Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976

240. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 24, 1976, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Caglayangil; Defense Agreement Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• Turkish
• Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil
• Ambassador Melih Esenbel
• Ambassador Sukru Elekdag, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFA)
• Ambassador Ercument Yavuzalp, Director General, Division of International
• Security Affairs, MFA
• Major General Cemil Cuha, Turkish General Staff
• Dr. Mustafa Asula, Deputy Director, Division of International Security Affairs, MFA
• Mr. Nurver Nures, Counselor, Turkish Embassy (Interpreter)
• Mr. Tugay Ulcevik, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister (Notetaker)
• U.S.
• The Secretary
• Mr. William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense
• Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• Ambassador William Macomber, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
• Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Mr. Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser
• Mr. William L. Eagleton, Director, EUR/SE
• Mr. Harmon E. Kirby, EUR/SE (Notetaker)

Secretary: It is a great personal pleasure to be able to welcome here my old friend, the Turkish Foreign Minister. I am very much looking forward to our discussions. We are not meeting as adversaries or to win points against each other. We are meeting as old friends with a good deal of common ground. We all want to try to solve our current problems in as constructive a manner as we can, with the intention of restoring our countries’ relations to what we would wish them to be. This is the spirit in which I welcome you here, Mr. Minister.

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you most sincerely for inviting me here. On every occasion that we have met our personal friendship has grown. Mr. Secretary, I wish that our strong personal relationship had not developed during an unfortunate period which has beclouded US-Turkish relations. It is my sincere intention to work with you to try to find ways and means of overcoming the impasse. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks for your warm hospitality and for the courtesy you have always shown us. Since our time together will be very limited—we will have only a few hours during the next two days here to discuss several matters—if the Secretary agrees, let’s arrange a work program for our delegations.

Secretary: I agree. We’ll finish all the outstanding issues in the negotiations in our first fifteen minutes together. Then, tomorrow, we will turn to the Cyprus problem and settle it.

Caglayangil: If you want to settle the Cyprus problem, it looks like I will be staying in the US forever.

Secretary: Well, I agree with your approach. As I see it, there are about six issues relating to the Defense Agreement which we need to discuss. They are:

1. The amount of assistance,

2. The additional things the US can do to assist Turkey to meet its defense obligations,

3. The duration of the Agreement and its relationship to the duration of the assistance obligation,

4. The problem of the relationship of the Agreement to American laws,

5. How we define our bilateral defense relationship in the context of our broader relationship in NATO, and

6. The unilateral use by Turkey of joint facilities in the event of a national emergency.

Those are the issues we shall have to address with respect to the Agreement. While you are here I would also welcome the opportunity to discuss the Cyprus problem. We recognize your sensitivity about any suggestion of a relationship between the Defense Agreement and Cyprus, but Cyprus does affect the general atmosphere and, moreover, the relations between two of our close allies. Thus we would like to be able to understand your current thinking on the Cyprus problem, and then perhaps we could exchange a few words about the Aegean problem as well. It seems to me these are the topics we could discuss.

Caglayangil: I am in full agreement, Mr. Secretary. There are other issues we want to dwell on as well. If you allow, I will take each of the subjects you mentioned and state our views.

Secretary: Which issues first?

Caglayangil: The bilateral issues to be negotiated. Mr. Secretary, before I came here to undertake these discussions, I sought authorization from my Government on each of the issues. You are aware of the complex situation in Turkey. We have a four-party coalition government. Since these subjects we are discussing here are of such great importance for Turkey, it was necessary to have thorough consultation in the Government. Naturally, I also felt the need to consult the Opposition parties. We have a National Security Council on which is represented the Turkish General Staff, the service chiefs, the Prime Minister and other relevant Ministers. The NSC discussed these issues and made certain recommendations to the Turkish Government on each of them. The Government considered those recommendations and, after a thorough discussion, made some decisions and authorized my approach to these issues. Of course, as I said, I had to contact the main Opposition leader, who is a former student of yours.

Secretary: When he was my student, he was a poet.

