301. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Senior Level Meeting: Lebanon

PARTICIPANTS

  • Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
  • Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs
  • Philip Habib, Senior Advisor to the Secretary
  • Ambassador Robert Strauss, Personal Representative of the President
  • Hamilton Jordan, Chief of Staff
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Robert Hunter, Staff Member National Security Council

(David Aaron and Hamilton Jordan joined the meeting while it was in progress; Zbigniew Brzezinski left before it was over.)

Ambassador Strauss noted that little progress is likely to be made in the autonomy talks by May. And either Begin and Sadat will be embracing one another by then, or there will be a total breakdown in their relationship. He is totally convinced that there is no chance of Egypt’s and Israel’s moving on the West Bank. Sadat does not even know what is going on; Khalil doesn’t want it; and Begin won’t move.

Dr. Brzezinski said that this means the situation is a mess.

Secretary Vance said that there is a lot to what was being said. On Lebanon, he said it was never our intention to get out in front, and to beat the drums on a Lebanon initiative. The effort goes back to a Khalil-Strauss conversation,2 when Khalil said that peace in Lebanon would buy added time for the peace process. Lebanon appears ready to do something, and is better able to do so. But how far can it go? He can’t say. Saudi Arabia would like greater stability, and would be of some help. Syria is interested in something happening, if it would increase stability and not be humiliating to it, so that it would be easier for it to wrestle with its internal problems. With Israel, how can it take care of its northern border situation and at the same time cut down on terrorism? With the PLO, indications are that it is becoming more sophisticated. It might see that more stability would advance its cause. The UN and UNIFIL want stability. Therefore, there may be the ingredients for something to move toward stability. For us, everytime Lebanon flares up, we have domestic problems as Israel over-reacts. The problem we must deal with is about dealing with the PLO. The President clearly can’t have this happen now. But the Lebanese and others might try to get the PLO to make some advance on terrorism to satisfy the Israelis. Will it work? He doesn’t know. Much of it is for Israel to decide. In advancing U.S. work, we would not be out front, but would work with others, and push others to advance the interest in getting more stability.

Ambassador Strauss said that, looking at the State Department plan3 in a vacuum, there would be no problem. But we really need something else, otherwise we will be blamed for failure. He doesn’t like the paper—though it is crafted well—because it looks duplicitous: it starts us on the course inevitably towards the PLO, without saying so. Second, if we say that we are not dealing with the PLO, the President [Page 979] might think this would get him by (and it could be technically stated), but this is not a technical issue, and the facts would appear to be different. It would get him in trouble. These are political considerations. He (Ambassador Strauss) has no answers. If the President had no political considerations, then few changes to the plan would be needed. But if he wants something politically—like in Florida—he can’t do both, or explain it away. If the PLO is in the equation, it is difficult. Therefore there is a basic decision, like the Sadat fiasco on the UN resolution in August.4 At the UN, we got into a position that wouldn’t fly. We need a fail-safe idea, though even that might doom us. He (Ambassador Strauss) could say to the Israelis: you are portrayed, fairly or not, in a negative light, which is getting worse and worse. This impacts on the peace process. He has shown polls to Begin which bear out what is happening here to Israel’s popularity. He can try to convince the Israelis to find positive things which it can do (and Begin is crippled politically). A cease-fire? A six-month moratorium on settlements? He (Begin) answers in the negative. He can’t do these things. There is less of a government in Israel than one thinks. It hasn’t got one. Therefore it can’t take positive steps. Therefore can we get a fail-safe mechanism? He (Ambassador Strauss) may go to see Begin in London about 17 November. He could also go to Sadat. There is a problem in raising expectations.

He could try to convince Begin to take the lead. He could lay the approach out to him, and give him assurances to get him involved as a leader with us. This will help Begin in Europe and here. He (Begin) could do this without political loss in Israel, or to Israel’s security.

Secretary Vance asked whether Ambassador Strauss could see Begin before November 17. If not, would it be possible to split off the PLO piece of the plan, and work on others, in order to get something more solid?

