313. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

SUBJECT

  • Assessments of Israeli Political Developments (U)

At Tabs A and B are State’s assessments2 of Begin’s prospects and the potential of a Labor government, as you requested. (C)

In summary:

Begin. State notes that most observers give Begin and Likud only about 6–8 months. Conflicts within the Cabinet are rife, with personal differences coming to the fore. (Begin has a 4–5 seat majority; 0–1 if Agudat Ysrael formally leaves the coalition and lines up with the opposition). Thus the government could fall over even a relatively minor issue. By contrast, the threat of defeat (Likud would suffer severe losses at the polls and almost surely be out of power) is likely to concentrate the minds of the fractious elements. (S)

Begin may now venture more into foreign affairs, playing to the domestic audience with a renewal of conflict in Lebanon, a crackdown on PLO activity in the West Bank, and stressing the relationship with Egypt even more. Only the last would be helpful to the peace process. (S)

State argues flatly that the May 1980 date for completing an autonomy agreement is dead. And the chances of extending the date would depend in large measure on Israeli activities in Lebanon and on the West Bank. The agreement with Egypt will continue to be implemented, however. (S)

Labor. The polls now indicate that Labor would get about 40% of the vote, and Likud about 30%. Labor’s flexibility in power would depend in large measure on whether it had to make a coalition with the National Religious Party. The NRP could split, however, over territories issues, or through attraction of its right-wing to the new hawkish Tehiya Party. But this is unlikely. (S)

Labor has mixed views on the autonomy process—which derives from Begin’s orientation, as opposed to Labor’s long-standing preference for partition and a deal with Hussein. Yet Labor does have to deal [Page 1028] with the autonomy talks as a fact, and could peruse them, demanding: Israeli control over East Jerusalem and over security in the territories; inclusion of some West Bank areas (uninhabited by Arabs) in direct Israeli control; authority over water and capacity to deal with terrorism; and seeking some arrangement with Jordan. (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 36, Serial Xs—(10/79–12/79). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Good, helpful. C.”
  2. The assessments are attached but not printed.