thant’s departure. The Soviet Union could be counted upon to create difficulties over a replacement, and the list of potential candidates for the Secretary Generalship was not impressive. (374, 377, 379, 382, 386, 390–392) On August 27, 1966, the Secretary General announced that he would resign. U Thant’s decision was a calculated effort to force the major powers to provide greater financial support to the institution. By creating a succession crisis he forced the permanent members of the Security Council to determine quickly the price they would pay to retain him. The United States decided to support retention of the Secretary General and discovered that unanimity existed on this point among the permanent members. (392, 394, 395, 398) On November 22 Goldberg met with U Thant, who informed the U.S. Permanent Representative that he would stay if UN financial problems were alleviated and if, on Goldberg’s initiative, the Security Council, in a private meeting, determined that it was unable to agree on another candidate. (404) A week later the Security Council members informed the Secretary General of their unanimous wish that he continue in office. U Thant was reelected on December 2. (405)

Changes in the U.S. Permanent Representative

As Representative to the United Nations, Goldberg had a major role in pushing forward the negotiations over a series of treaties to their conclusion, most notably the Celestial Bodies agreement. (384, 387–389, 399, 407) However, by early 1967, the Ambassador was showing signs of discontent with the restrictions on his role imposed by the Department of State and was unhappy with administration Vietnam policy. (408–410) These differences festered until Goldberg finally resigned in June 1968. The President then turned to former Under Secretary of State George Ball, who, however, resigned in September 1968 to join the Presidential campaign of Vice President Hubert Humphrey. (431–433) James Wiggins replaced Ball and served out the remainder of Lyndon Johnson’s term.

Committee of 24

In the final years of the Johnson Presidency, the issue of U.S. participation in the work of the Committee of 24, a trusteeship oversight group, loomed large. The Committee, which frequently visited trusteeship territories, was dominated by radical former colonial states and Soviet bloc representatives. Its frequent criticisms of U.S. administration of its Pacific Trust territories, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico as well as the committee’s costly junkets made the Committee of 24 a continuing irritant for U.S. policymakers. After lengthy consideration and delays caused by timing, the United States terminated its participation in December 1968. (411, 416, 421, 425, 426, 436)

UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The creation of a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) between January and March 1964 was a major policy initiative of the Johnson administration. Basic documentation on general U.S. policy toward Cyprus is in volume XVI. The United States initially hoped to deal with the outbreak of violence on the island republic and avoid an armed clash of its Greek and Turkish allies through either British intervention or the creation of a European force under NATO control. (438–440, 446) The prospect of U.S. military participation in such a force was discussed but the Joint Chiefs of Staff displayed little enthusiasm. (443, 444, 450) The British were unwilling to carry the burden alone, (445) while President Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader, was determined to create a UN force. (447, 449, 455) After discussions during early February 1964 with the British, Makarios, and the Secretary General, and a strongly worded intervention from its ambassador in Cyprus, the United States reluctantly moved toward a UN peacekeeping force solution. (453–458) Under Secretary of State George Ball traveled to Europe for talks with the involved parties. (459, 460) Ball, who played a major role in configuring U.S. policy, still opposed a UN peacekeeping force. He reported his findings to the President at a February 17 meeting. (461, 462) The following day he expressed his frustration with Makarios at an “off the record” press briefing. (464)

In spite of Ball’s resistance, a UN solution emerged in late February. Makarios’ opposition had killed the idea of a NATO force, while the United Kingdom rejected final efforts to expand its responsibility as a guarantor power. (468) Discussions at the United Nations centered on the terms of reference and responsibilities of a peacekeeping force. (465–467, 469–475) Ominously, however, agreement on UNFICYP was obstructed by Turkish objections. (476, 479) Even after the Security Council approved the peacekeeping force, March 4, 1964, Turkey continued to voice dissatisfaction with the arrangements governing its operations.