Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa

30. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

• NSC Review Group Meeting, 10 April 1970

1. The Review Group met at 1445 hours on 10 April under the chairmanship of Henry Kissinger to discuss the response to NSSM 89: “US Policy for Southwest Africa (Namibia)”.²

2. Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting by saying that this matter would not be brought before the NSC but would be handled by a memorandum to The President.³ It was ascertained that a Presidential decision was needed by 20 April so that the US representatives to the United Nations could be given instructions.

3. There was considerable discussion of the three options presented in the response to NSSM 89. All present agreed that regardless of the option selected, it is “just a matter of time” until the UK or the US would be forced to veto a resolution on imposing mandatory sanctions on South Africa.

4. State recommended Option 2—take selective actions in addition to present restrictions to dissociate ourselves from South Africa’s illegal administration of the territory. State would want some flexibility in selecting specific courses of action under Option 2 with the addition of three other courses of action presented under Option 3 if necessary. Specifically, State would want authority to support a proposal in the United Nations for reporting on compliance with the arms embargo on South Africa, to provide funds for refugees from Namibia, and to support referral to the International Court of Justice for an opinion of some legal aspects of South Africa’s administration of Southwest Africa.

5. JCS, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Commerce, and Treasury recommended Option 1—continue present restrictions on US activities in Southwest Africa but avoid any major new action involving the territory. When asked the position of the Agency, I said that it would be inappropriate for CIA to take a position on these policy questions. The OEP representative took a similar stand.

6. It is interesting to note that Mr. Shakespeare said that the people at USIA were for Option 2 and that he personally was for Option 1. Mr. Kissinger pressed Mr. Shakespeare for an agency position, and the response was Option 1.

7. All agencies that wish to express their positions are to do so in writing by close of business 13 April for inclusion in the memorandum to The President.

Edward W. Proctor

Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01086A, Box 7, Subject Files, NSC Review Group Meeting Agenda/Minutes, Folder 223. Secret.
2. Document 29.
3. Document 31.