Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

191. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the White House¹

Cairo, March 4, 1979, 1536Z

4429. Subject: (S) Meeting With Sadat—March 4. Ref: (A) State 53031,² (B) Cairo 4426.³

1. (S-entire text).

2. Met with Sadat for hour and one-half this morning at Pyramids Rest House. VP Mubarak was also present. Sadat had obviously read media reports about hard line Begin has taken in Washington talks and was very somber.

3. After I had gone through points cited reftel and supplemented these with oral instructions that President Carter had given me prior to my departure, I noted talks to date have not been particularly promising and that no one could say whether situation would improve at today’s session. I had been asked to alert Sadat to the possibility that we might not get anything further out of Begin at this time and noted that President Carter would welcome having Sadat’s thoughts on what might be done in such a situation. President Carter was deeply appreciative for what Sadat has done up to now to facilitate peace effort and would not want anything to happen that might hurt Sadat or Egypt’s image. I made a point of telling Sadat that President Carter had commented that there are few people for whom he has the regard and affection that he has for Sadat (Sadat was deeply touched). In this context, the President thought it important that he be fully candid with Sadat.

4. After he had heard me out, Sadat said that he had foreseen this eventuality. The situation, he stated, is at a “turning point.” He deeply appreciated President Carter’s efforts to date and reiterated his total confidence in the President. He also appreciated the President’s candor and said he wished to analyze situation as he sees it. He then spoke along following lines:

— (A) Just as President Carter does not want anything to harm Sadat and Egypt, he, Sadat, is concerned that nothing that happens damages President Carter’s position. This, Sadat thought, is especially important since, as he views situation, Begin is simply playing for time. Begin is against everything that was signed at Camp David. Begin was “forced” to sign CDAs against his desire and has ever since been seeking to undermine the CDAs. Begin first violated the December 17 target date and is now playing his “last card” in order to try to return the situation to a pre-Camp David configuration. At minimum it will be several months before Begin can be brought around to sign treaty.

— (B) If we agree that joint US/Egyptian actions should not harm either President Carter or Egypt, Sadat viewed this as an important starting point. This should mean that our policies be identical. If this is agreed upon, Sadat thought it essential that a new, bold initiative be taken before the House, Senate, American and world public opinion in order to demonstrate who is genuinely interested in peace. Sadat said he could guarantee European support for such an initiative. He thought that the majority in the U.S. will also favor his position when it is fully explained. Time for confrontation (with Begin) has come. He did not wish to leave the initiative in Begin’s hands. Why should we appear to be defensive before House, Senate, American and world public opinion? Best defense, Sadat noted, is an offense.

— (C) He had given Israel everything that is reasonable between equal parties. But he would not accept Israel as a “super power,” as Begin seems to be demanding. If we agree to Begin’s demands and views, he was sure that the Israeli PriMin will only ask for more.

5. Alluding to his comment that a new initiative is needed, Sadat outlined following scenario that he has in mind:

— (A) He would ask me to tell the waiting press after our meeting that I had given him a preliminary report on the talks with Begin. Before commenting himself, he would want to get a full report on today’s session. He had asked me to meet with him again tomorrow morning in order to provide him with a full report. At that time he would also give me his responses. (I did so with press after our meeting.)

— (B) After our meeting tomorrow, Monday,⁴ he plans to announce that he had talked with President Carter this evening and that he had received a follow-on report of the Begin talks. Here he noted parenthetically his hope that the message he will receive from President Carter tomorrow will be one that clearly states the negative Israeli position without in any way making President Carter appear to be prejudiced. He will then reply that he had decided to go to the U.S., departing Tuesday, March 6, and arriving in Washington on the following day.⁵ Sadat noted that he will go even if uninvited. I assured him that President Carter would be happy to have him come at any time.

— (C) In the U.S., Sadat’s theme will be the following: he had assured the Congress and the American public that he will never let them down. His purpose in coming is not to discuss anything with Begin, since he has nothing to discuss with the Israeli PriMin. Instead, his purpose will be to hold discussions with President Carter, to whom he had given major concessions, and to brief the House and the Senate on the “more dangerous situation” that currently exists in the area following the Iranian collapse. At a later point in our discussion, Sadat said that he did not wish to exclude a tripartite summit, but reiterated that he has nothing to discuss with Begin. He left it entirely up to President Carter as to whether to ask Begin to remain in the U.S. for a few more days. He emphasized that Begin should not rpt not be told at today’s session of his proposed announcement tomorrow or upcoming trip to U.S. The Arab/Israeli problem, Sadat repeatedly insisted, is merely a small part of the major area problem, but charged that Begin is unable to see this.

— (D) He will plan to be frank with the American public. Before leaving, he will release his letter of November 78 to President Carter (78 Cairo 25990),⁶ as well as his letter to Begin of November 78 (78 Cairo 26045)⁷ and Begin’s reply (78 Tel Aviv 18708).⁸ He hopes that these letters will show that he has done everything humanly possible to meet the legitimate Israeli concerns. Sadat commented that, as we knew, he has long been convinced that there is no hope of concluding a peace treaty as long as Begin is in office. Begin is not capable of accepting peace because it is against the Israeli PriMin’s fundamental principles. He thought President Carter and he should now try to manage situation so that Begin “either bends or breaks.”

