Nicaragua
237. Telegram 435 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reviewed political developments in the wake of a December 1972 earthquake, noting that the National Governing Council had responded to the disaster by declaring martial law and by naming Anastacio Somoza Debayle as the head of a National Emergency Committee.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, POL 2 NIC. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa, San José, San Salvador, and USCINCSO. On December 23, 1972, an earthquake measuring approximately 6.2 on the Richter scale struck Managua, killing between 5,000 and 10,000 people and destroying an estimated 70 percent of the structures in the Nicaraguan capital. In telegram 1148, February 16, the Embassy reported that opponents of Somoza had become more vocal in calling for reforms since the earthquake, adding that prominent figures in business, the professions, and agriculture who had previously avoided involvement in politics believed that “the USG and international lending agencies should press for such reforms, if for no other reason than to assure that their aid is properly and efficiently utilized. They are currently pessimistic, but are prepared to draw encouragement from any signs of change or improvement.” (Ibid.) Telegram 267 from Managua was not found.
238. Telegram 1648 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: Somoza told the visiting Commander of the U.S. Southern Command that he believed the December 1972 earthquake would lead to significant social and economic changes and that he was prepared to lead Nicaragua through those changes.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to Guatemala City, San Salvador, San José, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO for POLAD. In a March 15 letter to Country Officer Stuart Lippe, Deputy Chief of Mission Warner wrote from Managua that he and Political Officer James Cheek disagreed over the extent to which the earthquake and its aftermath had affected Nicaraguans’ political attitudes, with Cheek believing that “people are more willing to criticize the government openly and to confront it and do battle for their ideas,” while Warner was inclined to believe that “if the reconstruction and the economy go well during the next few months, the present muttering and grumbling will mostly fade away.” (Ibid., ARA/CEN/N Files, Lot 76D179, POL 15 Government, N–1973)
239. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central American Affairs (Lazar) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch)
Summary: Lazar recommended that Nicaragua not be included on the itinerary for Secretary Rogers’ upcoming trip to Latin America, noting that such a visit might be misinterpreted in the region as a sign of a U.S. preference for “client-state” relationships.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA/CEN/N Files, Lot 75D469, Nicaragua–Political, 1973. Confidential. Sent through Hurwitch. An April 19 notation by Kubisch reads: “a thoughtful memo and much appreciated.” At the end of the recommendation, Kubisch wrote: “will consider further.” Rogers made a five-hour stop in Managua on the afternoon of May 14. In a July 2 letter to Lazar, Shelton wrote that he had “never seen an official trip go off so smoothly,” adding that Rogers appeared to have been “touched by the scene of total destruction in Central Managua” and that his “sympathetic understanding was felt by others who were deeply appreciative of his feeling.” (Ibid.)
240. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: In a conversation with Embassy officers regarding Nicaraguan politics and a recent clash between the National Guard and members of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, Conservative Party leader Fernando Agüero noted that the country’s youth increasingly saw violence as the only way to bring about change. Agüero added that the FSLN therefore had a large following.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, POL 12 NIC. Confidential. Drafted by Godard on September 28 and cleared by Cheek. Beneath the “Ambassador’s Comment” section of the memorandum, a notation in an unidentified hand reads: “What else would be worthy of Ambassador’s comment?” The meeting was held in Agüero’s home. In telegram 3788 from Managua, September 18, the Embassy reported that recent clashes between Nicaraguan National Guardsmen and unidentified assailants might indicate renewed activity by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In telegram 3810 from Managua, September 19, the Embassy reported on a National Guard communiqué announcing that four FSLN members had been killed in the engagements in Nandaime. (Ibid., [no film number])
241. Airgram A–63 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: With Nicaraguan elections set for 1974, the Embassy reported on the disorganized and divided state of the Conservative Party and noted that a more credible opposition would be in the interest of both the U.S. and Nicaraguan Governments.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–1973, POL 14 NIC. Secret. Drafted by Political Officer James Cheek on October 30 and approved by Deputy Chief of Mission Leland Warner. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors.