Ambassador Strauss said he is looking for alternatives to progress on the autonomy talks. Is Jordan it? No. The autonomy talks are a fraud. It can be kept up until June, through the primaries. We might get to then. But if we want something positive, then it is difficult. Begin has shown he won’t let this happen; Begin is through. Therefore he might grasp at something on Lebanon.

Secretary Vance asked whether Ambassador Strauss could see Begin sooner, without raising expectations.

Ambassador Strauss said that this is the problem, of doing it without having another U.S. initiative fail. Eppy Evron will say it can’t be done.

Secretary Vance said that Eppy will say the approach is ok only if all terrorism stops.

[Page 980]

Ambassador Strauss agreed, but added that that doesn’t just mean terrorism mounted from Lebanon.

Ambassador Habib said that Eppy sees Israel’s loss of image each time Lebanon blows up. He (Evron) worries about a rising tide of opinion, that could even lead to anti-Semitism. Therefore Eppy is not as negative.

Ambassador Strauss said that Eppy thinks Ambassador Habib has great credibility.

Ambassador Habib asked what would happen if Lebanon takes the lead—and Begin gets what he wants, which is the PLO (issue?) off his back?

Ambassador Strauss said that he wants Begin to bless our effort, and give us some room to maneuver. That means we must clearly be seen as not doing 1, 2, or 3. We want Begin to applaud what we are doing, even if it isn’t likely to succeed. Therefore we need a political structure.

Ambassador Habib said we could give assurances to Begin on the PLO.

Ambassador Strauss said yes, since we can’t do anything with the PLO anyway, unless the President says he doesn’t want to run for re-election.

Ambassador Habib said that we do not want that flexibility anyway. We can set limits within the existing framework.

Ambassador Strauss said that if we go this route, the American press will look back, and say that Hal Saunders and the State Department have used Lebanon to do what they have always wanted: to deal with the PLO. Lebanon will be seen as an excuse. Therefore we would be on the defensive. Does Hal agree?

(Assistant Secretary Saunders nodded yes.)

Secretary Vance said it was never our theory to undertake our plan without Israel’s ok. The lead must be taken by the Lebanese.

Ambassador Strauss said that Hal Saunders is on the right track only if what he (Ambassador Strauss) says is done.

Ambassador Habib said that we have to understand our limits with the PLO, irrespective.

Ambassador Strauss said that these limits are not clear in the State paper. He would restructure this effort differently—and back up. This would improve its chances of succeeding.

Ambassador Habib said our effort should not be dramatic, but low-key.

Secretary Vance agreed; otherwise it is doomed.

Ambassador Strauss asked why.

[Page 981]

Secretary Vance said that if there is a spotlight, it will be harder to do.

Ambassador Strauss asked whether the spotlight would actually help.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether the Israelis want a settlement in Lebanon.

Secretary Vance and Ambassador Strauss said yes.

Dr. Brzezinski asked why.

Secretary Vance said the Israelis see that they are losing over Lebanon, that it is hurting them. Weizman and Dayan and some others know this. The polls show that Israel sees it is being hurt.

Dr. Brzezinski said that Begin could see that Israel has a security zone in Lebanon under Israel’s control; Lebanon is kept divided, and the Syrians off balance; and Begin keeps the PLO as a rallying symbol. If this is a tacit thing, then it will defuse the situation.

Secretary Vance said that in practical security terms, this is right. But it has gone beyond that now. Israel is worried about its image with its friends, like the Netherlands, England, even the U.S.

Ambassador Habib said that nothing in the plan takes away these benefits. Haddad will still be there as a buffer. There is no security threat to Israel (the threat is really terrorism). The communal divisions in Lebanon that are useful to Israel would still be there. But Israel would gain in its capacity to gain support for what it does with regard to a Lebanon truce.

Dr. Brzezinski said that for Begin, it is important to maintain the distance between the U.S. and the PLO. If this were reduced, there is the political danger that the Israelis would stick it to the President.

Ambassador Habib said we could define limits, which would not create difficulties. He would like to see this done.

Ambassador Strauss said he will not go for the plan until this is done. Before starting, we should say where we will not go. Say it and mean it.

