Iran 1971
109. Telegram 218 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
MacArthur warned that the Shah, indignant over the consortium’s delay in meeting with OPEC Persian Gulf producers, was threatening unilateral OPEC cutbacks.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 3 OPEC. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Beirut, to Tripoli, London, Paris, the Hague, Caracas, OECD Brussels, OECD Paris, NATO, Jidda, Kuwait, Dhahran, Tokyo, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, and Algiers.
110. Letter From President Nixon to the Shah of Iran
Nixon expressed concern at the conflict between oil-producing countries and the oil companies, and dispatched Under Secretary Irwin to act as an intermediary.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Iran. No classification marking. Drafted at the Department of State on January 15 by Nicholas Veliotes (U). Identical letters were sent to the King of Saudi Arabia and the Emir of Kuwait
111. Telegram 277 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Under Secretary Irwin reported back to President Nixon and Secretary Rogers on his meeting with the Shah, in which the Shah lobbied for a separate Persian Gulf oil agreement rather than the OPEC-wide deal that the companies sought.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Iran. Secret; Nodis. Repeated to Jidda, Kuwait, Dhahran, Tripoli, London, The Hague, OECD Paris, and EC Brussels. In a telegram dated January 18, following his discussion with Amouzegar, Under Secretary Irwin recommended to the President and Secretary Rogers that the oil companies negotiate a regional oil agreement for the Persian Gulf. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 3 OPEC). Further documentation on the Irwin Mission is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974.
112. Telegram 301 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador MacArthur summarized his briefing with the consortium negotiators, in which he recommended concessions on the scope of the oil agreement.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 3 OPEC. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to London and Kuwait City. Repeated to EC Brussels, Dhahran, The Hague, Jidda, OECD Paris, Paris, and Tripoli. In Telegram 302 from Tehran, January 19, the Embassy reported a consortium representative’s remark that Amouzegar had been convinced by his talks with Irwin that Washington agreed that Gulf oil negotiations should proceed before consortium talks with Mediterranean producers began, a view which MacArthur himself seemed to share. MacArthur protested, “I gave company reps Iranian viewpoint firmly held by Shah and Amouzegar, that negotiations should proceed first with Gulf group… For them now to imply to their principals that this position (consistently held by Shah) is result of Under Secretary’s talks here yesterday and my own views today seems self serving and rather devious.” (Ibid.)
113. Telegram 495 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador MacArthur defended the credibility of Iranian assurances on oil, contradicting company claims that Finance Minister Amouzegar had raised new conditions.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 3 OPEC. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to London and to Tripoli. In Telegram 16444 to Tehran, January 30, the Department advised MacArthur to approach Amouzegar regarding the oil companies’ concern that Iranian promises against “whipsaw” in oil pricing had been weakened
114. Telegram 722 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador MacArthur and his British counterpart rejected the oil companies’ request for a formal démarche to Iran to resolve remaining disputes with OPEC. The U.S. ambassador favored a message from the President to the Shah to help cement the final deal.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 3 OPEC. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to London. In Telegram 476 from Jidda, February 14, Ambassador Thacher wrote, “we should avoid any action tending to endorse the arbitrary short deadlines and coercive legal measures by which U.S. corporations were forced on very short notice commit themselves to payments of billions of dollars over the next few years.” (Ibid.) In Telegram 28309 to Tehran, February 19, Rogers informed Zahedi that “The settlement just reached with the companies is of great importance … in assuring stable market arrangements during the five-year period of the agreement. Of particular importance to the negotiations and us were the assurances given in this respect at the time of Mr. Irwin’s visit.” (Ibid.)
115. Intelligence Note RECN–3 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
The report summarized the terms of the final oil agreement between OPEC’s Persian Gulf members and the international oil companies.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential. Drafted by Harvey T. Clew (INR/Economic). Released by Leonard Weiss (INR).
116. Airgram A–56 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The report examined the attitudes of Iranian youth and the implications of these attitudes for US foreign policy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–2 IRAN. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Embassy Youth Committee. Cleared by Arnold L. Raphel. Approved by Donald R. Toussaint. Repeated to Khorramshahr and Tabriz. In a comment to Jack Miklos, May 4, Timothy Childs agreed that the attitudes of the activist youth were widespread, but that their beliefs would be tempered by time. Of the suggestion that the U.S. government attempt to draw nearer to the activists, Childs wrote “the only way to do that would be for the United States to urge, and be seen to be urging, further steps towards liberalization upon the Shah. For a variety of reasons I am sure we would be most hesitant to do this. Therefore I conclude that we should not worry too much about the ill-informed views of activist youths. By the time they reach positions of influence it should be apparent to them that the United States has a lot to offer Iran.” (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D351, Box 6, POL 13–2, Students, Youth Groups, Iran 1971.)