242. Telegram 296 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that the National Liberal Party and its support structures were expected to ensure Somoza’s victory in upcoming Presidential elections, adding that the U.S. Government should encourage Somoza to exercise close control over his campaign to avoid abuses that would discredit the electoral process.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to San José, Tegucigalpa, Guatemala City, San Salvador, and USCINCSO for POLAD. Airgram A–5 from Managua, January 24, provided a detailed analysis of the National Liberal Party. (Ibid., P740005–1798)
243. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Springsteen) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)
Summary: The Department of State recommended that President Nixon politely refuse Somoza’s request for an appointment during a private visit to Washington, noting that such a meeting could be misinterpreted in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Latin America as a U.S. endorsement of Somoza and his candidacy for the Nicaraguan Presidency.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P740043–1517. Confidential. Drafted by Lippe and cleared by Bowdler and Lazar. A notation on the memorandum reads: “Request for appointment denied per Davis memo of 4/11/74 (S/S–7407273).” In an April 11 memorandum to Springsteen, Davis informed the Department that Scowcroft had called Somoza on August 10 to inform him that Nixon’s schedule was such that a meeting would be impossible. (Ibid., P740043–1522)
244. Telegram 2580 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that leading opponents of the Somoza regime had published a proclamation calling for Nicaraguans to abstain from voting in the elections scheduled for September 1, adding that the Nicaraguan Government was moving to prosecute the signers of the document.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740175–0581. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa, San José, San Salvador, and USCINCSO for POLAD. In telegram 2575 from Managua, July 1, the Embassy reported the June 28 lifting of martial law in the capital, in effect since the December 1972 earthquake. (Ibid., D740174–0702) In telegram 3185 from Managua, August 15, the Embassy reported that a criminal prosecution of the 27 signatories of the proclamation had resulted in a six-month suspension of their citizenship rights, adding that the sentence heightened the likelihood of a clash between the government and its opponents. (Ibid., D740225–0277) In telegram 192333 to Managua, August 31, the Department suggested that the Embassy informally advise the Nicaraguan Government of U.S. press interest in the “Case of the 27” and of rising congressional interest in civil rights. (Ibid., D740242–0696) Airgram A–45 from Managua, May 6, is ibid., P740048–1189.
245. Telegram 3285 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that Nicaragua’s Catholic bishops had issued a Pastoral Letter emphasizing the importance of preserving citizens’ rights and allowing dissent. The Embassy concluded that the release of the letter a short time before national elections was evidence of a move by the Church towards increased social and political activism.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740231–0025. Confidential. Repeated to Guatemala City, San José, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, and USCINCSO for POLAD. In telegram 2798 from Managua, July 17, the Embassy reported that during a meeting with Warner, Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo expressed the church’s intention to maintain a dialogue with Somoza and to avoid being used for political purposes, while adding that there would “be times when in its defense of the poor and its pursuit of social justice the church will criticize the government.” (Ibid., D740192–0871)
246. Telegram 3780 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that partial returns from the September 1 elections gave Somoza a twenty-to-one advantage over his opponent, but that a final, official tally had not been announced, further undermining the credibility of the Nicaraguan electoral process.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740273–0314. Confidential. Repeated to Guatemala City, San Salvador, San José, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO for POLAD. All brackets are in the original except “[1.]”, added for clarity. Telegram 3530 from Managua is dated September 10. (Ibid., D740252–0311) In telegram 3809 from Managua, September 30, the Embassy reported that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal had announced the official results of the elections on September 28, certifying that Somoza had won 91.7 percent of the vote. (Ibid., D740275–0983) In telegram 217787 to Managua, October 3, the Department transmitted President Ford’s personal congratulations to Somoza on his election. (Ibid., D740279–0656)
247. Airgram A–92 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: Deputy Chief of Mission Warner analyzed likely political developments in Nicaragua over the seven years that Somoza was expected to be in office. Warner predicted opposition forces would remain largely ineffective but the Somoza family’s overt domination of the country would gradually decline as the regime moved to formalize a one-party system.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P740112–1173. Confidential. Drafted by Warner and approved by Shelton. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors and “[of]”, added for clarity.
