326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and the Consulate General in Jerusalem1

3230. For the Ambassadors and Consul General from Amb Linowitz. Subject: Approach Toward the Negotiations.

1. (Secret-entire text)

2. I want to outline my present thinking about the negotiations in which we are engaged to give you an opportunity to challenge my approach or improve on it.2

3. My basic concern is that we seem to be trying to back our way into the critical issues. I do not think we can succeed in this way, and I fear that we are spending valuable time on peripheral issues which will in any case defy resolution until the fundamental questions are resolved.

4. An example of this is the number of representatives for the transitional authority. It seems to me that Egypt wants it to “look” like a legislature—this may be possible—but only if Israel is first convinced it will not “act” like a legislature. The issue here is not the number but the powers. Once we have established the latter, the former may more easily fall into place.

5. I think similar arguments can be made on the other key issues which remain outstanding on modalities: East Jerusalem and the electoral system. Frankly, it would not discourage me in the slightest if we were to mark time on modalities while we focused almost exclusively on powers and responsibilities.

6. In the area of powers and responsibilities, I am also concerned about our approach. We seem to be gearing up for a yet another cloning process of creating sub-groups as a substitute for a clear idea of what we are trying to achieve. The conventional wisdom seems to be that in [Page 1064] order to attract the Palestinians we have to produce a detailed program for life on the West Bank with all the relationships between Israel and the SGA spelled out. I question that assumption and, in any event, question whether we could possibly accomplish such an ambitious program by May, or even soon thereafter.

7. It seems to me that we should be striving to establish a number of guarantees and some limitations for both sides and set up an equitable framework wherein the inhabitants of the West Bank can order their own lives and establish their own interrelationships with Israel and Jordan. My thinking is that we should strive to accomplish the minimum agreement that has a better than even chance of drawing in the Palestinians.

8. With this objective in mind, I wonder how much fact gathering and expertise we need and, more important, how much time we must spend on this process. It seems to me that we already know the Israelis are prepared to transfer full authority in a number of spheres subject to the restraints that will be necessary to protect the security of Israel and the economies of both Israel and the West Bank/Gaza under conditions of open borders. I do not see that it is necessarily our business to detail those restraints—instead, should we not put our energies into devising an equitable framework whereby both the Israelis and the Palestinians can, in the transition phase, work out their interrelationships confident that their interests will be protected?

9. All of this leads me to think that our energies over the next month should be devoted to attaining a statement at the next plenary along the following lines: the three delegations have agreed that full authority over internal policy formulation and implementation shall be transferred from the military government to the transitional authority in at least, but not limited to, the following spheres: education, transportation, etc. (to include as many spheres as possible). The delegations recognize that within these spheres certain economic and security questions may arise which affect the mutual interests of the transitional authority, the Government of Israel and other governments of the area. The three delegations have therefore instructed the working group on powers and responsibilities to develop equitable mechanisms for resolving such questions which will protect the rights and interests of all the people in the area.

10. I would welcome your comments. Obviously this message is not all inclusive and I look forward to your suggestions as to how we might build on it for the future.

Vance
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880145–0665. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Walker; cleared in NEA and by Calvin Konner (S/S–O); approved by Linowitz. Printed from a corrected copy.
  2. Responses were received from Amman, in telegram 79, January 7; from Jerusalem, in telegram 55, January 9; from Cairo, in telegram 698, January 11; from Tel Aviv, in telegram 763, January 12. All telegrams are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 1/80. A response from Jidda was not found.