— (E) In meeting with congressional committees, Sadat intends to brief them on current area situation. He noted Numeiri/Mengistu meeting in Freetown had been a failure and that Qadhafi had only a few days ago spoken of concluding a military pact with Ethiopia. He also alluded to the PDRY attack on YAR as further evidence of the deteriorating area situation. The Sudan, he contended, is now in grave danger. He might have to act to defend it. In saying this, he did not mean that he contemplates an attack against Libya, but that he has to take into account that the Sudan is now likely to be threatened both by Ethiopia from Eritrea and in the west from Libya. He saw situation developing in accordance with Soviet desires. Soviet purpose, Sadat insisted, is to neutralize Egypt. For this reason, he noted, GOE is prepared to assist Oman and Somalia. He hoped Congress would recognize seriousness of situation and be willing to assist him in meeting it without insisting on previous conclusion of treaty.

— (F) Sadat continued that he will invite House and Senate “to write a treaty as they would between USG and any friendly state” for use with Israel. He would sign it without reading it. His sole condition is that treaty must be on equal basis and not rpt not try to make “super power” out of Israel. Later in our talk he modified his earlier statement somewhat by saying that President Carter and he should, during their upcoming meetings, agree on what they regard as a fair and just treaty and present it to the Congress for endorsement.

— (G) The primary purpose of his visit to the U.S., Sadat reiterated, is to place the Israeli problem before the American Congress and people in proper perspective after the Iranian situation. Everything in the area, he pointed out, is heading toward area-wide “hatred” for Israel. He hoped that USG will not accept Israel as its “vanguard” in area because this would mean that USG receives same “hatred.” Israel will do nothing without getting something for it.

— (H) After he had asked Congress and American public to “relieve me of my commitment to you because Israel is not ready” Sadat said that he would call UN Security Council to meet in order to discuss situation. He would discuss details of what he has in mind when he meets President Carter. USG support will be necessary.

— (I) Sadat reaffirmed that he remains committed to the two CDAs and is prepared to reaffirm this.

— (J) Towards end of our meeting Sadat indicated that he hopes to come back with USG commitment to increase economic assistance to Egypt for development purposes (“Carter Plan”) and to provide arms for use in meeting Soviet threats to Middle East and Africa.

6. If President Carter disagreed on certain points or has other views, Sadat said that he will be pleased to have them. He hopes it will at the very least be possible to agree on general lines. If what he proposes is in any way harmful to President Carter’s position, Sadat can if necessary carry out his proposed scenario from here. Even if Congress and American public go against him, he will continue his efforts. Egypt is part of this area and must do what it considers necessary to defend itself and other friendly, moderate governments.

7. I told Sadat that President Carter has been thinking on purely hypothetical basis about the possibility of shifting the focus of the current Egyptian/Israeli treaty negotiations to establishment of West Bank and/or Gaza autonomy and asked for his views. At first Sadat did not understand the question and I explained the point again. When he understood it, he said that such an arrangement is perfectly agreeable to him if it can be worked out. In querying him on this point, I emphasized that this thinking is purely exploratory and no one knew as yet whether the idea would commend itself to Begin. Sadat indicated understanding.

8. Sadat will expect President Carter’s phone call⁹ this evening from 2300 local time onwards. I am scheduled to meet with Sadat again at 1130 local tomorrow, Monday, morning, at Pyramids Rest House.¹⁰ It will be helpful have any follow-up instructions, including definitive account of last meeting with Begin by 1100 local (0400 GMT), for use with Sadat. Will also be helpful have some reading at that time of President Carter’s telecon with Sadat.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0909. Secret; Flash; Exdis Distribute as Nodis.
2. Sent March 4, telegram 53031 to Cairo and the White House conveyed a list of points for Eilts to make in his conversation with Sadat. Vance instructed Eilts to inform Sadat that it would not be possible to convene a new round of talks involving Begin and Khalil and that Carter had concluded that it was important for him to meet with Begin “as quickly as possible in an effort to overcome present Israeli objections.” Vance also instructed Eilts to present some “preliminary observations” on the talks between Carter and Begin and to reassure Sadat that the United States continued to negotiate from the documents discussed with Khalil and Dayan at Camp David in February and that it remained “prepared to discuss with both parties what we can do to ensure that the treaty is a strong and viable one.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0812)
3. Sent March 4, telegram 4426 from Cairo provides Eilts’s preliminary assessment of his March 4 meeting with Sadat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0808)
4. See footnote 2, Document 193.
5. Brzezinski recalled in his memoirs that the “decision for Carter to go to the Middle East was precipitated” by Sadat’s proposal to come to Washington. Brzezinski continued: “We all felt that Sadat’s initiative was not exactly a constructive one, for its immediate effect would be to underline the degree to which the Camp David Accords had come unstuck.” (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 281)
6. See Document 145.
7. Telegram 26045 from Cairo, November 30, 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–1710; P850067–1779) The text of Sadat’s letter to Begin is printed as Document 146.
8. See Document 150.
9. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter spoke to Sadat by telephone from the Oval Office from 4:28 p.m. to 4:31 p.m., March 4. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
10. See footnote 2, Document 193.