Secretary Vance said that this is fair.

Ambassador Strauss said we need to be forthright about it, so the President will not get trapped.

Ambassador Habib said that Hal Saunders wants to protect the President.

Ambassador Strauss said that this plan is a stepping stone to the PLO. We need to guard against that. Maybe he should get in a plane, go to Israel, and talk about an initiative on Lebanon. And why not say that some progress has been made?

Secretary Vance said that it needs to be a little quieter.

[Page 982]

Ambassador Strauss said he could say he is getting their thoughts. The problem is not to see the others. If he goes to Israel, he has to say why he is doing so.

Dr. Brzezinski said that if the approach is quieter, why would Israel be interested. It will see the U.S. inching towards the PLO, whatever we do. One they stop; second they will stick it to us here.

Secretary Vance said this might be right. But Israel sees damage from past Lebanon actions, and will again if the cease-fire breaks down.

Dr. Brzezinski said that there is a trade-off. It is after Cambodia, it is an ugly situation, and politically and morally something should be done. There would be an impact in the Arab world if we did nothing.

Ambassador Strauss agreed.

Secretary Vance raised the question of how to do something, and stick to it, on the PLO. It is up to Lebanon, Syria, and the UN to affect the PLO.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested the UN.

David Aaron said he had thought the PLO was interested in getting legitimacy.

Secretary Vance said that if we can’t do that, how do we do something. Maybe we can go part way on a truce plan; then in time go on.

David Aaron asked why the situation is calmer now. Is it because we have this initiative going? Israel is worried that something might happen. Then should we just let it simmer, and keep the effort moving to keep the situation quiet?

Ambassador Habib said that this is a good point. Therefore we should move on a gradual, phased basis.

Secretary Vance said that we need movement on a phased basis—e.g., how can we get movement on Tyre? How can we get the LAF into Tyre? Therefore we need some understanding on how to do it. Pieces like that can be moved. Maybe we can do that without being inconsistent and without dealing with the PLO.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how great the U.S. role should be.

Secretary Vance said that we should first move to talk with the Israelis—and not see it slide past them.

Ambassador Strauss said we have to go to Begin first, and get him as a co-conspirator.

Secretary Vance said that second we should go to Lebanon and say that it must do more. Therefore, we should ask them what they will do. We should go to Syria and ask them what they will do—e.g., pulling some forces out of Beirut and the airport.

Robert Hunter asked what the incentives would be for the PLO to cooperate.

[Page 983]

Secretary Vance said that they see progress, and are more sophisticated politically. Therefore they will take what looks like a constructive position, and they will get stronger. Eventually, they want a dialogue with the U.S. But they see this as realists, that it will not happen now.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how constructive the PLO would be. Would it be tacit? A cease-fire?

Secretary Vance said that complicated arrangements need to be worked out. The Lebanese should take the lead. We and others should help lead this to a more stable situation.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if there would be understandings.

Secretary Vance agreed.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if the understandings would be written.

Secretary Vance said he didn’t know.

Ambassador Habib said that some things were clear. The UN would need an expanded role. The UNIFIL role should be increased.

Dr. Brzezinski asked who would negotiate with the PLO.

Secretary Vance replied the UN and Lebanese.

Ambassador Habib suggested Syria.

Assistant Secretary Saunders suggested Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Secretary Vance said that we would not negotiate with the PLO.

Ambassador Habib said that the PLO has not met our terms, so that there would be no contact.

Ambassador Strauss said it isn’t what we start out to do that matters, it’s where we would get, and how the press puts it. It would take skill to assure the American people, the Jewish community, the Congress what we will not do. Therefore, is this worth it?

Assistant Secretary Saunders said we should see Lebanon on its own merits.

Ambassador Strauss said that if we say we will talk with the PLO in the Lebanon context, we will still get screwed.

Ambassador Habib said that we should have limits not to go that far. If we set limits we are ok.

Ambassador Strauss said we need a protective coating.

Secretary Vance said we must talk with the Israelis next.

Ambassador Strauss added that we should tell them the truth.