Caglayangil: The Opposition leader listened very carefully and said that while he did not wish to raise any great controversy, he did disagree over my Government’s approach. He disagreed with the fundamental basis on which we have been addressing these negotiations.

Secretary: What does he want, Turkish bases in the US?

Caglayangil: He had his own views about Turkish defense policies.

Secretary: What are they?

Caglayangil: He explained them at length—over about an hour’s time. I don’t think it would be appropriate to repeat those views here. In thinking about this Agreement we are discussing, there may be those who would say that there must be an ideal solution for every dispute. I am not trying to find an ideal solution, but rather what is possible.

Secretary: I know that asking you to be “reasonable” would be asking too much. The Deputy Secretary of Defense doesn’t understand my making these jokes all the time. My Ambassador is about to have a heart attack. He will certainly goad me after this meeting.

Caglayangil: There may well be differing views on how to approach the question of restoring Turkish-American bilateral relations. I think we should both take a considered look at the circumstances in which Turkey finds itself. Naturally the US side will want to explain frankly the problems it sees as well.

Secretary: I agree. I think I understand the problems you refer to— the problems facing you in the coalition government and the general approach of the former student of mine to whom you referred. I think we agree on how to proceed in these talks. You have to recognize, however, that regardless of whether these negotiations fail or succeed, you will be blamed at home (laughter). In our country also there are pressures, pressures on us that we cannot always control. But I think that if each side tries to understand the difficulties of the other, we can surely resolve together the problems that face us.

Caglayangil: In a sense it would be useful if there were a way in which I could expose you to, or bring to you here, the many different views that Turkish circles express on how to restore our bilateral relationship, particularly given the fact that we are also bound together in the broader fifteen-member NATO context. Most Turks note that of all the NATO allies, Turkey has the longest land and sea frontiers with the Soviet Union. Because of our geographic position, we have been given a special mission. Thus, the responsibilities that Turkey undertakes as a result of these special responsibilities are all the greater. Consequently, the support others give to Turkey in enabling it to fulfill its responsibilities should also be considered special and should be commensurate with those Turkish responsibilities. People (i.e. in Turkey) note that normally in the US there is an all too easy and ready comparison made between Turkey and Greece. Turks point out that Turkey, with a population of 40 million, has a very different mission in the common defense than Greece, with 8 million (sic). In spite of the latter fact (i.e. disparity), the US Government traditionally equates the two countries. In devising assistance programs, you do not exactly equate them, but the aid to Greece is normally about 3/4 that of Turkey. The treatment you give to Turkey often causes public opinion in Turkey to say that the Government of the day is far less successful than the Government of Greece in obtaining support from the US. In these negotiations over past months, we have certainly tried to expose to you our special problems and to bring to your attention the special burdens we have undertaken. It has been brought to my attention that at the technical level in the negotiations you have offered $200 million annual assistance. It seems to me it would be difficult for Turkey to renew its defense cooperation with the United States with defense support set at the $200 million level. But on the other hand, I recognize that this is a complex issue, and I certainly would not consider it a matter for bargaining or haggling.

Esenbel: In short, Mr. Secretary, the Minister has indicated that any Turkish Government is always under criticism when the comparison is made between US aid for Greece and US aid for Turkey. In the past you have given Greece about 3/4 of what you have provided Turkey. Our role is so much heavier that we think this ratio to be unfair.

Caglayangil: I don’t say that I necessarily agree with this complaint, I was just saying that this is the popular belief in Turkey. In approaching this problem, I think we should try to see whether there is any possibility of narrowing our differences. If it appears possible, then we should continue our discussions. If, on the other hand, we conclude that it is impossible to bridge our differences on defense support, we might decide there is no useful purpose in continuing the negotiations.

Secretary: Despite our deep personal friendship, the Foreign Minister has been relaying an ultimatum to me for the past twenty minutes

Caglayangil: I am at your disposal.

Secretary: The first issue is the extent of defense cooperation on which you proposed the language “limited to NATO purposes”. We have proposed the language “consistent with NATO purposes”. There is also a sentence providing for “No purposes other than those authorized by the Republic of Turkey.” We would be prepared to accept

Caglayangil: I understand the idea you have expressed. Provided we agree on other issues, this will not be an impediment. I can agree to make such a statement.

