Spanish Sahara, 1973–1976
87. Intelligence Memorandum
Summary: The memorandum provided background on the controversy surrounding Spanish stewardship of the Spanish Sahara, Moroccan and Mauritanian claims to the territory, Algeria’s interest in the region, and the potential for conflict. The paper also examined the impact of the controversy on U.S. interests in both North Africa and Spain.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 79R01099A, OPI 122, Box 15. Secret; [text not declassified]. The bracket in the title was printed as a footnote in the original.
88. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger assured Cortina that the U.S. position of neutrality regarding the Spanish Sahara had not changed despite recent news reports. Kissinger also explained that his upcoming trips to Morocco and Algeria were unrelated to Spain.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, October–November 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in the distinguished visitor’s lounge at the Torrejon Air Force Base. Kissinger was en route to Egypt to discuss the Middle East peace process.
89. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Boumediene discussed Algeria’s position on the Spanish Sahara.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External October–November 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Presidential Palace. Kissinger was in Algeria to review the Middle East peace process with Boumediene.
90. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and King Hassan discussed Moroccan, Spanish, Algerian, and Mauritanian positions on the Spanish Sahara. King Hassan agreed to accept the decision of the International Court of Justice, but declared that he would move forces into Spanish Sahara if Spain granted it independence.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical Files, Morocco. August 20, 1973–September 19, 1975. Secret; Nodis. Kissinger was in Morocco to discuss bilateral relations and the Middle East peace process with King Hassan.
91. Telegram 113002 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco
Summary: The Department instructed the Ambassador to meet with Foreign Minister Laraki, to express U.S. concern over Morocco’s increasingly militant posture toward the Spanish Sahara. The Embassy in Spain was instructed to inform the appropriate Spanish officials of Moroccan assurances that they would avoid the use of U.S. equipment against American allies.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent to Madrid, and repeated to the mission to the UN and Algiers. Drafted by Joseph V. Montville in NEA/AFN; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs L. Bruce Laingen, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Robert J. McCloskey (info), Skogerboe, Atherton, and Rewoods; and approved by Sisco.
92. Telegram 170882 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Summary: Kissinger issued instructions for the Ambassadors to the United Nations, Spain, and Algeria regarding U.S. policy on the Spanish Sahara.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent immediate to Rabat and Madrid, and repeated to Algiers, Nouakchott, and Paris. Drafted by Michael L. Durkee in EUR/WE and Joseph V. Montville in NEA/AFN; cleared by Sisco, Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs James J. Blake, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs William B. Buffum, and Johnson; and approved by Kissinger.
93. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Colby informed Kissinger of a report regarding Moroccan plans to invade the Spanish Sahara.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01066A, OPI 10, Box 9, Folder 23. Secret; [text not declassified].
94. Telegram 237194 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco
Summary: The Chargé was instructed to convey a message from Kissinger to King Hassan expressing concern over reports of imminent Moroccan military action in the Spanish Sahara. Kissinger advised against it and noted that any such action would lead Spain to appeal to the United Nations Security Council.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco, State Department Telegram, From SecState—NODIS. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only. Repeated to Madrid. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Alfred L. Atherton, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Harold H. Saunders; cleared by Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Robert E. Barbour, and Hoganson; and approved by Kissinger.
95. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Cortina discussed a possible Moroccan attack in the Spanish Sahara, and the need for all parties to resolve the issue through negotiations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–2401. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Robert E. Barbour; and approved by Covey on October 20. The meeting took place in the Spanish Embassy.
96. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Boutaleb discussed Morocco’s position regarding the Spanish Sahara. Boutaleb delivered King Hassan’s assurances that Morocco did not intend to engage Spain militarily in the Sahara.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–2423. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stanley T. Escudero in NEA/AFN on October 18; and approved by Covey on November 4. The non-official translation of King Hassan’s letter is ibid., P820123–2428.
