128. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Negotiating Strategy
In a strategy session at State this morning,2 two views were argued:
—We should basically reject Sadat’s new demands as going beyond Camp David. The President should tell him that the Treaty text as it now stands must be accepted. In other words, we would not try to pin the Israelis down on any of the West Bank/Gaza issues prior to the conclusion of the treaty negotiations. It was generally recognized that this would reduce Israel’s incentives for moving seriously on the West Bank/Gaza, although we would continue to have some leverage in the form of aid.
—We should meet Sadat part way in trying to clarify West Bank/Gaza issues now. If we do not do so, he may be unwilling to sign the treaty; and it may be harder to move the Israelis later than it is now. (This last point is not unanimously agreed upon). If we took this approach, we would essentially try to establish two things with the Israelis:
1. The side letter on the West Bank/Gaza must include a target date by which elections will be held.
2. We would prepare and discuss with both sides a draft agenda3 for the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. It would specify talks on how the elections will be organized; the definition of powers and responsibilities; the powers of the local police; the initial redeployment of Israeli forces; and the question of reciprocal rights of residence and land acquisition. We would not necessarily expect the Israelis formally to accept the draft agenda, but it would give Sadat something concrete to point to as evidence that we, at least, will work seriously for the success of these negotiations.
[Page 441]In either of the above options, we would be very restrained in dealing with Israeli aid requests at present. In essence, we would not go much beyond a minimal commitment on the airfields.
In the second scenario, we would begin talks immediately with Dayan on the draft agenda idea. He will almost certainly reject the notion and he will have no authority to agree in any case. Nonetheless, we could then go to Sadat and explain that we have begun talks on the agenda, that we support the idea of a target date for elections, and that with these assurances we expect Sadat to accept the treaty text as it now stands. Without saying so explicitly, we would be rejecting the idea of getting the Israelis to committing themselves to specific unilateral gestures according to a fixed timetable and we would ignore his suggestion that the practical implementation of any agreement should begin first in Gaza.
In brief, we would be picking up one of Sadat’s demands that fits closely with what most of us feel is already implicit in Camp David—namely, an agenda for the next round of negotiations—and we would press the Israelis to accept a target date for the holding of elections (subject to agreement having been reached by that time). Politically this should be defensible as consistent with Camp David. It could delay the talks, but it also might give Sadat enough to justify accepting the Treaty as it now stands. In any case, this is the recommended strategy which will go to the Secretary at noon today. If you have any reactions, I will try to get them into the final memo.