Secretary: (Speaks aside to Mr. Clements) I am up against negotiating with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. That issue is substantially settled. Let me have an easy one now.

Caglayangil: How can I ensure a better impression than what I have done?

Secretary: A second issue is the emergency use of facilities. Here we have the problem that this was in the 1969 Agreement, but it was a secret provision. Our problem is not in the provision, but in a public clause which will produce debate in Congress which will be very serious. I wonder whether we can handle this as in the previous issue on the basis of an understanding and assurance rather than on a for mal text.

Caglayangil: I accept that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary: Good. Now there is a more complicated issue. This is the reference to US legislation.

Caglayangil: What is your proposal?

Secretary: We understand that you do not want something that might include discriminatory legislation against Turkey. But if we have nothing referring to legislation we are inviting the Congress to attack the agreement. In this the Greek lobby would have influence. We propose a sentence which makes it clear that there is no discriminatory legislation: “The provision of defense support hereunder shall not be governed by restrictions of US law other than those generally applicable to recipients of such defense support.” This makes it clear that there are no restrictions that apply only to Turkey.

Caglayangil: I regret that I am not in a position to give you satisfaction on this. I shall explain this. I do not agree that my own country should be subject to US legislation. I do not understand the reason for it. I could possibly discuss certain conditions in the case of grants, but in the case of cash purchases I cannot.

Secretary: This is a problem. I can understand your refusal to accept restrictions that apply only to Turkey. Under those conditions your answer would be decisive. But the United States Administration is authorized by Congress to sell arms to any country, including the British or others, under certain laws. This apples to the Executive. They say: NATO and others.

Esenbel: He (Caglayangil) says that on grant aid it is okay but cash purchases are different.

Secretary: You, Mr. Ambassador, are active on the Hill where you control more votes than I do. In principle, you may be right. You may say: “Why should we attach conditions to what we sell?” The fact is that Congress has always attached conditions and this has been accepted by the Turkish Government. The FRG and Israel are subject to the same restrictions. To remove them we would have to go to Congress and change the law. This is not possible. We must one way or another tell Congress that the conditions apply to this Agreement. We do not, however, insist on using the word “restrictions”. Is this right, Monroe?

Leigh: We could say “requirement”.

Secretary: Yes, “requirement” or “regulation”.

Leigh: “Provisions of US law.”

Secretary: Yes, if you want to avoid the term “US law” you could say “those legal provisions other than those applicable to other recipients of US defense support.”

Caglayangil: (After consultation with his colleagues) I appreciate your difficulty, Mr. Secretary. I have a formulation which I hope would not disturb certain circles in Turkey: “Defense support provided to Turkey shall be effectuated in accordance with the general practice applicable to all other recipient countries.”

Secretary: Could you substitute “provision” for “practice”?

Caglayangil: You don’t mention American law?

Secretary: Yes, that is right. In paragraph 1 of Article XX, after

Caglayangil: Both no! We can use our phrase instead. It covers your preoccupation.

Secretary: I am not worried about the difference between “practice” and “provision”. There are many practices, however, and this might be broader than you want. If we reference our agreements, we will have a framework and this would avoid intrusion of the Cyprus problem. If we keep the other phrase we can accept “general practice.”

Elekdag: (After consultation with Caglayangil) He says that if we keep “within the framework, etc.” why add this other phrase. Secretary: The advantage to you is that it prohibits us from passing discriminatory legislation against Turkey. The kind of legislation passed a year ago would have been contrary to this agreement. That sentence actually adds to your advantage.

Yavuzalp: (After consultation) How about “in accordance with contractual obligations and with the general practices, etc.” and a period after “this article”? “In accordance with contractual obligations and with the general practices applicable to all other recipient countries.”

Secretary: Is this all right? I can go to jail.

Monroe Leigh: Yes. If you prefer “existing agreement” instead it is okay. “Contractual obligations” is rather vague.

