304. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • London Meetings (U)

The meetings2 with the Israelis and Egyptians went better than expected. For the Egyptians, the talks took place against the background of Sadat’s expressing optimism in contrast with press reports of Strauss’ testimony—i.e. the effect Strauss was trying to achieve. Khalil continues to be impressive, and his seriousness about the process is now complete. (C)

From the Israeli side, the hidden factor was Burg’s near-desperation to come home with something, in order to counter Dayan’s charges that he couldn’t run the negotiations. He publicly announced that he was coming with new ideas; and when Strauss demonstrated that they were worth nothing (e.g. that Burg would go to visit West Bank leaders—who surely wouldn’t receive him!), he flailed around for alternatives, which Khalil and Strauss obligingly provided. (S)

The agreement on supervision of the elections is the most significant—i.e. that the military will not take part, that Palestinians can (with approval of the Working Group), that there can be outsiders (unspecified), and that the world press can be there. This also covers the whole “process,” not just election day. (C)

The agreement to continue the Israeli presentation on the current powers and responsibilities of the military government is less opti[Page 993]mistic, though with real effort this could become a means of talking about specifics of powers to be transferred, thus getting away from the Egyptian insistence on sterile debate about “principles.” (C)

Thus modest progress was made, out of a sense that this was the only way to keep the United States from losing some interest. Both Khalil and Burg were privately prepared to see the process go faster and more effectively than the communique stated. Bourg was even on the verge of accepting language that would have committed Israel to a truly full transfer of authority, but pulled back. However, we shouldn’t overestimate what has been achieved, either. It was clear that meeting like this outside the area—and all the press and hangers-on—was a good idea. (S)

Privately, Khalil raised with Strauss the possibility of a new UN Resolution—citing his belief that we will be faced with one anyway. He wants to put one together that would have the blessing of Israel, Egypt, and most of the other Arabs, thus boxing in the PLO. Strauss explained all the difficulties with this proposal (which has the earmarks of the resolution the Egyptians sank in August!).3 (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 10/79. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.”
  2. Strauss held trilateral talks with Burg and Khalil in London October 25–26. Summarizing the talks, Strauss reported progress on establishing procedures for supervising elections in the West Bank and Gaza, agreement between the Israelis and Egyptians to a procedure to move the Working Group on the Powers and Responsibilities of the Self Governing Authority away from arguments over discussing principles or details first into matters of “substance,” and an “Israeli proposal for taking steps in the West Bank and Gaza that might encourage Palestinians to look more favorably on the negotiations and elections there.” Strauss added that while the negotiators have acknowledged that “there is still a long, hard road ahead,” they “have tried to project a posture of serious progress made here.” (Telegram 21257 from London, October 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175–1702)
  3. See Documents 285 and 287.