248. Telegram 4972 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: Shelton reported that 10–15 FSLN militants had occupied the home of former Agriculture Minister José María Castillo and taken approximately 20 hostages shortly after the Ambassador and his wife had left a reception there.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740376–0805. Confidential; Niact Immediate. In telegram 4974 from Managua, December 28, the Embassy reported that the Nicaraguan Government had declared martial law in response to the incident. (Ibid., D740376–0768) In telegram 4977 from Managua, December 28, the Embassy reported that the FSLN was demanding $5 million, the repeal of all repressive laws, the release of imprisoned FSLN members, the publication of FSLN pronouncements, and safe passage to Cuba. (Ibid., D740376–0801) In telegram 4985 from Managua, December 30, the Embassy reported that Somoza had negotiated an agreement with the terrorists through the intercession of the Papal Nuncio and the Archbishop of Managua. (Ibid., D740377–0190) In telegram 4994 from Managua, December 30, the Embassy reported that the hostages had been released at the airport and that a plane had carried the terrorists, 14 released prisoners, and a ransom payment to Cuba. (Ibid., D740377–0869)
249. Telegram 119 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported on widespread approval of the FSLN kidnapping incident of December 27–30 and concluded that the reaction reflected the depth of anti-Somoza sentiment more than it did any sympathy for the Sandinistas.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750610–0688. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to San José, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, Guatemala City, USCINCSO for POLAD, and USIA for ILA. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. In telegram 122 from Managua, January 10, Warner emphasized that “except among students,” he saw “no groundswell of support for the FSLN” and that the Nicaraguan Government was “firmly in control.” (Ibid., D750010–1152)
250. Telegram 568 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: Shelton assured Rogers that there had been no major violation of human rights in Nicaragua.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750047–0305. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. In telegram 28626 to Managua, February 7, Rogers stated that he had heard reports that Nicaraguan authorities had responded to the December 1974 FSLN kidnapping incident by making arbitrary arrests and killing opponents. Reminding Shelton of congressional interest in human rights, he asked Shelton for “a precise assessment of the extent to which the GON is meeting human rights standards.” (Ibid., D750046–0887) In telegram 598 from Managua, February 11, the Embassy provided a more extensive report on the human rights situation, observing that while “Nicaragua is not without its blemishes when it comes to human rights,” there had been “a distinct absence of widespread, assiduous, and severe repression of ordinary rights and liberties for the last two decades.” (Ibid., D750044–0590)
251. Telegram 1169 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy presented its justification for military aid to the Nicaraguan National Guard.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750104–0592. Secret. Repeated to DOD, JCS, and CMDR US SOUTHCOM/J–5. In telegram 15489, January 22, the Department asked Chiefs of Mission to assess the need for and effectiveness of U.S. Security Assistance to their host countries. (Ibid., D750024–0986)
252. Telegram 2529 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that the Nicaraguan political climate had improved somewhat since the tense period following the December 1974 FSLN hostage-taking incident.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750226–0551. Confidential. Repeated to USIA, Guatemala City, Panama City, San José, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors.
253. Letter From the Chief of the Political Section of the Embassy in Nicaragua (Sutton) to the Country Officer for Nicaragua (Gowen)
Summary: Sutton noted that outgoing Ambassador Shelton was prolonging his stay in Nicaragua for as long as possible and presenting himself as Somoza’s only friend in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, thereby creating difficulties for his successor.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1975, ARA/CEN, Nicaragua 1975 Subject Files, Chrons: Memos, 1975, Lot 78D69. Secret. The July 3 memorandum from Sutton to Shelton was not attached, but is ibid., POL 1–2, Basic Policies and Guidelines (Briefing Papers), N–1975. In a February 28 conversation with Kissinger, Ford suggested replacing Shelton. (Memorandum of conversation, February 28; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 9, February 28, 1975—Ford, Kissinger) An undated briefing memorandum to Ford for a May 2 meeting with Sevilla Sacasa noted that the Nicaraguan Ambassador might request the retention of Shelton, who had been severely criticized in the U.S. press for being too friendly with Somoza. (Ibid., NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 5, Nicaragua—Political, Military) James Theberge was appointed to succeed Shelton on July 11.
254. Telegram 3322 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that Somoza was outraged by Jack Anderson’s newspaper columns criticizing the Nicaraguan President’s business dealings.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 5, Nicaragua—State Department Telegrams, To Secstate—Exdis. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Columns by Jack Anderson charging Somoza with greed and corruption appeared in the Washington Post on August 18, 19, and 22. (Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, “Nicaragua Ruler is World’s Greediest,” Washington Post, August 18, 1975, p. C23; Anderson and Whitten, “Somoza Family’s Power Is Pervasive,” Washington Post, August 19, 1975, p. B13; Anderson and Whitten, “Economic Jolt Seen in Oil Decontrol,” Washington Post, August 22, 1975, p. D15) In telegram 3321 from Managua, August 25, the Embassy reported that Somoza had raised the Anderson articles when Theberge presented his credentials on August 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750293–1038) Telegram 3201 from Managua was not found.