97. Telegram 248532 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco
Summary: The Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to King Hassan, expressing U.S. concern over the proposed civilian march into the Spanish Sahara. Kissinger asked that King Hassan explore diplomatic measures to resolve the conflict and avoid a confrontation in the region.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to the mission to the UN, Madrid, and Tunis (Eyes Only for Assistant Secretary Atherton). Drafted by Escudero; cleared by Saunders, Barbour, Buffum, Covey (by phone), and Sisco; and approved by Johnson. In telegram 248533 to Madrid, October 19, the Embassy was instructed to inform Cortina of U.S. support for Spain’s request for a Security Council meeting, and a diplomatic settlement of the Spanish Sahara issue. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 206, Geopolitical Files, Sahara, October–November 1975)
98. Telegram 254913 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria
Summary: The Ambassador was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to Boumediene, thanking the President for explaining the Algerian position on the Spanish Sahara. Kissinger reiterated the U.S. position of neutrality on the issue, emphasized the need for a negotiated settlement within the UN framework, and offered U.S. diplomatic assistance, short of mediation, to resolve the issue.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical File, Algeria, September–December 1975. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Rabat, Madrid, Nouakchott, and the Mission to the UN. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Hoganson and Sisco; and approved by Kissinger.
99. Telegram 5445 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
Summary: Sisco reported on his meeting with Waldheim regarding the Spanish Sahara. Waldheim’s proposal involved three principal elements: Spanish withdrawal from the region by February 1, 1976; Moroccan abandonment of the Green March; UN administration to supervise the withdrawal and consult the Sahrawis.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency File, Box 19, USUN, DOS to SOS Nodis 10/1–12/31/75. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
100. Telegram 3211 From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State
Summary: Boumediene expressed his concern over the Moroccan Green March, and asked Kissinger to convince King Hassan to abandon the march.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 1, Algeria, State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only-Direct. In telegram 258841 to Madrid, October 31, Kissinger informed the Embassy that letters were sent to Waldheim, King Hassan and Boumediene in an attempt to delay the Moroccan March and allow more time for Waldheim’s proposals for a peaceful resolution of the Sahara dispute to gain acceptance. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 12, Spain, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—Exdis)
101. Telegram 258216 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco
Summary: The Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to King Hassan concerning the proposed Green March into the Sahara. Kissinger asked for the King’s views on Waldheim’s proposal for settlement of the Spanish Sahara issue and emphasized that the proposed march would increase tensions in the region.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Borg; and approved by Kissinger by telecon—Adams.
102. Telegram 3226 From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State
Summary: Parker reported on his meeting with Boumediene. Boumediene reiterated his position that responsibility for the future development of the Sahara problem rested with the United Nations and the United States. Parker responded that U.S. influence was limited, and that responsibility rested with those directly involved: Algeria, Morocco, Spain, and Mauritania.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850012–2320. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In telegram 258217 to Algiers, October 31, the Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to Boumediene regarding the proposed Moroccan Green March. Kissinger assured Boumediene of continued U.S. support for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, and reiterated that the United States was not informed of the march in advance and had limited influence on Morocco. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical File, Algeria, September–December 1975)
103. Telegram 7618 From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State
Summary: The Ambassador delivered a message from Cortina informing Kissinger of the failure of negotiations to halt the Moroccan Green March. Cortina expressed concern that soldiers would accompany marchers and attempt a military invasion of the Spanish Sahara. Cortina asked Kissinger to send a démarche to King Hassan advising against precipitous actions.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 12, Spain, State Department Telegrams, To SecState—NODIS (2). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
104. Telegram 259602 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco
Summary: The Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to King Hassan conveying the Spanish Government’s concerns about the proposed Green March, and reiterating U.S. support for a negotiated solution to the crisis.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—NODIS. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Madrid. Drafted by Weislogel; cleared by Atherton, Buffum, Rowell, Mack, and Barbian; and approved by Kissinger. Telegram 259604 (Document 106) subsequently instructed the Embassy not to show Cortina’s message to King Hassan. In telegram 259601 to Madrid, November 2, the Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to Cortina informing him of U.S. efforts to convince King Hassan to stop the Green March, and U.S. support for a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 12, Spain, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—NODIS)
105. Message From King Hassan to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)
Summary: Message from King Hassan to Kissinger in which he expressed concern that Algerian recalcitrance on the Spanish Sahara was not about self determination, but an attempt to create tension in the region and thereby create an opportunity for Soviet intervention in the Western Mediterranean.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical Files, Morocco, September 22, 1975–December 23, 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
106. Telegram 259604 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco
Summary: The Ambassador was instructed to disregard paragraph 3 of telegram 259602.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—NODIS. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Mack; and approved by Atherton.
