Agreement has been reached within the Alliance on the attached text of
the US note of reply to the Soviet note
of September 12 on MBFR/CSCE and on attached oral points to be
made by the US in handing over the
note.2 The Secretary plans to call in
Ambassador Dobrynin this week to
convey the US note of reply and to make
the agreed oral points. Also attached is a paper outlining the main
issues involved in reaching agreement among the Allies on the US note of reply, particularly the question
of participation by flank countries in MBFR talks and our proposed approach to dealing with this
issue when the US note of reply is handed
to the Soviets and thereafter.
Attachment 49
Main Issues
The Soviet Note. During Dr. Kissinger’s visit to Moscow last
month, the Soviets handed to him on September 12 an outline of the
sequence envisaged for MBFR and
CSCE initial talks and
subsequent discussions (Tab C). In sum, the Soviet note
envisages
|
1972 November 22 |
Multilateral preparatory talks for CSCE at Helsinki. |
|
1973 Late January |
Preliminary consultations on questions of procedure and
organization relating to the problem of reducing armed
forces and armaments first of all in Central Europe. |
| Late June |
The CSCE conference will
begin its work in Helsinki. |
| September or October |
A conference on the problems of reducing armed forces and
armaments in Europe will start. |
The note marked the first Soviet acceptance of firm dates for MBFR talks, though it (a) clearly
seeks to limit the extent of discussion at the first MBFR session to matters of
organization and procedure and (b) proposes a firm date for the
CSCE meeting at Ministerial
level to begin.
The Participation Issue. The general Allied
reaction to the Soviet note was favorable, and they are prepared to
agree with the scenario outlined, as currently reflected in the
US draft reply. The flank
states—Turkey particularly—insisted, however, that they be
represented at the talks. The Turks proposed that there be rotating
participants from each flank, with advisers from the other flank
states present. This conflicted with the US preference that the talks be limited to states with
forces and territories involved. A US
attempt to achieve consensus against flank participation failed, but
the Turks accepted a US proposal
entailing two rotating flank representatives present at the talks
who would
- —be designated, like other participants, as
“representatives”;
- —not sign possible agreements emerging from MBFR talks;
- —not participate directly in formal decisions reached in
those talks;
- —have the right to speak on issues of direct concern upon
the invitation of one or more participants;
- —have the right to circulate papers; and
- —have the right to have present advisers of the same
nationality.
Handling the Flank Participation Issue with the
Soviets. While the Turks would have preferred to have the
US address the flank
participation issue in its reply to the Soviet note, they agreed
with a strong majority, led by the US, that the issue be deferred until the Soviets reply to
the US note and each of the Western
participants issues similar formal notes of invitation to
participate in MBFR talks to each
of the prospective Eastern participants (USSR, GDR, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary). These notes indicate the special
arrangements governing the flank representatives, and would be
delivered in about two weeks, following Allied agreement on the
wording. We favor informing the Soviets about Western participation
in this manner in order to
- —avoid raising a possibly contentious issue with the
Soviets that could delay a Soviet reply to the US response;
- —have the Western participants signal their participation
preference on a joint basis, which would (a) enhance its
weight and (b) deflect from the US flank recriminations in the event the
Soviets objected to expanding Western participation beyond
those states with forces in the FRG, Benelux, GDR,
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the area outlined to the
Soviets by Mr. Kissinger as the US preference.
In deference to Allied wishes, we have agreed that we should state
orally in delivering the US reply
that Allied views would be communicated later. The Turks,
nonetheless, reserved the right to press bilaterally with the
Soviets their preference for having advisers of other flank
countries present at the talks behind the rotating flank
participants.
Particularly in light of recent stories, the Soviets may choose to
make an issue of the participation question, going so far as to make
confirmation of the US reply
contingent on a satisfactory clarification on Western participation.
However, if they should do so, they would risk forfeiting US and Allied agreement to the November
22 date for initial CSCE talks.
In the event that, after CSCE talks
begin in November, the Soviets seize upon the flank participation
issue as a reason to defer the January 1973 MBFR talks, we could make clear to the Soviets that our
agreement to their note was based on the understanding that an
overall program was envisaged, and that their refusal to proceed
with MBFR talks in January could
call into question the June date they proposed for the CSCE meeting at Ministerial level. In
practice, the Allies will be in a position to slow the pace of
multilateral preparatory talks if the Soviets prove
intransigent.
In light of the tangled and sensitive history of this issue, we
believe that, in presenting the US
reply and in dealing with the participation issue, the US should not go beyond the statement
that, following Mr. [Page 362]
Kissinger’s discussions in
Moscow, we and our Allies have consulted at length on the matter of
their participation in MBFR talks,
and that the resulting Allied consensus of Allied views on this
subject will be communicated later. If pressed, we believe that the
US should indicate only that we
are not prepared to go further in dealing with this question at this
time.
Other Aspects of the US Reply and Oral Points. The following are
other salient aspects of the US reply
agreed by the Allies:
- —We purposely omit reference to Helsinki as the site for
CSCE itself, since the
venue should be agreed by all participants during
preparatory talks at Helsinki.
- —The Soviets proposed that the initial MBFR talks address only
procedures and organization; by contrast, a majority of
Allies feel strongly that it must embrace substantive
questions. An Allied consensus, however, has emerged that
the subsequent negotiations require some exchange of views
on substantive issues relevant to setting an agenda during
the initial talks. However, we believe that the Soviets will
resist strongly any detailed substantive discussion, and
Allied positions for the initial talks will have to be
tailored carefully with this in mind.
- —We use the date January 31, 1973 for initial MBFR talks, since it is the
latest date in January, and thus allows us maximum time
after the Inauguration to complete preparations.
- —We use the phrase, “mutual and balanced force
reductions,” rather than the Soviet phrase, “the problem of
reducing armed forces and armaments,” because of MBFR’s history since 1968 as
the Allied description of their objective.
- —The Soviet note indicated that MBFR talks would be conducted in a place other
than Helsinki. The US reply
does not suggest a venue, since the Allies have not yet
reached agreement, though Geneva remains a majority
preference. There is also general Allied agreement that the
talks should not take place in Helsinki.