Esenbel: Our understanding is “contractual obligations applicable to all other recipients.”

Secretary: One concern that Monroe Leigh raises is that he says: If you say “contractual obligations” without saying “between the parties” someone may find another agreement that would apply.

Caglayangil: We cannot mention “between us.” They will ask in Turkey if there is a secret agreement.

Secretary: We can live with this.

The next problem we have is the duration of the Agreement and of the assistance commitment. Our first idea was to make the duration of the Agreement conform with the duration of our NATO obligations. You proposed that the duration of the Agreement and of the assistance obligation be coequal in length. As for length, I recall that you proposed three years and we, five. Three years is a little short. It throws into a nervous state all of these people who fear they will soon have to be negotiating with you again.

Caglayangil: The duration of the Agreement and of the assistance provision also relates to the amount of assistance to be provided. I am unable to discuss duration at this stage, independently of the amount of assistance.

Secretary: Okay.

Caglayangil: I don’t think we can put an article into the Agreement stipulating that the duration of the Agreement will be the same as the North Atlantic Treaty, but we could possibly state in the preamble that it is the parties’ express conviction that their security relationship will last as long as they both adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Secretary: I think we can live with that. We can agree later on actual duration. There remains the problem of how mention of extending the Treaty should be drafted. We would prefer language indicating that the Treaty will be automatically extended unless one party gives notice of an intention to terminate. This is stating the problem somewhat negatively.

Caglayangil: There is already in the Agreement a clause which says the Treaty will continue unless either party gives a year’s notice of intention to terminate. I don’t see any purpose in further elaborating that point.

Secretary: Yes, but we would like to have it read that the Treaty will be extended unless there is a notice of intention to terminate.

Caglayangil: I agree.

Secretary: Then we understand that the Treaty continues unless one party gives one year’s notice of intention to terminate prior to the expiration period. There is one more technical point to be taken up before turning again to the assistance question. In the current text of the Agreement it is stated that the annexes will be an integral part of the Agreement. We see some difficulty with this. If we do it, Congress will say that it cannot approve the Agreement until it sees the annexes. Since the annexes are highly technical in nature and may take some time to produce, what I would prefer to do, in order to avoid delay in submitting and getting the Agreement through Congress, is to eliminate all references to annexes in the text. Let’s simply agree that within six months, or three months if you prefer, or whatever is reasonable, we will negotiate the annexes. I am suggesting this in order not to delay moving the Agreement through Congress. If we retain the present language, it will unquestionably hold the Agreement up. If we agree on this point among ourselves, we can go ahead and get the Agreement approved by Congress while we are negotiating the annexes.

Yavuzalp: Could we reflect our understanding on this point in an exchange of notes?

Secretary: If we gave a note and Congress got wind of it, we would have to give the note to Congress, and that would arouse their concerns and occasion unnecessary delay.

Caglayangil: We have had an unfortunate experience in the past with the negotiation of implementing agreements. It took us two and a half years to negotiate and sign the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement. That Agreement noted that there were special circumstances surrounding certain aspects of our cooperation and that we would conclude the necessary implementing agreements to handle those questions within six months. That was in 1969. When our Government resigned in 1971 no implementing agreements had been concluded. When we came back to power in 1974 we found that only one agreement had been signed. If these annexes are not concluded in three months, we shall have problems. Perhaps we should insert a clause in the Agreement saying that if the annexes are not concluded, we shall suspend all U.S. activities at the facilities (sic).

Secretary: All I am trying to do is to avoid giving Congress any opportunity to delay approval of the Agreement. This is a purely technical detail that we are addressing.

Caglayangil: I appreciate your point…

Secretary: Monroe? (To Mr. Leigh)

Leigh: Maybe we should look at the Minister’s proposal about a clause specifying that if the annexes are not concluded in three months, there would be a suspension of operations.

Secretary: Can we simply say in the Agreement that the necessary implementing agreements or administrative agreements shall be concluded in three months?