107. Telegram 3286 From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy informed the Department of a meeting with Boumediene, who demanded the UN Security Council expel Moroccans from the Spanish Sahara. He warned that failure to do so would result in a “conflagration.” Boumediene implied that Kissinger could send a message to King Hassan and halt the march.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 1, Algeria, Department of State Telegrams, ToSecState—EXDIS. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the Mission to the UN, Madrid, Rabat, London, Moscow, Nouakchott, and Paris. The telegram is incorrectly dated 1973. In telegram 264177 to Algiers, November 7, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform Boumediene that Kissinger had received his message, that King Hassan had been informed of the U.S. position on the Spanish Sahara, and that there was little the U.S. could do to influence King Hassan on this matter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
108. Telegram 264586 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Summary: The Department offered a proposal for Waldheim to resolve the Spanish Sahara crisis, involving bilateral negotiations between Morocco and Spain under UN auspices. Kissinger requested Waldheim not indicate this was a U.S. proposal.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850011–1985. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Rabat, Madrid, Paris, and Algiers. Drafted by Buffum and Blake; cleared by Hartman, Ortiz, and Atherton; and approved by Kissinger. In telegram 5404 from Rabat, November 7, the Department was informed that Morocco had postponed the Green March for 24 hours to allow bilateral diplomatic efforts with Spain to continue, and that the Government of Morocco was willing to allow the UN to provide an “umbrella” for agreements reached with Spain.
109. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Colby provided Kissinger with an assessment of the likelihood of a Moroccan invasion of Spanish Sahara, as well as likely Spanish and Algerian responses to an invasion.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box SCI 23, Geopolitical File, Sahara, November 1975. Secret; [text not declassified]. The memorandum was sent to Kissinger as the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs in error, since he left that office on November 3.
110. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Bouteflika discussed the role of the United States in the Spanish Sahara crisis. Bouteflika asked Kissinger to become more involved, and exert greater pressure on Morocco to accept a UN referendum on the fate of the region and its inhabitants.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical Files, Algeria, September–December 1975. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in the American Ambassador’s residence. Kissinger was in Paris to attend the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.
111. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Lamrani discussed Algerian and Soviet involvement in the Spanish Sahara. Lamrani requested military support in addition to U.S. diplomatic efforts. Kissinger agreed to examine options for either direct or indirect assistance to Morocco.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820117–0422. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Weislogel on January 30; and approved by Covey on February 13. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office.
112. Telegram 1227 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State
Summary: Atherton reported on his March 1 meeting with King Hassan, in which they discussed the Sahara dispute.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840105–0879. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
113. Telegram 84513 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts
Summary: The Department informed all posts that the U.S. Government would not recognize the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR).
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff Files, Box 22, Spanish Sahara (2). Limited Official Use. Drafted by Escudero; cleared by B. Keith Huffman, Jr. in L/NEA, Director of NSC Interdepartmental Group Raymond C. Ewing, Gleysteen in ARA/CCA, Cumming in EA, and Ford in AF; and approved by Atherton. Polisario declared the creation of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic on February 28.
114. Telegram 6832 From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State
Summary: Anderson and Parker offered their observations, assessments, and conclusions on the Sahara situation and its impact on U.S. interests in the region.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff Files, Box 22, Spanish Sahara (3). Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Rabat, Algiers, and Nouakchott.
115. Telegram 263793 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations
Summary: The Department provided guidance for the U.S. delegation on the Sahara issue in preparation for the General Assembly’s Fourth Committee meeting.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff Files, Box 39, USUN (4). Confidential; Immediate; Limited Official Use. Repeated to Algiers, Rabat, and Nouakchott. The Fourth Committee met November 11 and passed a resolution, which was adopted by the General Assembly on December 1. The resolution reaffirmed a commitment to the principle of self-determination, noted the OAU session seeking a solution to the problem of Western Sahara, and postponed the question of Western Sahara until its 1977 session.
116. Intelligence Report 676
Summary: The report examined the prospect for continued conflict between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff Files, Box 22, Spanish Sahara (3). Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor Consultants. Prepared by John J. Damis in INR; and approved by P. H. Stoddard. Bracket was printed as a footnote in the original.