Dr. Brzezinski said that this (talking with Israel) seems to be a change from the State paper, which says that Israel should be brought in at some point.

Ambassador Habib said this should be before the initial phase.

Secretary Vance said that first we have talked with the UN about the role it will play; second we have talked with Lebanon about its role; third we should talk with Israel now.

[Page 984]

David Aaron asked what this will do for them. They see that we are putting them on the spot over Lebanon. If they say no, they see problems. If they say yes, this is the slippery slope to the PLO. We need a plan, if they say no, not to leave this problem at their doorstep. We can’t let this effort come to grief in Jerusalem. We need a plan for Begin that will not crowd the Israelis.

Ambassador Strauss said that if we go to the Israelis, we must have in our options one that we know they can accept—e.g., to do what they are now doing. We need an option they will accept.

Secretary Vance said we could lay out why they should be involved. He is not sure; this could put them on the spot.

Ambassador Strauss asked what he meant.

Secretary Vance said he meant on the autonomy talks.

Ambassador Strauss said that we did this before. It was bad. We need a little forthrightness, with an option the Israelis can say yes to, even if we don’t like it.

Secretary Vance said he has the idea of dealing with this in small pieces—e.g., Tyre. Can we devise steps?

Ambassador Habib said that if the cease-fire is maintained, it could be done. If not, the PLO will not let Tyre be neutralized.

Secretary Vance suggested acceptance of the cease-fire as ok, even if fragile. Then on to the next piece. How can it be put together?

Ambassador Habib said that once Lebanon is there (Tyre) it would be hard to change. The PLO will have to agree to lots before we get to that point.

Secretary Vance said that it is at least a piece.

Ambassador Strauss said we should go back to premises. It is given that, for the PLO, there is nothing in it for them that we will give. With regard to Israel, there is damn little in it for the PLO to warrant their getting in, to crunch on a deal. Therefore there is nothing in the plan for the Israelis. Therefore how do we get them in? First, we could give them something; but we can’t. Second, there is world opinion—this is the only thing. It is something positive, with low costs, and is a positive step towards peace in the world. This needs a bit of escalation of publicity. The only thing we have is that this is something positive for Israel, with low risks, and assurances of what we will not do. Then it reaches the launch pad, with political security and support here.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how this would be done.

Ambassador Strauss said we should say to Begin: you won’t do anything on the autonomy talks or on settlements—for good reasons, etc. But Israel must take a positive step for world opinion. Therefore, here Israel can be on the side of the angels. The problem is in being crowded into dealing with the PLO. We would publicly say we would not do [Page 985] this. This approach would probably fail, but it is our only chance. Maybe David Aaron is right, we should just let it bubble along.

Secretary Vance said we couldn’t let it bubble along.

David Aaron and Ambassador Strauss said we should do something.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Ambassador Strauss should go to Israel now.

Secretary Vance said that to go would be good.

Ambassador Strauss said that is why he thought of London.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we can wait that long.

Secretary Vance said the situation will break before that.

Ambassador Habib said the visit should be before then. There will be an Arab foreign ministers meeting and a summit, with Lebanon as the number-one item on the agenda. The summit is set for November 17.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how we should proceed.

Secretary Vance said that Boutros Ghali said we should play it softly until Egypt gets its land back, and then work Israel over (Note: side comment on the autonomy talks).

Dr. Brzezinski asked how we should proceed.

Secretary Vance said first, is this worth pursuing further. He believes we can’t drop it. The situation will blow up, and we will be blamed. Yet it will not do for us to be visibly in front. Therefore how should we structure how Ambassador Strauss will approach Begin? Second, what little piece is there—e.g., Tyre or Beirut—to keep the momentum going, to give a better chance that it will not fall apart in a) a Syrian-Israeli air battle; or b) some terrorist action in Israel mounted from the West Bank (since it is doubtful that the PLO would launch one from Lebanon).

Ambassador Strauss said that any PLO fool could commit a terrorist act.

Secretary Vance said that, to be specific, would Saunders, Strauss, and Hunter join forces on a couple of issues. How should we structure this, and what can we get out of it if Ambassador Strauss is to go soon?

