6. Telegram 143450 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan1 2
Washington, July 20, 1973,
2313Z.
Subject:
- Diplomatic Relations With Daud Regime
Refs:
- A. State 142393; B. Kabul 5319; C. Kabul 5325
- 1.
- Department appreciates Embassy’s discreet contacts with Daud and Naim and recommendation in ref. B. We also appreciate full reporting from Embassy indicating steps regime has taken to consolidate its position and its apparent success in exerting effective control throughout country.
- 2.
- The basic thrust of our approach is to play any question about recognition in as low a key as possible with a view to avoidance of seeming to approve or disapprove the new government. This is in accordance with Department practice for the past several years, and with S-Res. 205 (1969) “that it is the sense of the Senate that when the United States recognizes a foreign government and exchanges diplomatic representatives with it, this does not imply that the United States necessarily approves of the form, ideology, or policy of that foreign government.” In brief, the Department’s policy is to minimize to the greatest extent possible recognition questions. Uncertainties generated by the traditional recognition policy, which many equated with approval, have not served United States interests well. Therefore, although we have not yet formally moved to French practice of recognizing states rather than governments, we attempt to avoid direct address to the question of recognition wherever possible. Generally, once the situation has clarified, the new regime is firmly established, and other governments have begun to recognize or formally to continue diplomatic relations, we find an appropriate opportunity to advise the new government of our intention to maintain diplomatic relations. Recognition is not mentioned but may be implied. In several recent cases, however, where there have been elements of continuity in the situation (including the recent abrogation of the monarchy in Greece) the Department has taken the position that no question of recognition arises. To do so in this case where no elements of continuity are apparent would be another significant step in the direction of a general policy in which the United States does not formally recognize governments but merely determines whether to maintain diplomatic relations with them. We are presently considering whether to take this step.
- 3.
- Until consultations completed per ref A, Embassy should maintain routine working contacts and hold open lines of communication to government offices; avoid formal acts that might be construed as recognition; and avoid statements suggesting that recognition is a major question that we shall formally or dramatically decide and announce.
- 4.
- We strongly support your effort to establish informal channels of communication to Daud and wish to emphasize that questions of recognition discussed above do not in any way restrict your flexibility in establishing informal contact with new authorities. In short, contacts are being maintained and we have no objection to your providing your interlocutor with a written record of any informal message you wish to communicate, which record could be transmitted to Daud. The thrust of your message can be that we look forward to friendly and constructive relations.
Rush
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. It was drafted by Arthur Rovine (L/NEA); cleared by NEA/PAB, NEA; and approved by Mark Feldman (L). It was repeated immediate to Ankara, and to Bonn, Islamabad, London, Rome, and Tehran.↩
- The Department encouraged the tentative contacts between representatives of the Daoud regime and the Embassy.↩