Elekdag: The Minister agrees that we don’t necessarily have to mention annexes in the Agreement as such…

Secretary: If we had a clause saying that any necessary implementing agreements shall be negotiated in three months, wouldn’t that be all right? That is not the same thing as saying in the Agreement or to Congress that there definitely will be annexes or implementing agreements. It would only say that any necessary annexes will be negotiated in three months.

Macomber: Particularly if we tell Congress the subject matter, which is fairly technical.

Secretary: The Deputy Secretary of Defense says that he will bring pressure on his people to insure that these annexes are negotiated within three months. I think we could live with a phrase like the one I suggested. Then if Congress asks what the additional agreements are about, we could say that they relate to lists of heavy equipment, etc. I would rather do it that way than through a secret exchange of notes. Once Congress got wind of an exchange of notes, they would really get suspicious, but a clause buried here in the Agreement should not cause us any trouble.

Mr. Foreign Minister, my Legal Adviser has another suggestion. We could put a clause in the Agreement saying that you would not allow us to reopen our facilities until there had been an exchange of acceptances of the Agreement. Actually, as I think about this suggestion, though, I don’t really like it. Frankly, if we agree to this, it will give you total control of the situation. The problem that bothers me, frankly, is that we can’t wait forever to get these facilities opened. You see what would happen if Congress approved the Agreement within a month, but you then said you could not let us resume operations until all the annexes were negotiated. You see the problem that would create for us. Maybe we should go back to my suggestion of a clause saying that any implementing agreements which may be necessary shall be negotiated in three months. If you don’t like the term “implementing agreements,” we could use “technical arrangements.”

Caglayangil: I don’t think there should be any great problem about concluding the annexes quickly. In effect, the armed forces of our two countries have already agreed on the language of the Agreement we have before us, which outlines the principles of their cooperation. All the principles and purposes of that cooperation appear in the Agreement. We should not have much difficulty on the annexes.

Secretary: Do you think we should refer to annexes or technical arrangements in the Agreement, or should we say nothing?

Caglayangil: It should be stated in the Agreement that the annexes will be completed in three months. It is not foreseen that we could permit reactivation until the annexes are completed.

Secretary: But you will understand that it would be impossible for us to implement our side of the Agreement so long as the installations stay closed. Theoretically, at least, we would have to start implementing our side of the Agreement as soon as we obtained Congressional approval of the Agreement, while you waited for the annex for each installation to be completed before permitting resumption of activities at that facility.

(Lengthy discussion among the Turkish delegation at the table.)

Caglayangil: Mr. Secretary, I would like to have clarified exactly what it is we are addressing. I want to try to understand your point. Do you mean to say that the sequence of events will be like this: We will sign an Agreement, then you will submit it to Congress, where it will be ratified. On our side we will ratify at the same time, but what then happens to the installations if at that point the implementing agreements are not concluded? What do we do about resuming U.S. activities? Is that what you are asking? If you are discussing that, I must say that it would not be possible. (i.e. resumption of activities prior to conclusion of the annexes.)

Secretary: No. Let me clarify. There is a Greek lobby in Congress which knows that this Defense Cooperation Agreement will lift all remaining restrictions on arms to Turkey. They will use every device to delay Congressional approval of the Agreement. The more things we put into the Agreement about additional annexes, understandings, etc., the more opportunities we give them to delay. If we put in a clause saying there are a number of annexes that will be concluded in three months, Ambassador Esenbel’s good friend Mr. Brademas, who is invited to the Turkish Embassy all the time, will simply say “Let’s wait three months to see what is in the annexes. It looks like another secret Agreement by Kissinger. Let the Congress see what the annexes are before we vote our approval.” Actually, I am changing my mind. I think it might be best to go back to Monroe Leigh’s suggestion. We could agree in effect to exchange letters of acceptance. We could put the Agreement to Congress and let it begin looking at the Agreement. If, in the meantime, the annexes have not been concluded, simply don’t send us your letter of acceptance, and you will not be considered to be breaking the Agreement. If the annexes are completed, then send your letter. If we put anything else in the Agreement implying that there are arrangements or agreements still to be concluded, that will give Congress an excuse to await the whole package. Then the thing will be pushed aside because of the Presidential campaign, and Congress will never act. Let us put in language talking about an exchange of acceptances. No one will know exactly what that means.

