Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976

106. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Deputy Secretary of State (Ingersoll)¹

July 20, 1974, 9:30 a.m. PDT.

K: Hello.

I: Yes. Henry.

K: Bob, that was a false alarm you got. Defense threatened to cut off aid [less than 1 line not declassified]. There is no cut off of military aid.

I: Good. They told us unequivocally in the meeting² that Schlesinger told them to cut off shipment.

K: You’d better go back there.

I: I surely will.

K: And make sure that they get in touch with their Secretary and that shipments are not to be cut off but on the other hand they’re not to be delivered either. If you follow me. There should be in the next few days technical delays. There should be no formal announcement of a cutoff. We’ll never get it started again.

I: Well this was—they told us that they had already held up…

K: It doesn’t make a G. D. difference Bob. You’re in charge of this operation until I get back. You just tell them what I agreed with Schlesinger.

I: Ok. You talked to Jim recently.

K: I just talked to him 5 minutes ago³ and he said it’s a misunderstanding but if it’s a misunderstanding you’d better make clear it doesn’t happen.

I: I’ll do that right away.

K: Has Hartman talked to the Turks.

I: And right after that he was going over to see Schlesinger.

K: I know. And he did and Schlesinger was not quite as tough as I would have wanted him but he was at least consistent with us. Did we tell him we’d have to cut off aid if there were no ceasefire.

I: I just heard the message described to me and he didn’t put that in there. I don’t know why.

K: Who, Schlesinger?

I: No, Hartman. But we gave that to Joe and put it in a cable to him as well.⁴

K: What do you mean Hartman didn’t put it in there.

I: I just had read to me a memo on his conversations with the Turkish Ambassador⁵ and he didn’t say it. At least it’s not reported.

K: Well, it’s going to be a lonely department when I get back. You called the Turkish Ambassador. You get Hartman to call the Turkish Ambassador and and you tell Hartman that the next time he doesn’t carry out instructions I want his resignation. I do not accept the principle that Assistant Secretaries have a judgment when they’re given an order.

I: Well, there may be…

K: There could be no misunderstanding. He was on the G. D. phone with me.

I: That’s what I thought. I don’t know that he didn’t say. I just heard the message read to me and it didn’t have it in it and I questioned it just before you came on the line.

K: There is no sense you doing it. Tell Hartman to call back the Turkish Ambassador. Tell him he did not make himself clear. He wants it clearly understood that the proposal for a cease fire that Sisco is bringing has our total support and that it is his view that it will lead—that if we threaten it to Greece it will lead to a cut off with Turkey also and we want him to know that as a friend so that there will not be a surprise if things don’t go properly.

I: I’ll do that right away.

K: Now, it took me an hour and a half to get Sisco to deliver this in Athens, now do you suppose we could deliver it in Washington. We’ve spent 2 hours longer already than I ordered it so tell Hartman it’s safe. And I want a call in 5 minutes that its been done.

I: Fine.⁶

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. Kissinger was in San Clemente; Ingersoll was in Washington.
2. See Document 105.
3. No record of this conversation has been found.
4. See footnote 4, Document 105.
5. Not found.
6. Kissinger and Ingersoll spoke at 10:15 a.m. PDT. In response to Ingersoll telling Kissinger that Hartman had delivered the message, Kissinger said: “My instructions this morning which Scowcroft wrote down was to say: Hartman should express his personal opinion that having threatened aid cutoffs to Greece it would certainly come to Turkey if they did not accept a Sisco proposal. It was not to be an official U.S. government threat at that point. It was supposed to be Hartman’s personal opinion. I will bet my bottom dollar he didn’t do it that way.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 384, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)