117. Intelligence Memorandum
The memorandum judged that despite the considerable increase in income as a result of the oil deal, Iran was likely to continue deficit spending.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, Job 79T00935A, Box 55, CIA/ER IM 71–43, Project 45.6028. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Office of Economic Research and Coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.
118. Telegram 36768 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, London, Tehran, and the Consulate in Dhahran
Prior to broaching the question of the Gulf islands and the proposed Gulf federation with the British, the Department solicited views on what role the U.S. Government might usefully play.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Joseph W. Twinam (NEA/ARP); cleared by Murphy (NEA/ARP), Miklos (NEA/IRN), Burns (EUR/BMI), Sisco (NEA), Davies (NEA), Robert T. Curran (S/S). In Telegram 1068 from Tehran, March 6, the Ambassador discouraged the Department’s proposal in paragraph 3C: “Given GOI’s adamant insistence upon validity of its claim to islands, we do not rpt not believe Iran would agree to any such ‘reexamination’ as GOI would fear such action would be construed as meaning Iran itself did not believe it had entirely valid claim.” MacArthur also added, “We see virtually no prospect of US and UK (or both) having success in encouraging Iranian support of even truncated federation without assurance of agreement between Iran and UK permitting Iranian presence on islands before UK withdrawal.” (Ibid.)
119. Telegram 2491 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State
Ambassador MacArthur informally proposed to Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home the introduction of an Iranian civilian presence on the disputed Gulf islands prior to the British withdrawal.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tehran, Kuwait, Jidda, and Dharan. In Telegram 376 from Dhahran, March 27, Dinsmore reported that Murphy when in the Gulf Sheikdoms had heard repeatedly that Iranian seizure of the islands would present an opportunity for dissidents to rise up against the rule of the sheiks and that the “United States would be tarred with same brush because area’s people aware of close U.S.-Iranian ties and there is assumption that what Iran does is in line with US desires…” Under normal circumstances, after the UK’s withdrawal, “at least Sharja’s and Dubai’s rulers would probably turn to Iran for help in time of trouble. Seizure of islands would render this kind of relationship with Iran out of question … Iran is setting course toward seriously weakening its ties with Arabs.” (Ibid.)
120. Memorandum of Conversation
Iranian Ambassador Afshar, reminding Under Secretary Irwin and Country Director Miklos of the Iranian role in the Gulf region, expressed the hope that Iran would be able to secure additional military equipment from the United States.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Miklos. Approved in U. The meeting took place in the Under Secretary’s office.
121. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger advised Nixon to discuss a proposed visit to Iran during his upcoming meeting with Ambassador MacArthur.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Middle East Files, Iran, Vol. III, 1/1/71–8/31/71. Confidential. Sent for information. A note on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
122. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Ambassador to Iran (MacArthur), and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)
Discussing a presidential visit to Iran, Nixon and MacArthur analyzed that country’s role in the Gulf, and its significance as an ally.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 475–23. Secret. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume
123. Memorandum of Conversation
Meeting with representatives from the departments of Defense and State, Ambassador MacArthur stressed Iran’s importance as the lone strong U.S. asset between Europe and Japan.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (NEA/IRN).
124. Letter from the Shah of Iran to President Nixon
At the behest of the UAR Government, the Shah urged President Nixon to pressure Israel to accept an Arab-Israeli peace settlement based on UNSC Resolution 242, Secretary Roger’s peace plan, and Ambassador Gunnar Jarring’s proposals.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Iran, M.R. Pahlavi, Shah of Iran Correspondence. No classification marking.
125. Telegram 1935 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador MacArthur alerted the Department that the Shah hoped to bridge the gap between the recent Persian Gulf oil settlement and the more favorable terms that Libya had just secured.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Tripoli.
126. Airgram 136 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Embassy reported on the recent outbreak of student strikes on Iranian university campuses and the crackdown which had followed.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–2 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Raphel; cleared by Charles W. McCaskill; and approved by L. Douglas Heck. Repeated to Khorramshahr and Tabriz. Major General Zia Farsioo, the Chief of the Judge Advocates Office, was responsible for executing thirteen student dissidents from an anti-Shah, allegedly pro-Beijing group known variously as Siah Kal, Lahijan, and the Iranian Liberation Organization. He was assassinated by the group on April 7, 1971. (Attachment to Donald Toussaint to Jack Miklos, February 11, 1972, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D410, Box 7, INT, Intelligence, General Iran, 1972.)
