Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972

274. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, January 12, 1972, 0004Z.

102. Subj: Bush-Jarring Meeting January 11. Ref: State 3029.²

1. Bush called on Jarring AM Jan 11 to ascertain latter’s current thinking. Jarring was suffering from one of his gloomy phases.

2. Jarring first denied AFP³ reports from Moscow that he had been holding round of talks there prior to his departure. He had routinely received new Egyptian Ambassador and had seen Kuznetsov but this did not reflect any initiative on his part.

3. Jarring then expressed unhappiness over Israeli campaign to blame him for Feb 8, 1971, memorandum.⁴ Ideas in that memo were fully consistent with US positions yet Israel had been at pains to give impression that US no longer supports him. Jarring also indicated he disturbed over US abstention on GA Res 2799(XXVI).⁵ Bush assured him that there no question but that US continues to support his mission.⁶ We abstained because we were concerned not to worsen the existing impasse.

4. Jarring also indicated that he concerned because Four Powers no longer meeting.⁷ This contributed to impression his mission no longer actively supported by Four. Bush said main problem with Four Power meeting was to know what could constructively be done.

5. There had not yet been opportunity for Jarring to talk to new SYG⁸ who, he noted, had stated on TV that he had some ideas on ME which he wished to discuss with his Special Rep. Jarring said he would call in Tekoah and el Zayyat in near future but unless Israel was willing to make some kind of statement that would break the impasse, he was pessimistic. In response to question, Jarring said this did not necessarily have to be a positive reply to his Feb 1971 memo. The FonMin of Senegal during GA had shown the way. It could be a statement that Israel does not desire to annex Arab territory but that it desires secure and recognized boundaries. On other hand, if Israel merely repeats that it will withdraw to secure and recognized boundaries to be determined in course of negotiations this would make it impossible for Egyptians to resume discussions.

6. Jarring mentioned that Jordanian Amb had also seen him in Moscow and had made clear that GOJ wants an aide-mémoire similar to the one handed Egypt last Feb. He had taken non-committal attitude and had said he must be careful not to raise entire Palestine question. (He said nothing about needing green light from USG.) Jarring said he would also call in Toukan but latter would have to convince him that such a step would be useful.

7. Bush indicated that this decision was entirely one for Jarring and the parties to make. At same time, we shared his misgivings about another aide-mémoire.

8. In discussion of Toukan’s imminent return to Amman, Bush said Toukan told us he would be replaced by Sharaf. Jarring (protect) said this would be ideal from his standpoint but that he was told in Moscow Toukan would be replaced by Munim Rifai.

9. Jarring said he planned to be available to parties in NY for indefinite future. He would have to return to Moscow Feb 8 for a couple of days during visit of his FonMin but otherwise he would be at UNHQ.

Bush

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1166, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, January 1–15, 1972. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Paris, London, Moscow, Jerusalem, and Cairo.
2. Telegram 3029 to Amman and Moscow, January 5, conveyed the Department’s disappointment that Jordan’s Foreign Minister was willing to delay the UN Security Council’s meeting on Jerusalem for only a week: “We understand Jordanian concern at continuing to be ‘left alone’ in context Arab-Israeli negotiations and its need at this point to demonstrate its involvement in political settlement efforts. At the same time, we do not want to get into position of appearing to be taking the lead in stimulating Jarring efforts with Jordanians and Israelis, since this could complicate our own efforts, particularly with Israelis, on interim agreement.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR)
3. Agence France-Presse.
4. See Document 211.
5. See footnote 4, Document 270.
6. Two weeks later, Sisco briefed Jarring in detail on the “state-of-play” of U.S. efforts to achieve an interim settlement between Egypt and Israel. (Telegram 15308 to USUN, January 27; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 658, Country Files, Middle East, Middle East Nodis/Cedar/Plus, Vol. V)
7. The Four Powers met twice in both June and July and once in both August and September in 1971. The meetings were marked almost entirely by Soviet accusations—and U.S. denials—that Israeli intransigence, with the support of the United States, was undermining efforts to achieve a settlement between Egypt and Israel. (Telegram 1495 from USUN, June 4; telegram 1700 from USUN, June 25; telegram 1893 from USUN, July 14; telegram 2023 from USUN, July 27; and telegram 2334 from USUN, August 20; all ibid., Boxes 1163–1164, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks) The Four Powers had last met on September 9, 1971, a description of which is in telegram 2604 from USUN, September 10. (Ibid., Box 1165, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—Jarring Talks, September 1–October 1, 1972)
8. Kurt Waldheim was appointed Secretary General for a term that began on January 1, 1972.