Ambassador Strauss said going soon is possible, not good, but he will try to improve it. Tentatively, he is to meet Khalil and Burg in London soon.

Dr. Brzezinski asked about talking with Dayan.

Ambassador Habib said that Dayan would not want to get into this.

Secretary Vance agreed. It has to be Begin.

Ambassador Strauss asked, if there were a bust in the ceasefire, would that be a better or worse time to move?

Ambassador Habib said it would be worse. The Arabs would sit still for an initiative now. Lebanon embarrasses them.

[Page 986]

Ambassador Strauss said that there could be a quick fact-finding trip, including Israel.

Ambassador Habib said that this is an idea for himself; he will not draw as much fire.

Ambassador Strauss suggested that Ambassador Habib go to Israel.

Ambassador Habib agreed. If he goes to Syria, he must go to Israel anyway.

Ambassador Strauss said it would be ok for Ambassador Habib to go to Begin. This would be better than himself. Would it be possible for him to go to three or four countries, and end up in Israel? If it looks like success, then he (Ambassador Strauss) could join him, and bring Eppy.

Ambassador Habib noted that Eppy is sympathetic.

Secretary Vance said that if this is fact-finding, what do we have in mind? What would Ambassador Habib look for?

Ambassador Habib said it would be to see whether the Lebanese have guts. Will Syria back them? The UN in New York will do so.

Secretary Vance asked if he would go to Syria to ask them to pull out of Lebanon.

Ambassador Habib said that Syria can’t do that.

Secretary Vance said that if he (Ambassador Habib) could talk with Syria on reducing its presence. That would be a real selling point in Israel.

Ambassador Strauss agreed.

Secretary Vance said that this is the one thing Israel wants to see. Then we have a chance of Israel’s encouraging this effort.

Ambassador Strauss said that we have to structure it. For Begin, we can expect nothing from the PLO. But maybe we can get something from Syria. We could say that this is a non-risk gamble: for Israel and us this is no risk.

Ambassador Habib said that therefore this changes nothing on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

Ambassador Strauss said that Syria would be first. Therefore this is the plus for the Israelis.

Secretary Vance said that he raised with the Syrians the question of withdrawing from downtown Beirut and the airport. They said that this depends on the Lebanese. If they say they will do it, and can provide security, the Syrians will talk.

Ambassador Habib said that the Syrians don’t believe this. They are devious in dealing with Lebanon.

Secretary Vance said that at least we can talk about it.

Ambassador Strauss asked about the way to structure it.

[Page 987]

Secretary Vance said that we should seek to do two things: extend the sovereignty and control of the Lebanese government; and deal with the Syrian aspect.

Ambassador Habib said that the PLO would have to pull back under this plan.

Robert Hunter suggested that we offer to speed up arms deliveries to the Lebanese as part of Ambassador Habib’s trip.

Secretary Vance said that this issue was raised by the Lebanese in New York. If we could move stuff faster, it would be a plus.

Ambassador Habib said he needs to have it in hand—by the last week in the month. This would give the Lebanese more guts.

Ambassador Strauss said that this is not a neat orchard.

Secretary Vance said that some help is required. Talking with the Lebanese, Syrians, and Israelis is needed to start with. Therefore fact-finding is the best we can do.

Ambassador Strauss said he has not signed off on this approach.

Secretary Vance said we should see what we can think of.

David Aaron said we should also look at the question, if we succeed, of what the PLO incentives are: to cooperate, or to blow it up?

Secretary Vance asked Hal Saunders and his colleagues to develop an outline5 of an approach.

(The meeting ended at 10:18 a.m.)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 58, Lebanon: Senior Level 10/11/79 Meeting: 10/79. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
  2. See footnote 8, Document 290.
  3. See Document 299.
  4. See Documents 285 and 287.
  5. Not found. Vance sent a modified version of the Lebanese truce initiative, developed from discussions among Vance, Strauss, and Brzezinski, to Carter in an undated memorandum forwarded to Carter by Brzezinski on October 19. See footnote 2, Document 303.