146. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)1

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

K: Secondly, on Angola. We cannot think of any other solution except to ask outside countries to promise not to send more arms in. If you are worried about the border in Zaire, we are willing to consider a UN force there. We promise you we would exercise restraint on our part and to get all foreign forces out.

D: You are asking us to put this on the same level politically. I see no problem with this kind of thing. I already reported what the President mentioned yesterday.2 What you are saying, I am going to add. The question really is in this case not very easy to control. It is in the capital of the country and no one knows where they are.

K: But look it will be easily known if something comes in or not. If we don’t keep our word, that will affect our relationship.

D: Do you have any ideas if Africa could do something? It is their business. It is not natural for us really.

K: No, but the way we could do it is to have the Organization of African Unity ask all outside powers, you see, and then we would both have an excuse to do it.

D: Ask whom?

K: Ask all outside powers to stop supplying arms.

D: OK, I will pass this on. A public statement from both sides? Who is going to control it?

K: We would be prepared to have the Organization of African Unity control it.

D: Who is going to control South Africa?

K: We have nothing to do directly with South Africa, but we would bring major pressure on them.

D: But if they continue?

K: Look, we are trying to win. We are trying to get everybody out of it.

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D: I really don’t haveto do this for the time being. I would like some political solution but to stop something very difficult to control.

K: The political solution—why not let the MPLA talk to the other units.

D: You mean they should appeal or we should appeal to them to sit down and talk.

K: We should all appeal to them to sit down and talk.

D: You have more information. I have very little information.

K: We would be prepared to urge them all to sit down and talk.

D: Appeal to them to sit down and talk from the two of us or a member of the Security Council. What do you think is better?

K: It could be an appeal from the Organization of African Unity which the two of us support.

D: In this way and as a second part of the deal, maybe not as a first one, politically I am sure he would understand.

K: But there has to be an end of supplies. This has to be part of it. I think it would make a good impression here.

D: The question is themselves. Whether they are going to take this from us.

K: I think if the two of us agree, we can get them to agree.

D: I will send this to Moscow and see what their reaction is.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 31, General Subject File, USSRDobrynin/Kissinger Exchanges—Telephone Conversations (4). No classification marking. All blank underscores are omissions in the original.
  2. See Document 145.