Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

32. Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador to Egypt (Eilts)¹

Camp David, September 7, 1978

SUBJECT

• State of Mind of Egyptian Delegation on Morning of September 7, 1978

I escorted President Sadat this morning from Dogwood² to Aspen³ and also had opportunity to speak to various members of the Egyptian Delegation. What follows is my assessment of state of mind of the Egyptian Delegation as of noon today.

In my brief chat with Sadat, he said he was very pleased with the way things were going. His meetings of the previous day with President Carter ⁴ and jointly with President Carter/Prime Minister Begin ⁵ had been very helpful. He expressed confidence that something positive will come out of the Camp David talks. Subsequently, Presidency Director Hassan Kamel confirmed to me that Sadat had told the Egyptian Delegation about his pleasure and satisfaction with yesterday’s talks. Ahmed Maher later told me that, in his briefing to the Egyptian Delegation, Sadat had indicated that he had told President Carter and Prime Minister Begin that he would be willing to negotiate the West Bank in the event King Hussein still refuses to participate.

In contrast to Sadat, Foreign Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel is worried and tense (Boutros Ghali is only slightly less so). Kamel is concerned (a) about Sadat’s having told Begin of his readiness to negotiate the West Bank if Hussein will not play ball and (b) that in today’s trilateral meeting, Sadat may make more concessions than he can implement. Kamel retains his worry that Sadat will be pressed by President Carter into accepting compromise positions that will discredit Sadat and Egypt in the eyes of the Saudis, the Palestinians and other Arabs. I suggested to Kamel that he ought to have a little more confidence that Sadat will know his own political limits, but stressed the importance of Sadat showing maximum flexibility at this delicate stage. Kamel remains decidedly uneasy.

After I had taken Sadat to Aspen, Ahmed Maher said he wished to speak to me. Maher commented that the Egyptian paper⁶ is regarded by Sadat as a comprehensive and balanced approach to achieving peace. He expressed the hope that both we and the Israelis will recognize this. He argued that the paper is as far as Egypt can go. I told him that I thought Prime Minister Begin will be commenting on the Egyptian paper at today’s trilateral meeting. At some point I was sure that President Carter would also comment on it.

Maher then asked if the Israelis are putting forward a plan of their own. I said that I was not aware of any such Israeli intention and noted that Prime Minister Begin still stands by his self-rule and Sinai plans. I understood that Prime Minister Begin had indicated to President Sadat that everything in these Israeli plans is negotiable.

Maher then wanted to know if we consider it essential that “something” come out of the Camp David meeting? Would it not suffice, he wondered, simply to have a statement that the U.S. will continue its active efforts to work with the parties to achieve peace. He acknowledged that this would be pretty thin gruel for a Trilateral Summit, but expressed concern that Sadat might be pressed to agree to concessions in the West Bank that will be rejected by Hussein, the Palestinians and the Saudis. I suggested that Sadat was surely equally mindful of the need to satisfy the Saudis, Palestinians and Hussein in anything he might agree to at Camp David. Our common objective, I reminded Maher, remains to try to bring Hussein to the negotiating process.

Maher echoed Kamel’s concern that Sadat had told Begin he was ready to negotiate the West Bank if Hussein refuses to do so. Maher said Foreign Minister Kamel had cautioned Sadat that the Israelis might at some point leak this bit of information and create embarrassment for Sadat and Egypt. Sadat’s reply had been that if the Israelis do so, he will leak some of the things that Begin has told him. Maher commented that the Egyptian Delegation sees little purpose in such mutual public recriminations. It might come to that, however, if the Israelis leak Sadat’s statement.

All in all, Maher noted, the Egyptian Delegation (except Touhamy, who is a bit of an outcast) is less sanguine than Sadat is about what might emerge from Camp David. Their gnawing worry is that Sadat will make more concessions than he should or that he can fulfill.

Atherton and Saunders got the same impression in talking to Egyptian Delegation members an hour later.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 11, The Secretary Camp David [Briefing Book]. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eilts.
2. Dogwood Lodge, on the grounds of Camp David, was Sadat’s residence throughout the summit.
3. Aspen Lodge, the President’s residence on the grounds of Camp David.
4. See footnote 7, Document 28.
5. See footnote 11, Document 28.
6. The text of the Egyptian paper, “Framework for the Comprehensive Peace Settlement of the Middle East Problem,” is printed in Quandt, Camp David, pp. 356–360.