136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
287747. Subject: Letter to Sadat.
1. We want to pre-position the message below from President Carter to President Sadat, even though we have not yet received your detailed report on your conversation with Sadat this morning.2 We will read that as soon as it comes in and send you any changes it suggests in this text along with talking points designed to be responsive to points made to you by Sadat this morning.
2. Start text: Dear President Sadat:
I enjoyed talking to you on the telephone Sunday3 and am sending this letter to expand further on what I said then.4 Secretary Vance has reported to me after meeting with Foreign Minister Dayan on Saturday5 and with Prime Minister Begin Sunday evening.6 These discussions were at times difficult but in the end I believe Cy made some headway. The negotiations have clearly reached a decisive stage, and I want to give you my best judgment of how we should now proceed to bring them to a rapid and successful conclusion.
After four weeks of continuous effort during which your delegation has demonstrated persistence and skill in support of your positions, I believe, except on the oil issue which is still under discussion between your delegation and the Israelis, we have arrived at the text of a treaty, its annexes and accompanying side letters and notes, which rep[Page 472]resents a fair balance of interests.7 While the Israelis still wish to delete the references to the Camp David framework from the treaty preamble, we have told them that the present language is an irreducible minimum and that we will not support changes. I personally reemphasized this point to Prime Minister Begin. I strongly urge that, for your part, you not seek further changes in texts of the treaty and its annexes that have been worked out by our delegations. To do so would, in my view, lead the Israelis to re-open other issues of importance to you on which we have with great difficulty obtained their agreement.
Secretary Vance’s meetings Saturday and Sunday focused on the two remaining major unresolved issues other than oil. They are, first, the question of what will be said in a side document about the manner and timing of the steps envisaged in the Camp David Framework for the West Bank and Gaza, and, secondly, the question of the phasing of Israel’s withdrawal to the interim line.
As you know, the Israelis have resisted any specific timetable for next steps in the West Bank and Gaza, taking the position that there should be no linkage between these negotiations and the subsequent process in the West Bank and Gaza. They have been particularly opposed to mentioning a specific target date for the holding of elections. We have supported your position and we have finally persuaded Dayan to accept as a target date that elections should be held not later than the end of 1979.
I propose that these assurances be embodied in a letter8 which I would write to you and Prime Minister Begin, if this procedure is acceptable to you. I am asking Hermann to go over with you9 the precise text of this letter. I believe a letter will be the quickest way to get agreement on the best possible language. It will be written to record the agreement of both sides in a way that will be no less binding than an exchange of notes. In addition, it gives me a chance to demonstrate the United States commitment to continued progress on the West Bank and Gaza.
On the issue of phasing of Israel’s withdrawal to the interim line, Dayan and Weizman will support in the Cabinet debate the language which we have sent to you. Weizman and Dayan cannot guarantee acceptance by the Cabinet but consider it of the utmost importance that they succeed in winning Cabinet approval.
Finally, we have asked the Israelis for a letter which they would address to us detailing certain unilateral steps they would take in the [Page 473] West Bank and Gaza to improve the political atmosphere for negotiations such as allowing freedom of political expression for the Palestinians during the negotiating period, moving Israel’s military government from their present locations in Gaza and Nablus outside the Arab municipalities and granting amnesty to certain prisoners and detainees who are inhabitants of the two areas. Dayan and Weizman said they would support such steps personally but would have to discuss them with the Cabinet first.
I am keenly aware of the importance—to Egypt, to the United States, and to the peace process—of moving promptly to achieve concrete progress for the Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza. I firmly believe that the best way to do this is to move promptly into the negotiations dealing with both of these Palestinian areas. Progress in those negotiations is the best way to ensure the earliest feasible elections. We can make our best effort to hold those elections before the interim Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. However, I do not believe it will be possible to establish a commitment now to the exact date. The Israeli agreement which we now have is to the objective of completing the negotiations and holding the elections as soon as feasible but in any case no later than the end of 1979.
I believe what has been achieved in these negotiations with respect to both the West Bank and Gaza can be regarded as an important accomplishment for Egypt as a realistic promise of progress for the Palestinians. The language firmly establishes that this treaty is the first step toward a comprehensive peace and that such a peace cannot be complete unless [missing text] solves the Palestinian problem. The letter which Ambassador Eilts will show you sets a firm date for the beginning of negotiations and a realistic timeframe for the subsequent steps envisioned in the Camp David framework. In those negotiations, we will be defining powers and responsibilities for the Palestinian self-governing body that will make it autonomous and indeed worthy of the name of self-government. As soon as we complete those negotiations, you can be justifiably proud that the first Palestinian self-governing body would be brought into existence well before the full exercise of Egyptian authority is restored in the Sinai. Your government will be able to stand by this achievement in the eyes of the world with pride.
I know from our talk, Mr. President, that you feel strongly that the interim withdrawal should not be completed before the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza, or at least in Gaza. I also want to see parallel progress on the Palestinian issues. By continuing our efforts in the next phase of negotiations, we can establish a practical linkage between stages of withdrawal and steps on the West Bank and Gaza, but to modify the texts of the agreement now [Page 474] under consideration for a specific Gaza date would, in my view, be impossible and would look like a new demand on your part which was not included in the Camp David Accords.
We will be a full partner in the next phase of negotiations and, as in the past, we can produce positive results by working together with you. We can let the world see that Egypt has not made a separate peace. By pressing forward, with our support, in the negotiations for the West Bank and Gaza these tangible, on-the-ground steps will be more convincing than any language we can agree upon today.
We now have the components of a peace treaty package which is fair to both sides, and I am urging both you and Prime Minister Begin, with whom I also spoke on the telephone,10 to move as quickly as possible to give your final approval to these documents.
It would help me, Mr. President, if you could give me your response as soon as possible. We are at a decisive moment which we must seize. Further negotiation will not yield significant gains for either side but could, on the contrary, place in jeopardy what has been accomplished thus far. Conclusion of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will be a major achievement. It will be so recognized throughout the world and will strengthen our hands to forge ahead without delay toward the objective of a comprehensive peace which we set for ourselves at Camp David.
With my best wishes.
Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.
End text.
3. You should make certain Sadat understands that his delegation here has not signed on to those elements of the treaty package which their instructions do not permit them to agree to. In particular, the letter on the West Bank and Gaza and the new language on phasing of withdrawal to the interim line were shown to them for the first time Sunday. What we are doing in effect is asking Sadat to approve a package which his delegation’s instructions do not permit them to agree to in a number of respects.
4. One of the changes we anticipate making in the above text would be to add a new second sentence which would indicate that the President has read your report of your Monday conversation with Sadat.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78. Secret; Cherokee; Flash; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Saunders, Atherton, Quandt, and Jack Perry (S/S); approved by Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2243)↩
- See Document 135.↩
- See Document 132.↩
- In telegram 288539 to Cairo, November 14, Vance instructed Eilts to insert the following after the first sentence before delivery to Sadat: “I have also received and carefully reviewed Ambassador Eilts’ full report on his meeting with you Monday.” Moreover, Eilts was instructed to have the following sentence beginning “Secretary Vance has reported . . .” start a new paragraph. Vance also provided Eilts with a list of talking points for his scheduled November 14 meeting with Sadat. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78)↩
- See Document 131.↩
- See Document 133.↩
- See Document 131.↩
- See Document 137.↩
- Ibid.↩
- See Document 133.↩