283. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State and the White House1

17880. Special encryption for the President from Bob Strauss. Cairo for Strauss. Subject: Strauss’ Initial Meeting With Prime Minister Begin.

1. Secret-entire text.

2. The two hour initial meeting with Begin August 17 took place in warm low key atmosphere with uncommon scarcity of PriMin’s emotional rhetoric. Result, however, was stalemate.

3. With only Ambassadors Evron and Lewis present, I gave Begin a friendly but unvarnished assessment of your concerns, including your resentment over unwarranted personal attacks by Dayan and others. Stressed unwavering nature of your commitment to Israel and its security, and urged Begin to help produce positive achievements which could breathe some credibility (with the Arabs) into Camp David process.

4. Begin made lengthy, reasoned argument for strict adherence to SC 242, 338, and Camp David Agreement (CDA) plus joint letter, as authoritative guidance for autonomy negotiations. He cited examples from recent Alexandria working group meeting of alleged U.S. support for Egyptian ideas which contradicted CDA, (e.g. “legislative council”). I told him both you and I agreed thoroughly that CDA was our mandate to be closely followed.

5. I then described problem we face re Palestinian resolution in UNSC, and probed persistently for any hint that Begin might acquiesce in a U.S.-sponsored resolution—with total lack of success.2 Begin said repeatedly and absolutely categorically that Israeli Cabinet stood unanimously behind its recent decision, i.e., if any repeat any new UNSC resolution dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict were adopted anytime before full implementation of CDA is completed, it would con[Page 915]stitute a modification of SC 242, which was explicitly accepted at Camp David as the “agreed basis” for CDA. Inevitable result would be to make “null and void those CDA passages which refer to 242. Though Begin would not be drawn out further as to consequences, clear implication was that GOI might withdraw from or suspend its participation in autonomy negotiations.3 Begin said USG should carry out its 1975 written commitment,4 and that required veto of any and all new SC resolutions which treat the Palestinian or Arab-Israeli issues.

6. After having done everything possible to spread salve on the various latest abrasions in the U.S.-Israeli relationship, I elicited Begin’s judgment that key step now needed to dispel ugly rumors and distortions would be for U.S. and Israel to agree that CDA and joint letter must be carried out in their entirety, to the letter, and to act in the negotiations accordingly.

7. At end of meeting, I told Begin that we had an honest disagreement about the question of a new resolution. We had tentatively decided to put forward a positive resolution of our own, not to amend 242 but to build on it. Gave him our rationale for going this route to avoid having to consider veto of resolutions put forward by others. Stressed any U.S. resolution would reaffirm 242 and 338 and contain essential elements from CDA concerning Palestinian problem. I did not repeat not show him any text.

8. Begin was rocked by this unpleasant news. He said he deeply regretted what I had told him, asked me to inform you that it would produce the most negative developments for all of us, and asked that you reconsider the tentative decision. He said again that any new UNSC resolution would, in the unanimous5 view of the Cabinet, cause “the agreed basis” of the Camp David Agreement (i.e. 242) to collapse. Later, Lewis and I agreed he was genuinely shocked and disturbed.

9. Over all, meeting was difficult but not mean or petty. Begin’s parting words to me were: Quote: Bob, I can only appeal to you and President Carter. Please reconsider your initiative to change the agreed basis for the Camp David Agreement.6 After all the effort we and you invested at Camp David, and after all our sacrifices to carry out the Agreement, to change the “agreed basis” now would be destructive of all we have done. We were never forewarned at Camp David that a [Page 916] year later there would come a new SC resolution which you would not veto, contrary to your 1975 commitment. I appeal to President Carter for reconsideration. Unquote.

10. Throughout conversation about resolution I remained firm and unyielding, pursuant to your instructions.

11. Met later in day with Dayan, Weizman, and Evron and went over same ground,7 stressing need for us to regain some credibility for Camp David negotiating process if it is to have chance of success. Their negative response was identical to Begin’s. Dayan warned me that Begin would be reporting fully to the Cabinet on Sunday,8 and that by Sunday there would be at least 10 contradictory versions of my presentation appearing in distorted forms in the press. He advised me to make my position clear directly to the press before leaving for Cairo. With Lewis’ agreement, I did so in brief departure statement at Dayan’s home.9

Lewis
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 3–12/79. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. In the right-hand margin of the telegram, Carter wrote: “The United States will not approve any UN resolution which would change or modify UN 242 at all. We will pursue the goals of security for Israel w[ith]in secure & recognized borders and the right of the Pales. to participate in the determination of their own future. In all cases, agreements already reached by Israel, Eg. & US at Camp David and in ME Peace Treaty will prevail. J.”
  2. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter drew a vertical line with an arrow pointing to it. Carter also underlined “probed persistently,” “Begin might acquiesce,” and “with total lack of success.”
  3. Carter underlined “clear implication was that GOI might withdraw” and “in autonomy” in this sentence.
  4. See footnote 5, Document 97.
  5. In the right-hand margin next to the portion of the paragraph ending with this word, Carter drew a heavy vertical line with an arrow pointing to it.
  6. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter drew a vertical line with an arrow pointing to it.
  7. No other record of this meeting has been found.
  8. August 19.
  9. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter drew a heavy vertical line with an arrow pointing to it.