118. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
16006. Eyes Only for Executive Secretary Tarnoff from the Ambassador. No other distribution. Subject: U.S. Strategy Options on Settlements Problem.
1. You will appreciate the extreme sensitivity of this message. I suggest you personally distribute it to the Secretary, Roy Atherton, and Hal Saunders only rpt only.
[Page 402]2. The Begin government’s decision to thicken a number of settlements on the West Bank has raised our ongoing test of wills with the GOI on the settlements issue in the post-Camp David period from one of words to one of deeds. While Begin’s domestic political vulnerabilities, not to say his own deeply held convictions, make it nearly impossible that we could bring about a formal revocation of the decision, neither can we allow it to go unchallenged or to become just another in an ongoing series of steps toward unlimited expansion and proliferation of Israeli settlements in occupied territories. There are already suggestions by government sources that the U.S. is overreacting, that Washington will come to understand this and that the problem will fade away, this despite the extraordinarily stiff phrases in the President’s letter of October 26.2 Israelis, of course, have many examples in the history of our relationship which lead them to conclude that the U.S. will eventually back down in order to avoid a bilateral crisis. Because of this history, it will be especially difficult to convince Israel that on the settlements issue, we are prepared for a long and, if necessary, public and vehement disagreement. In the following paragraphs are set out what we believe are the options for American policy and actions on this crucial matter.
3. The problem:
To limit to the greatest extent possible the scope of implementation of the GOI’s decision to augment existing settlements on the West Bank, and to dissuade the GOI from inaugurating any new civilian settlements, at least until negotiations over the establishment of the self-governing authority are completed.
4. Background and analysis:
During the Knesset debate over the Camp David Accords, Begin assured his critics that the decision to withdraw from the Sinai settlements constituted no precedent for the settlements in the West Bank and Golan Heights, which are far more important to Israelis for both security and emotional reasons. He promised that existing settlements in those areas would be strengthened and new ones set up. Thereafter, Begin ducked the issue for several weeks. During the Cabinet debate over the draft Israel/Egypt treaty, and especially the linkage issue, which was conducted under the shadow of an extremely emotional overreaction to the U.S. replies to Hussein and to tendentious press accounts from Arab sources about the Saunders visit, Begin encountered unexpectedly strong criticism. He apparently felt this ministerial resistance could only be propitiated by an explicit decision to augment the West Bank settlements. The overwhelming nature of the Cabinet [Page 403] endorsement of the draft has been widely attributed, in part self-servingly, to this decision. In reaction to the Cabinet pronouncement, initial public and press reaction in Israel for the principle of expanding the settlements has been almost universally favorable. At the same time, the Labor opposition and some of the press have criticized the public announcement of the decision as needlessly provocative of the U.S. and the Egyptians, as well as its reported applicability to the Samarian Highlands rather than to the “defense line” in the Jordan Valley. Gush Emunim, on the other hand, has condemned it as being pitifully inadequate.
5. Strategy:
We assume that Begin took this decision fully aware of the storm it would trigger in the U.S. We are also certain that it will now be virtually impossible, for domestic Israeli political reasons, to get him to rescind the decision or to forego its implementation completely. If he reversed himself, he could precipitate several resignations from his Cabinet, face a severe undermining of this parliamentary majority, and shatter Herut. The personal effect of this on Begin would be enormous. We therefore believe that our maximum objective in the short run is to prevail upon him to limit implementation of the decision to the smallest number of people in the fewest places over the longest period. Further, we should try to extend this restraint into a de facto prolongation of the moratorium on new settlements beyond expiration of the ninety-day freeze that Begin accepted.
6. No Israeli Government will under present circumstances renounce its right to establish new settlements or to add families to existing ones. Indeed, we believe that a GOI decision even to defer new settlements beyond three months will require that Begin be convinced that such cessation is essential to avoid grave damage to the U.S.-Israeli relationship. And even this may not be enough to deter him from implementing life-long beliefs concerning Jewish rights to Eretz Yisrael, especially since these views are shared by some of his closest associates in the Cabinet.
7. If there is to be any hope of moving Begin, our policy on this issue in the weeks ahead will have to generate virtually irresistible domestic political pressure on the GOI to avoid a prolonged crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Even then, the most we are likely to achieve would be a personal and private commitment by Begin to the President to slow down and minimize thickening of existing settlements and postpone new settlements during negotiations to set up the self-governing authority. Less desirable would be a de facto Begin decision which would be acknowledged neither to us nor to the Israeli public, but he would have great difficulty sustaining this for very long without admitting to his Cabinet and the public at large that such a de facto [Page 404] freeze was in effect. Neither of these possibilities can be realized unless we are prepared through words and actions in Washington to prove our steadfastness and seriousness to Israel on this issue. Suggested below are two possible alternative strategies for achieving this purpose.
