76. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State 1

5012. Subject: Cyprus Danger Signals in Greece–Cyprus Relations. Ref: Athens 3936.2

1.
We suspect that from GOT viewpoint, current Cyprus situation seems somewhat less complex than it may appear to GOG and GOC. Turks derive some grim satisfaction from “Greeks fighting Greeks,” whether antagonists are Makarios and Ioannides, Makarios and Grivas, or Makarios and Papadopoulos. (This despite fact they got along pretty well with latter.)
2.
GOT has little desire get involved in favor of one side or the other. Its basic interest in Cyprus rests on concern for Turkish community there and unwillingness for strategic reasons see unrestricted or unchallenged Greek control of island (e.g., enosis).
3.
Thus, most Turks prepared indefinitely live with present situation. In face of clearcut prospect of suppression Makarios by Ioannides or any other “hostile” Greek leadership, GOT might be prepared be a little easier on Makarios, but as yet we have seen no sign of this here.
4.
We concur wholeheartedly with recommendation for US policy contained para 11 reftel.3
Macomber
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, and USUN.
  2. Dated June 24. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 3936 from Athens, Tasca expressed increasing concern with the crisis atmosphere developing in Cyprus: “In my view, we should limit U.S. action to reinforcing our approaches to UNSYG, urge NATO SYG to keep attentive watching brief and encourage both to work directly with the London–Zurich signatories. Within this context, when opportunities occur, consistent with our secondary role in the complex of problems, we should seek to discourage solution based upon violence, and gambling that somehow violent solution will bring positive gains to any of the parties of lasting value.” (Ibid.)