255. Telegram 203504 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nicaragua
Summary: Sevilla Sacasa asked the U.S. Government to state publicly that it had not passed confidential information to Jack Anderson and to deny the journalist’s claim that AID funds had been improperly used in Nicaragua. The Department noted that Somoza was concerned that opposition groups might see the Anderson articles as evidence of a shift in U.S. policy towards him.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750295–0754. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Lazar and Bova and approved by Lazar. In telegram 3364 from Managua, August 27, the Embassy reported that it had encouraged Somoza not to make a public issue of the articles but that Somoza saw the Department’s response to the articles as a test of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. (Ibid., D750297–0050) In telegram 212569 to the Embassy in Managua, September 8, the Department summarized Kissinger’s note to Sevilla Sacosa assuring the Ambassador that no U.S. agency had provided documents to journalists and that AID had no claim against the Nicaraguan Government for improper use of funds. (Ibid., D750309–1112)
256. Telegram 3595 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy recommended approval for the sale of aircraft and munitions and the provision of training to the Nicaraguan Government, despite concerns that the transaction might be criticized as a form of support for Nicaraguan counterinsurgency efforts.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750317–0985. Confidential. In telegram 216121 to Managua, September 11, the Department asked for the Embassy’s views on the potential political sensitivity of the transaction, noting that Somoza reportedly viewed the case “as another test of USG attitude towards him.” (Ibid., D750315–1115) In telegram 254493 to Managua, October 25, the Department reported that approval of the transaction was proceeding but that the transfer of incendiary white phosphorus ordnance would not be approved, in accordance with a new region-wide policy. (Ibid., D750372–0624) In telegram 4291 from Managua, November 6, the Embassy reported that Somoza had been furious about the denial of white phosphorus ordnance but that he would proceed with the transaction. The Embassy concluded that “there seems to have been no significant damage to U.S.-Nicaraguan relations.” (Ibid., D750388–0456)
257. Telegram 3875 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that support for the FSLN seemed to be growing, largely because the overt opposition to Somoza was weak and divided.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750346–1126. Secret. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified or was garbled in the original. Telegram 2325 from Managua is dated June 16. (Ibid., D750210–1066)
258. Telegram 316 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that while Somoza was willing to meet Kissinger in San José during the Secretary’s upcoming Latin American tour, the Nicaraguan President had expressed his disappointment that Kissinger was not planning to visit Managua. The Embassy concluded that it was “impossible to exaggerate the psychological and political importance” to Somoza “of symbolic signs of friendship and acceptance by the United States.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850023–1970. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Telegrams 12756 and 13815 were not found. In telegram 808 from Managua to Lima, February 19, the Embassy reported that Somoza had received a phone call from Oduber informing him that the Central American Presidents’ meeting with Kissinger in San José had been changed to a Foreign Ministers’ meeting. Somoza indicated Foreign Minister Montiel would go in his stead. (Ibid., D760062–0918) In telegram Secto 4046 to Managua, February 19, the Department indicated that a tight schedule would prevent Kissinger from stopping in Managua en route to Guatemala. (Ibid., D760062–0188) Kissinger later met with Montiel in San José on February 24. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., P820121–0678.
259. Telegram 544 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: During a meeting in Managua, Rogers reassured Somoza that the U.S. policy of friendship with Nicaragua remained unchanged and that the United States would fulfill its Rio Treaty commitment to protect the countries of the hemisphere from external aggression.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760041–0121. Secret; Exdis. Telegram 494 from Managua was not found. In telegram 451 from Managua, January 29, Theberge briefed Rogers for his meeting with Somoza. (Ibid. D760034–0389) In telegram 478 from Managua, January 30, the Embassy reported that Montiel had expressed the hope that Rogers would reiterate U.S. security commitments in the wake of Cuban intervention in Angola; the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister reportedly described Nicaragua as “feeling cut away and drifting” in the face of growing doubts about U.S. willingness to resist Cuban aggression. (Ibid., D760036–0226) The Prewitt article is not further identified. For the Anderson articles see footnote 1, Document 254.