8. The options:
A. Such an approach could include inter alia, the following measures:
—Slow down or suspension of treaty negotiations with Egypt
—Delay of discussions concerning U.S. commitment to assist Israel in building two Negev airfields
—Indefinite suspension of Matmon C consultations
—Conspicuous footdragging on already committed aid deliveries
—Publicized recall of the Ambassador to Washington to discuss the settlements issue with the President
—Consideration of having the President not visit Israel (or Egypt) in conjunction with the signing of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty
—Plus measures outlined in option B.
Pro
—Could shock Israeli body politic into realization that unlimited continuation of settlement activity is incompatible with attainment of peace, even with Egypt, and immediately jeopardizes Israel’s all-important relationship with the United States
—Would demonstrate to the Arabs the seriousness of our commitment to minimizing further Israeli settlement activity
—Recalling the Ambassador would be almost uniquely strong demonstration of our displeasure with Israel (Note: we do not believe this step has ever been taken during any previous confrontations with Israeli Governments.)
Con
—Such a massive response is much more likely to trigger a back-lash against the United States and Egypt and be seen as attacks on Israel rather than as directed at the Begin government’s policies. Result could be rallying of support behind Begin and further acts of defiance in the settlement area, rather than the desired result of internal pressure on Begin and his government to desist from such activities.
—Suspension of negotiations by Egypt because of the linkage issue would convince many Israelis of Sadat’s bad faith, lead to renewed accusations of Egyptian-American collusion, and run grave risk of aborting Israeli/Egyptian treaty, despite fact that agreed text is within reach.
[Page 405]—Even suggestions of suspension of aid already committed to Israel would invite charges of violation of U.S. commitments at the highest levels not to use aid as a form of pressure and would trigger outrage both here and among Israel’s supporters in the U.S.
—This package of pressures may be required at a later, much tougher point in the negotiating process over the West Bank and Gaza; if employed now, its effect will be weakened then.
B. Without triggering a uniformly defensive reaction in Israel, this strategy would carry the clear message that both U.S.-Israeli relations and the hard-won gains in the peace process are bound to suffer acutely if the Begin government does not accept the necessity to suspend settlement activity at least until the first phase of West Bank-Gaza negotiations are completed, and that restraint can bring positive benefits. Elements of this strategy could include some of the following:
—Delivery of stern face-to-face message by the President to Begin during the latter’s upcoming visit to the U.S., with a forthright public acknowledgement, if necessary, of their deep disagreement
—Regular and frequent expressions of hope by high level U.S. officials that GOI will not take provocative actions concerning settlements in occupied territories
—Explicit statements or calculated leak to press that U.S. willingness to help GOI with costs of relocating infrastructure and materiel from Sinai to Negev is directly linked to freeze on settlement activity
—Continuing delay of overall Matmon C discussions, while continuing approvals of essential military deliveries and authorization to purchase a few selected priority new items.
—Mustering support of key Congressional figures and influential private supporters of Israel for administration’s position on settlements issue. This can be brought to bear when Begin is in the U.S. and during the already planned visits of several important senators and congressmen to Israel over the next few weeks
—Hint willingness to reconsider financial assistance for relocation of Sinai settlers if Israel demonstrates prudence and restraint in the settlement field
Pro
—Without reneging on our standing commitments to Israel’s security requirements or undermining the negotiations with Egypt, forcefully brings home the real cost of Israeli obduracy on the settlements issue in terms of U.S.-Israel relations.
—Over time could assist moderate elements in Israel, including members of the coalition, to isolate Begin on this issue, rather than leaping to his defense. This type of approach seemed to produce such an effect in the period following the breakdown of the Jerusalem talks [Page 406] in January, after which almost no new settlements were set up, as well as in the period following the GOI’s inadequate answers to the U.S. questions in March, which were changed to a more favorable formulation several weeks later
—Will permit congressional and private friends of Israel to support the administration’s opposition to Israeli policy on a specific critical issue about which many of them share our concern rather than triggering an undiscriminating defensive reaction on their part as a more heavy-handed approach might do
Con
—Could produce the same kind of defensive and defiant reaction that option A would probably trigger
—Might not convince Israelis of our determination to see this matter through.
9. Between these two options: I strongly recommend option B. However, I must add that the odds of achieving our goal of a de facto settlements freeze and great restraint on “thickening” are considerably less than 50–50, under option A, they would approach zero.
10. Whatever package of measures we decide to employ, we should begin immediately and proceed steadily. Each passing day may lead Begin and Israel to conclude that this bilateral conflict, too, like so many others, shall pass away.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Middle East, Box 46, 10/21–31/78. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See Document 108.↩