162. Telegram Tosec 794/104621 From the Department of State to the Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency 1 2
Following sent action Jerusalem, Islamabad, New Delhi, London, Ottawa, May 18, from SecState rptd to you:
Quote
Subject:
- Indian Nuclear Tests
1. This cable provides strictly preliminary weekend assessment of some of the implications of India’s nuclear detonation. It does not profess to take account of all possible reactions and concerns from the numerous areas of the USG with an interest in this development. The immediate impact of course will be felt in connection with CENTO Ministerial meeting and we are developing guidance separately for that session, relating particularly to what we expect will be strong expressions of concern from Pakistanis, linked to their continuing efforts to achieve change in US arms policy. Meanwhile, we are holding strictly to low-key guidance contained Secto 764 in response public and press queries.
2. The nth power has finally come forward. The Indian test is a setback to nonproliferation; we had made it clear to the Indians that we opposed a test by them, even one labelled, as in this instance, a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). The implications could be considerable, both with regard to South Asia and in the broad nonproliferation context. The challenge is no longer keeping India from going nuclear; it is stabilizing a new nuclear “power” within the international framework and trying to dissuade others from following suit. Now that the barrier has been broken by India this task will be more difficult. However, none of the other near-nuclears—Japan, Israel, South Africa—are likely to be decisively influenced by the Indian action. The most immediate problem will be containing the Pakistani reaction.
3. South Asia. The Indian test is bound to have an unsettling effect on the South Asia scene, most particularly on the Pakistanis. Whatever the Indians say, the Pakistanis will regard India’s going nuclear as posing a new threat to Pakistani security. It will intensify their efforts to get a change in our arms policy; they could seek added security assurances from China and the US. They could conceivably decide to launch their own crash program, although we estimate that their capabilities for doing this are extremely limited.
4. With respect to our bilateral relations with India, the test also causes concern. We have long urged the Indians not to test, and they know that in so doing they are disregarding our views. A November 16, 1970 aide memoire to the Indian Atomic Energy Agency Commission stressed the USG position that any nuclear device, including one labelled a peaceful nuclear explosion was tantamount to the development of a nuclear weapon. It appears probable that in developing their device, the Indians used heavy water that we provided for the Canadian supplied CIRUS research reactor. In our November 1970 aide memoire we stated that the US would consider use US nuclear materiel in development of PNE’s a contravention of the terms under which it was made available. (Separate message reviews our intelligence assessment on materiel used in test.)
5. The Indian test also comes at a particularly awkward time in the process under way to build a new Indo-US relationship when the Indians are turning to us for renewed economic and possibly foodgrain assistance and are assuming a visit to South Asia by the Secretary. We note that the Indian Foreign Secretary expressed his “devout hope” to our Charge that Indo-American relations would not be set back. We agree with Embassy Delhi that the decision to test now was at least in good part an attempt on Mrs. Gandhi part to distract Indian concerns from an increasingly depressing domestic scene, and to provide a morale booster to flagging spirits.
6. There will be several policy issues relating to South Asia that have to be addressed:
A. Secretary’s visit. A visit to India in the next few weeks could be seen as somehow condoning the Indian action. On the other hand, the Secretary’s visit to the area would serve our larger interests, particularly since it would include Pakistan and Bangladesh as well. Since the visit has not been formally scheduled there is the option of letting the matter ride for perhaps a few months.
B. Aid talks. Although the economic cost of the test is fairly minimal (we estimate $10–20 million) there will be sentiment in Congress that any new aid to India will be eaten up by nuclear development.
C. South Asian arms policy. In real terms, the Indian test is irrelevant to the South Asian arms balance. India already has overwhelming superiority over Pakistan without a nuclear weapons capability. Even generous US supply of conventional weaponry to Pakistan would not affect this. Nonetheless, the test is likely to increase substantially Pak pressures for a revision of our arms policy.
7. Nonproliferation. In the nonproliferation context, the Indian test comes at a bad time. In 1975 there will be an international conference to review the NPT. By breaking the nth country barrier India has made it difficult for us to argue the value of the NPT and has in particular made it easier for other potential nuclear powers to claim their “right” to detonate underground “peaceful” nuclear explosions.
8. Finally, other potential nuclear powers will be watching closely to see how we react to the Indian test as a gauge of our real attitude towards proliferation. Specifically, if it becomes clear that US materials were used, they will want to see whether we continue to take seriously our peaceful uses agreements as precluding utilization of US-supplied material or equipment for PNE’s.
Rush
Unquote.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. It was drafted and approved by Kurze. It was repeated priority to London for Moynihan; and sent immediate to the Mission in Geneva. In Telegram 764 from Damascus, May 18, Kissinger instructed that the Department not issue a strong statement on the Indian nuclear test. Official reaction was to be limited, and any statement would be to the effect that American policy does not favor nuclear proliferation in general because of its adverse effect on world stability. (Ibid.)↩
- Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush acknowledged Secretary of State Kissinger’s orders for a “low-key” response to the Indian nuclear test and speculated on its long-term implications for nonproliferation and regional instability, but requested permission to develop a longer-term response.↩