127. Telegram 2495 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador MacArthur notified the Department that instances of “externally directed and supported” anti-government subversion in Iran had increased in recent months.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Moscow.
128. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger summed up the series of letters from the Shah which assured Nixon of the UAR’s good intentions and requested that the U.S. Government press the Israelis to change their position in the peace negotiations.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Iran, M.R. Pahlavi, Shah of Iran Correspondence. Secret. A stamp on the document reads “The President has seen.” Tab A is published as Document 129. Tab B is not published. Tab C is published as Document 124.
129. Letter From President Nixon to the Shah of Iran
Nixon replied to the Shah that a peace settlement must be the work primarily of the Arabs and the Israelis, although the United States was working with both sides within the Jarring mission framework.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Iran, M.R. Pahlavi, Shah of Iran Correspondence. No classification marking. In Telegram 1885 from Tehran, April 13, Ambassador MacArthur discussed with Zahedi the Shah’s first letter, countering that although Washington was making great efforts, the United States was not in a position to impose a solution on Israel, which would only harden Tel Aviv’s stance. When MacArthur added that Israel had strong domestic opposition to placate, Zahedi responded that the United States also had domestic political concerns to consider in the matter. (Ibid., Box 1268, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 1/1/71–5/31/71.)
130. Telegram 3128 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Ambassador wrote that a former leftist Iranian student, Bahram Daryani, had publicly charged U.S. organizations, including the FBI, with facilitating anti-Iranian activities in the United States.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–2 IRAN. Confidential.
131. Telegram 3146 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
In meetings with minister of Agriculture Zahedi and Minister of Court ALAM, Ambassador MacArthur voiced dismay about the Daryani charges, to which ALAM replied that Iranians felt that the U.S. Government should do more to restrain Iranian students in the United States.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–2 IRAN. Confidential; Exdis. In June 1970, for example, when the Shah’s twin sister, Princess Ashraf, visited San Francisco, 40 Iranian students, who raided the Iranian Consulate General in protest, were arrested. However, the U.S. Government declined the request of Iranian officials that the detainees be deported. (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 76D470, Box 9, Chronological Memoranda of Conversation, Iran 1970.) The Embassy reported other possible explanations, including the idea that SAVAK, following its disclosures of communist activities in Iran, wanted to demonstrate independence of western influence, or that the Shah was putting Washington on the defensive at a time when he was contemplating relations with Communist China. (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D351, Box 6, POL 13–2, Students, Youth Groups, Iran 1971.)
132. Telegram 3242 From the Embassy in Iran to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)
Ambassador MacArthur questioned Minister of Court ALAM as to whether underlying Iranian grievances against the United States had motivated the Daryani affair.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–2 IRAN. Secret; Nodis.
133. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger recommended that the President sign a waiver to allow Iran to continue to receive grant military assistance despite its reclassification the previous year as a “developed” country.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1268, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran Military, 1/1/71–12/31/71. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum from OMB Director George Shultz, June 9, is not published. The President signed the attached waiver, Presidential Determination No. 71–18, on June 24, 1971
134. Telegram 119690 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
The Department of State notified the Embassy of the credit terms authorized by the Export-Import Bank for Iran’s FY 1972 military purchases.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by John Lentz; cleared by Glenn McLaughlin, Don Bostwick (XMB), and Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (NEA/IRN); and approved by Paul H. Boeker (E/IFD/ODF).
135. Telegram 3589 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador MacArthur conveyed to the Department his support for the Shah’s interest in employing Major General Hamilton Twitchell as a consultant to the Iranian Armed Forces following Twitchell’s retirement as Chief of the U.S. Army Mission in Iran/Military Assistance Advisory Group (ARMISH/MAAG).
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 IRAN. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense and CINCSTRIKE.
136. Memorandum From the Chief of the Free World Division, Central Intelligence Agency, ([ name not declassified ]) to the Central Intelligence Agency Heroin Coordinator ([ name not declassified ])
In response to a White House request, the CIA prepared a paper weighing the merits of asking the Shah to ban future poppy cultivation in Iran.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, Job 80T01315A, Box 24, S–3686–S3716. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.
137. Telegram 4015 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador MacArthur reported to the Department on the terms of the consortium’s agreement with Iran for additional revenue outside the terms of the five-year settlement.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Repeated to London, Vienna, Jidda, Kuwait, and Dhahran
138. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to Secretary of State Rogers
Helms discussed Ambassador MacArthur’s concern that the insecurity of Iranian communications allowed the Soviets access to details of U.S.-Iranian diplomacy.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80B01086A, Box 1, Executive Registry Subject Files, I–13, Iran. Secret. The letter is a copy with an indication that Helms signed the original.