Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

315. 315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, December 2, 1979, 2318Z

311093. Subject: Responses to President Sadat’s Message to President Carter. Ref: State 293463.²

1. Secret-entire text.

2. In a manner and at a time you deem most suitable, please convey the following oral response³ on behalf of the administration to President Sadat’s letter of September 9⁴ (assistance to Egypt). Septel⁵ provided like talking points in response to Sadat’s October 6 (Soviet/Cuban security threats) letter.⁶

3. Assistance to Egypt:

—The various aspects of U.S. assistance for Egypt have, of course, been the subject of a continuing dialogue between our two governments. A number of the points raised in President Sadat’s letter were discussed with Vice President Mobarak during his September visit,⁷ not only by the President but also by other senior officials. And we in the Embassy have similarly had frequent contacts with you and others here on these matters.

—On the subject of our longer-term military supply relationship, Vice President Mobarak’s visit was very useful, coming as it did in the immediate wake of Dave McGiffert’s Mission to Egypt⁸ and during the initial course of the decision-making process in Washington. This latter process has taken longer than we had hoped, but future programs for Egypt cannot be considered in isolation—the relationship to other budgetary requirements and the need for congressional support, to cite but two examples, must be considered.

—President Carter and his top advisers are taking a careful look at your requests for military assistance. We hope in the near future to hold discussions again in Cairo with Minister Ali and General Bedawi which will allow you to prepare definite plans.

—As Vice President Mobarak noted, your needs are great. On the one hand, we will not be able to do all that you might desire, particularly in the short term, because of budgetary ceilings. On the other hand, there have already been pluses, such as our achievements in getting some of the F–4s and APCs to Cairo in time for the ceremonies on

October 6.⁹ We will do our best to meet your critical needs and look to a continuing relationship which will enable us to do more in the future.

—In that connection, we welcome the signing last month of the memorandum of understanding¹⁰ covering future cooperation that we may be able to undertake with your domestic defense industry. This is a complex field and we need to work carefully together to ensure that our efforts are fully successful. But it is also an area which offers the possibility of sustained benefits not only to your military but with possible application to the civilian side as well.

—On the economic front, we are pleased that you perceive an improvement in the area of economic cooperation, a subject which, as you know, was a major focus of conversation in Washington with Vice President Mobarak. Here too, while we may be unable to respond as comprehensively and swiftly as you might desire, Egypt’s needs are a matter of prime concern to us.

—In the wake of Vice President Mobarak’s visit, we have reconsidered what we could do to help you finance Egypt’s wheat imports. Our desire to be helpful is, as you know, limited by the absolute necessity to restrain the large U.S. budget deficit and the compelling needs of many developing countries. Nevertheless, we have proposed to the Congress that we raise our provision of wheat to Egypt under the PL–480 concessional credit program in the current U.S. fiscal year from the originally planned level of dols 198 million to dols 275 million, plus dols 14 million in shipping cost subsidies. This means an increase by 100,000 tons to 1.6 million tons.

—Our PL–480 assistance to Egypt is by far our largest in the world. We took dols 60 million from our food aid planned for other countries in order to maintain the planned 1.5 million ton program for Egypt this year against grain price increases, and we have asked the Congress for dols 17 million more to provide the extra 100,000 tons. In the current fiscal year, Egypt will receive about one-third of our worldwide food aid provided on concessional credit terms.

—Our total economic assistance to Egypt is today over dols 1 billion a year. We have provided over dols 5.5 billion in such assistance to Egypt since 1974.

—Looking to the longer term, aid has obligated dols 200 million for various agricultural programs which, when combined with steps your government is considering, should facilitate increased yields, thus promoting more effective use of Egypt’s land and water resources. My government is now studying how we might best facilitate cooperation between your public and private sectors and American companies in the development of new agricultural lands as well.

—As for the other commodity requests which Vice President Mobarak presented during his Washington visit, these have been carefully studied, and the President has asked me and members of the Embassy staff to discuss with your ministers opportunities that exist for making the best use of resources already in hand or now being programmed. As you know, we have in the last few months signed up some dols 335 million for commodity assistance. With congressional completion of action on the 1980 funds, we will soon be in a position to discuss the best way of using these funds, relating them to the substantial progress which Egypt has achieved in enhancing its foreign exchange earnings.

—As you may be aware, over dols 2 billion exist in the aid pipeline; these are funds obligated for use in Egypt’s development but still not put to use. There would thus seem to be some room to speed up implementation of existing, agreed projects. There would also seem to be an opportunity to accelerate the designing of new projects. If your government and mine can obligate funds sooner in the year, Egypt would benefit sooner from funds which our Congress has already approved.

—Again, I want to emphasize that we are indeed mindful of Egypt’s needs and of our commitment to help as we can. That has been our objective on the offers we have been able to make to date and this will be our intent with future programs. While our efforts may fall short of our own wishes—and Egypt’s expectations—we do expect to be able to assist in maintaining your military strength and improving the welfare and prosperity of the Egyptian people.

Vance

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 12, Egypt: 12/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Samuel R. Peale (NEA/EGY); cleared by Kirby, Keene, Edward Casey (E), Gaffney, Hunter, and Robert Steven (S/S–O) and in EB and AID; approved by Draper and Saunders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790556–0550)
2. Telegram 293463 to Cairo, November 10, conveyed from the Department to Atherton instructions for his meeting with Mubarak scheduled for the same day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790518–0019)
3. Atherton conveyed Carter’s message to Mubarak in a meeting held on December 6. (Telegram 24946 from Cairo, December 6; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 12, Egypt: 12/79)
4. See Document 289.
5. Telegram 309367 to Cairo, December 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790552–0659)
6. Conveyed in telegram 20675 from Cairo, October 7, Sadat’s October 6 letter responded to an October 1 message from Carter, informing the former of the measures the administration would take in response to the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. In the letter, Sadat proposed four measures to counter “the exploitation by the Soviet Union of unjust situations still prevailing in various areas of the Middle East, in Africa, in the Far East, and in Latin America:” 1) a “long range” program of economic and military assistance to the countries “most directly affected by the Soviet efforts at penetration and destabilization;” 2) “increase the capabilities of countries willing to take a firm stand against the Soviet plans;” 3) “increase efforts to solve the international problems which are exploited by the Soviet Union;” and 4) support “genuine liberation movements who should not be left in a position where they feel that their only support comes from the Soviet Union and other Soviet-leaning countries.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–2248)
7. See Document 293.
8. See footnote 4, Document 274.
9. Reference is to the October 6 commemoration of Victory Day, during which the Egyptian military paraded weapons that had recently been obtained, including U.S.-built F–4 fighters and Chinese aircraft. The Egyptian press, according to the Embassy in Cairo, emphasized the appearance of these weapons as a way to illustrate the “success of Sadat’s policy to diversify sources of military supplies.” (Telegram 20621 from Cairo, October 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790457–0382)
10. On October 21, U.S. and Egyptian officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding allowing Egyptian industry to manufacture U.S.-designed military equipment, including missiles, spare parts for aircraft, electronics, armored vehicles, ships, and optical equipment. (Telegram 21772 from Cairo, October 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790483–1136) The text of the agreement is in telegram 270477 to Cairo, October 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790474–0924)