Caglayangil: What you have said about references to annexes appears in Article XXII. In fact, there are several references to annexes in the Agreement.

Secretary: Then we will have the Working Group take them out.

Caglayangil: I agree.

Secretary: We should have the Working Group organized so as to get to work right away when we finish. Is there anything left to discuss?

(Laughter)

The only question left has to do with assistance levels. We ought to be able to discuss that and also settle the Cyprus problem before going to see the President. Am I wrong? Should we leave the Cyprus problem to settle tomorrow?

Caglayangil: Tomorrow. We have made progress this afternoon in a way conforming to all the requests of the Secretary. Then I take it that tomorrow will be my day and that you will accept whatever I say?

Secretary: Shall we discuss the assistance level today, or do you want to leave that until tomorrow?

Caglayangil: No, today.

Secretary: I want to explain candidly how we have approached the assistance problem. We needed a figure that would have some chance of passing Congress, a figure that would relate in some manner to our historic assistance figures for Turkey. It would, of course, be possible to write any figure one chooses into the Agreement, but it would not get through Congress. That would be a humiliation for both of us. Our approach has been to try to see what the best is that we can do and then give it to you frankly, rather than make it a matter of long negotiation. That is how we approach the matter now. First, before turning to the basic assistance figure, we have discussed some additional things we might do to help Turkey meet its defense responsibilities. As regards military equipment, we have already proposed to make available T–38’s, F–100’s and one intelligence facility.

Yavuzalp: Karamursel.

Secretary: Yes. There are some other things we could do that we have not previously mentioned. We could provide 36 helicopters, a submarine rescue ship, two destroyers, the LORAN Navigation Station at Kargaburum, and give you access to the U.S. satellite communications system.

Macomber: We have advanced the date on access to the communications satellite.

Secretary: Yes, that is right. We are advancing that date by two years. In addition, I think we can get the ExIm Bank to do something for Turkey—about $50 million per year over five years.

Esenbel: For what purpose will the ExIm loans be? Defense?

Macomber: They will be oriented toward projects designed to help you with your own balance of payments.

Secretary: That’s right, they will be oriented toward projects of that kind rather than toward defense. We can offer you a combination pack age of grant and FMS of $250 million. That is the best we can do.

Esenbel: Does that include the ExIm figure?

Secretary: No, without ExIm. That is the highest we can go. We have really made a major effort. I think that your Ambassador, who knows conditions here, will agree that we have made a major effort. He won’t say it here, but he can tell you privately. Most of my advisers felt that I should make this offer to you somewhat more slowly, but I have given it to you directly as the best we can do. Do we already have a clause in the Agreement establishing annual defense consultations?

Hartman: No.

Caglayangil: I am not a technician. I understand Ambassador Macomber indicated to Mr. Elekdag earlier that the U.S. Government is prepared to provide F–100’s to replace some of our old F–100’s.

Secretary: Yes, that is right. That is not new, we have mentioned it before.

Caglayangil: This offer created anxiety and a strong negative reaction in the Turkish armed forces. They told me the age of the F–100 airplanes, and I was surprised to find they are nearly as old as I.

Secretary: Yes, but these aircraft were on the list the Turkish Air Force provided us.

Sisco: Yes, it was our understanding that the Turkish Air Force intends to use them for spare parts. These items are from your list. That is why we have offered them.

Caglayangil: Of course, everyone tends to compare his military forces with those of neighboring countries. It is well known to you what aircraft are now in the pipeline for Greece. If you could arrange with us an aircraft swap of some sort to permit us to modernize our aircraft, we might be able to make progress.

Secretary: What are you suggesting? That you give us old F–4’s for new F–4’s?

Esenbel: No, he is suggesting that we give you F–100’s for F–4’s. You have something like this with Spain.

Secretary: That is different. F–4’s were supposed to be exchanged for F–4’s. We don’t have any need for F–100’s.

Esenbel: Frankly, why not consider doing something with F–4’s? F–100’s have little life left.