260. Telegram 867 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy concluded that U.S. military assistance to Nicaragua had a symbolic importance that was far greater than the relatively small amount of aid involved would suggest.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760067–1037. Confidential; Priority. In telegram 36160, February 13, the Department asked Chiefs of Mission in Latin American countries programmed to receive military aid to provide an assessment of “the need for, the effectiveness of, and interrelationship between, the various elements of U.S. Military Security Assistance for FY 1977.” (Ibid., D760056–1006) In telegram 186 from Managua, January 13, the Embassy reported that the FSLN guerrilla forces opposing the Nicaraguan Government were beset with internal conflicts and were winning less sympathy from the general public than they had a few months earlier. (Ibid., D760013–1194)
261. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
Summary: Theberge outlined U.S. policy objectives in Nicaragua, suggested that Nicaraguan friendship and cooperation should not be taken for granted, and emphasized the importance of military assistance as a means of assuring the Nicaraguan Government of U.S. concern for the country’s security. Theberge also recommended expanded contacts with moderate opposition groups in Nicaragua and called for continuing attention to human rights issues.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760039–1506. Secret. Included as an enclosure to airgram A–16 from Managua, March 16. The rest of the Embassy’s draft of the Fiscal Year 1977–1978 CASP for Nicaragua was pouched with airgram A–13 from Managua, March 19. (Ibid., P760034–2248) The CASP as approved by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group was pouched by the Department to Managua in airgram A–3300, July 2. (Ibid., P760100–0297)
262. Airgram A–12 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: Opposition leader Pedro Joaquín Chammoro visited the Embassy and presented allegations that torture was taking place at Managua police headquarters. The Embassy commented that it had no conclusive evidence of systematic violence against prisoners but that Chamorro’s visit reflected an increasing awareness among Somoza’s opponents of U.S. concern over human rights issues.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760060–0104. Confidential. Attached but not published are a letter from Chamorro to Theberge and a statement by Chamorro on his observations as a detainee at the Managua police headquarters. According to telegram 699 from Managua, February 12, Chamorro had been arrested for disobeying a summons in a slander case. (Ibid., D760054–0134) In telegram 762 from Managua, February 17, the Embassy reported that Chamorro’s visit to the Embassy on February 13, after his release from jail, “was something of a symbolic watershed in his relationship with the U.S., tacitly confirming his judgment that the American Embassy is no longer aligned exclusively with the regime;” the gesture thus represented “a not inconsiderable success in the Embassy’s six-month old effort to project a more even-handed image.” (Ibid., D760059–0915)
263. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Vice President Rockefeller
Summary: Scowcroft briefed Rockefeller on Nicaraguan affairs and U.S.-Nicaraguan relations in advance of an April 20 courtesy call on Somoza at the Nicaraguan Ambassador’s residence in Washington.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 14, Vice President, 7. Confidential. So[Page 705]moza’s biography (Tab A) is not attached and not found. In an April 16 memorandum to Davis, Jon Howe of the Office of the Vice President requested a briefing paper. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, Box 14, Vice President, 7) In an April 17 memorandum to Scowcroft, Low noted that “Sevilla Sacasa wanted a Presidential meeting [between Ford and Somoza] but was not encouraged by State.” (Ibid., Box 11, President Ford—General, 3) Ford telephoned Somoza on April 20 and noted that he “had a very good 10 minute conversation.” (Notation on undated paper entitled “Recommended Phone Call”; ibid.) According to an April 21 memorandum for the record by Stuart Rockwell of S/CPR, Somoza stated at the conclusion of his conversation with Ford “that he was very pleased that the President should have taken the time to call him.” (Ibid.) The April 19 Department of State briefing paper for Rockefeller is ibid., White House Central Files, Subject File, Box 39, Nicaragua.
264. Telegram 3118 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: Commenting on a draft report on human rights in Nicaragua, the Embassy recommended revisions that would emphasize the violent, pro-Castro, and anti-U.S. nature of the FSLN.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760258–0076. Confidential. The draft report on human rights brought to Managua by Gowen and the draft report to Congress has not been found.
265. Telegram 3490 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: Theberge told Somoza that cordial U.S.-Nicaraguan relations would depend on the Nicaraguan Government providing better information on cases in which human rights abuses were alleged to have occurred.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760282–0875. Confidential; Immediate. Telegram 162407 to Managua is dated June 30. (Ibid., D760253–1099) In its annual report on the human rights situation in Nicaragua, transmitted in airgram A–17 from Managua, March 15, the Embassy stated that “Nicaragua’s record in the human rights field may not be exemplary among Latin countries but neither has the record been particularly objectionable in recent years.” (Ibid., P760038–2094) In telegram 1626 from Managua, April 6, the Embassy reported that Somoza had complained about what he characterized as a double standard under which Nicaragua was criticized for its human rights record while other countries were not. Somoza also asserted that the United States “had no business telling friendly countries how to govern, or to intervene in their internal affairs.” (Ibid., D760132–0134)
266. Telegram 3798 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State
Summary: Reporting on a meeting with Somoza in which he had reiterated the U.S. Government’s concern over alleged human rights abuses, Theberge observed that Somoza was not being frank and forthcoming and did not “seem to fully grasp the importance of creating the friendly American public opinion so essential to our good relations.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760310–0935. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Telegram 3490 from Managua is Document 265. Telegram 3686 from Managua is dated August 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760299–1100) Airgram 3590 to all posts is dated July 20. (Ibid., P760107–2331) In telegram 3504 from Managua, July 23, the Embassy reported that an officer had met with General Reynaldo Pérez Vargas to establish the channel for contacts on human rights agreed upon on by Theberge and Somoza on July 21. (Ibid., D760283–0108)