286. Telegram From the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the White House and Department of State1
2656. For the President from Bob Strauss. White House please pass Amb. Strauss’ Aircraft (86971). Subject: (S) Strauss’ Wrap-up Meeting With Prime Minister Begin. Ref: Cairo 16863.2
1. S-entire text.
2. Summary. In a cordial two-hour meeting with Begin on Sunday,3 I reviewed with him our approach to tabling our own UN resolution, and Sadat’s negative reaction. Begin was surprised and pleased by Sadat’s views, and he visibly relaxed—I surmise because he sees that he is not long in opposition to us. He pressed me to recommend to you that we change our position. Politely but firmly, I told him I could not do that; but would faithfully report to you Begin’s and Sadat’s clearly stated objections to our initiative, and their emphasis on moving ahead with their own relationship instead. Finally, I prevailed on Begin to say a few positive words to the press about the strength of U.S.-Israeli relations. End summary.
3. After returning from Cairo I met for about two hours with Begin, accompanied by Ambassadors Lewis and Evron. Begin was markedly [Page 921] fresh and vigorous considering the fact that he had chaired what was apparently a fairly difficult Cabinet meeting for much of the day.
4. I gave Begin a very brief summary rundown on my meeting Saturday night with Sadat (reftel), stressing Sadat’s statements to me that his relationship with Begin is much better than before and that he looks forward to their pending meeting4 in Haifa for even more improvement. I told Begin that I explained to Sadat the rationale behind our position on putting forward a resolution of our own in the Security Council, and that I told Sadat of Begin’s disagreement with our proposed course of action. Sadat’s response, I said, was that he agreed with Begin’s view and that any resolution would complicate the picture for the autonomy negotiations and distract from the progress which Sadat was confident would be made before the end of the year. I told Begin that Sadat had given as his reasoning for opposing any new resolution his “high hopes” that—as he and Begin talked further about the issues—they will gradually find solutions to most of the outstanding problems, and that any UN action would complicate this process. I concluded by telling Begin that I would now return to Washington and report to you and to Cy Vance both his (Begin’s) and Sadat’s reactions to our proposed view and strategy. There was no reason to avoid telling Begin of Sadat’s attitude because Sadat in a speech delivered after our meeting had expressed his concern and negative attitude.
5. Begin was clearly pleased to learn that Sadat agreed with him. (I had previously suspected that they had talked by phone before I had seen Sadat; however, I now doubt that for it would have been almost impossible for Begin to feign the degree of surprise he registered when he heard my report.) He then said that it was all the more obvious that we should reconsider our course of action and drop the idea of any new resolution. He summarized the decision already taken Sunday by the Israeli Cabinet in support of his initial negative reaction to me on Friday. He again asked that you review your decision in light of my additional findings in Egypt.
6. During this discussion, I did not deviate from the position I had taken with Begin on Friday:5 that while our decision is still tentative, I would be less than candid if I did not say that this is the direction in which we are now moving.
7. I then asked Begin whether he was optimistic about the course of the autonomy negotiations. Begin said that he believed the approach was the correct one. As was the case before Camp David and during the Treaty negotiations, there were obviously major difficulties ahead. [Page 922] However, he was convinced that the basic elements of agreement on autonomy had been hammered out at Camp David and that it should be possible to reach agreement on how to implement those elements, so long as the whole agreement is treated as an entity and no effort is made to separate it into various “chapters”. Begin went on to say that he agreed with Sadat that their relationship had greatly improved, beginning with their meeting in Washington the night before the Treaty was signed (March 25). He then reviewed at some length the ups and downs in their personal rapport. He seemed both pleased and somewhat bemused by the fact that Sadat and he were now able to disagree sharply about the issues without it affecting their friendship.
8. After some further discussion of Sadat’s personality and their increased ability to communicate with one another, Begin again said that since we had now heard both from him and Sadat strong objections to our proposed course of action, the whole idea of a US sponsored resolution should be dropped. He counted on Secretary Vance’s statements to Ambassador Evron and to Senator Stone that the Kuwaiti resolution would be vetoed if put forward. He said that we should continue to work energetically in the working groups and plenary on the various autonomy issues and put aside all UN action. He then asked me what I would recommend to you when I returned.
9. I told him I would report faithfully his views and Sadat’s to you in detail, along with the suggestions from both of them that we abandon our resolution option. However, I could not say that I would recommend a change in our position on the resolution. I left Begin in no doubt that that position still stands and that I could only assure him that I knew you would give careful thought to his views and to Sadat’s. Begin then reverted to the subject of his relationship with Sadat, describing in some detail their discussion in El Arish, and more recently in Alexandria, about Jerusalem. He took considerable satisfaction in the fact that in Alexandria he had been able to explain in detail the Israeli view of the Jerusalem problem without exacerbating their personal relationship, and that indeed it was after Begin’s explanation that Sadat had insisted that Begin and he use first names with one another (I have now heard this account from both Sadat and Begin. Sadat sounds as if he believes an arrangement on Jerusalem is nearly within reach; Begin on the other hand talks about their positions as being far apart but takes pleasure in fact that they can be frankly discussed without rancor.)
10. Begin also raised with me the subject of oil supply, describing the original commitment Sadat had given him in Washington which was covered in your letter.6 He said that the Israelis were now anxious [Page 923] to try to pin down in an aide memoire more details about quantities, prices, etc. He intends to raise this subject with Sadat at Haifa early next month since Modai and Hilal have not reached any agreement on these details and time is beginning to run out. I told him that Khalil had also raised the oil issues with me and wanted you to be informed of Egyptian concerns, just as Begin had wanted you to be informed of Israeli worries. I explained that the price issue is a complicated one, but said I would get into the subject and see if it cannot be resolved.
11. Our meeting concluded with a long discussion about what he and I might say to the press. Begin tried to persuade me to say that I would recommend to you reconsideration of our position. I told him that I would not get into any possible recommendations to the President and said to the press only that I had encountered serious reservations both in Cairo and Jerusalem, that I would report faithfully what I had heard to you, and that I was certain you and Cy would take into consideration the views of both Israel and Egypt. I impressed on Begin the increasing annoyance in Washington about the steady stream of unfair critical comments from Israel about the United States, our relationship with Israel, and the strength of our commitments. After some discussion, including some criticism by Evron of statements made in Washington about Israel, Sam and I succeeded in persuading Begin to join me in front of the cameras and to make a supportive statement about the US-Israeli relationship.7
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131-1711. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cairo and Tel Aviv.↩
- See Document 285.↩
- August 19.↩
- See Document 288 and footnote 4, Document 289.↩
- See Document 283.↩
- See Document 236.↩
- The text of the comments made by Strauss and Begin to the press outside Begin’s office following their August 19 meeting was conveyed in telegram 2654 from Jerusalem, August 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790378–0281)↩