Caglayangil: We really can’t discuss F–100’s, because we can’t modernize our Air Force with F–100’s.

Secretary: When you get $250 million FMS you can buy F–4’s.

Caglayangil: To modernize our Air Force, we would have to allocate all that money for F–4’s.

Elekdag: We have an obsolete Air Force. All the NATO countries are phasing out their old aircraft and replacing it with new. We propose to give back to you F–100’s and F–84’s in return for Phantoms.

Secretary: The problem is that we have no use for F–100’s and F–84’s. Hence it does not do us any good to get them. Is there any way we could use them?

Clements: No.

Elekdag: Even if the Phantoms were not completely new, they would be acceptable to us.

Caglayangil: This issue has very important implications for us because it will be taken in Turkey as an indication of the degree of importance the U.S. attaches to Turkey.

Secretary: Wait a minute. The purpose of providing you the F–100’s would be to allow you to use them for spare parts so that you could make operable the F–100 squadrons you now have. If you had $250 million in FMS you could then purchase the newer aircraft, the F–4’s. The Deputy Secretary of Defense tells me that he would see to it that the delivery priorities on the F–4 were shuffled in such a way that you would get early delivery. Isn’t that right, Bill?

Clements: Yes, we could see that at least a symbolic number of F–4’s are delivered at an early date.

Secretary: Now on the T–38’s… Elekdag: The Turkish Air Force says it doesn’t want T–38’s.

Secretary: You asked for them.

Elekdag: Well, they say they don’t want them.

Macomber: They were on the Turkish Air Force list of require ments.

Caglayangil: Frankly, when we spoke to the Turkish Air Force about T–38’s and F–100’s, they were disillusioned, dismayed and disconcerted. We want to modernize our Air Force. We can’t do it that way. We cannot modernize our Air Force by spending $250 million.

Secretary: You can’t buy modern planes with $250 million?

Elekdag: What the Minister means is that $250 million is not enough for modernizing our Air Force. This is not the solution we expected.

Secretary: But you will have $250 million every year of the Agreement. That is double the assistance being given to you now. You will have the money. In addition you could get two destroyers (sic), 36 helicopters and $50 million from ExIm. We can’t do better than that.

Esenbel: Mr. Secretary, can’t you make an effort to replace our F–100’s? They would not have to be new planes. They could be planes your Air Force is using now.

Secretary: I think we just don’t have them. Isn’t that the problem?

Clements: Yes. But what F–4 program does Turkey want? I have never understood it.

Esenbel: We want used planes, not new ones, to replace our older aircraft.

Clements: Yes, but in any case you would be paying for them under FMS.

Esenbel: We want a trade like the one you have worked out with Spain.

Secretary: But in the Spanish case, it was a swap of aircraft that they had for ours.

Hartman: Yes, we would have been able to use the F–4C’s.

Clements: How many aircraft do you think you need?

Elekdag: I told Ambassador Macomber that we need four squadrons of F–4’s.

Clements: How many aircraft are in your squadrons?

Elekdag: Twenty planes per squadron, a total of eighty.

Clements: You wish to make this change over what period of time?

Elekdag: Four years.

Secretary: You could use the FMS funds. How much is actually involved?

Clements: We would have to calculate. You don’t want eighty used F–4’s, do you?

Esenbel: Yes, used, as in the Spanish case.

Hartman: What the Spanish were prepared to return to us we needed.

Esenbel: The Spanish are shifting to the F–16. Our objective for now is to phase our Air Force into the F–4. We would be able to explain to Turkish public opinion that the U.S. had given us the additional assistance of used aircraft to modernize our Air Force.

Secretary: We have to go to the President now.

Clements: Let me work on the problem. I will see what can be done and report early tomorrow morning.

Secretary: The Deputy Secretary of Defense proposes to work on the problem. We will have an answer first thing in the morning.² In the meantime, shouldn’t the working group get started now? I must get the Foreign Minister over to the President.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Harmon Kirby and cleared in S on July 14. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s conference room.
2. At the follow-up meeting on March 25 at the Turkish Embassy, Kissinger offered