Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

337. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter ¹

Washington, February 7, 1980

SUBJECT

• Expedited Deliveries of Equipment to Egypt (S)

Attached is the memo you requested from Harold Brown (Tab A)² following Vice President Mubarak’s visit.³ It seeks to set forth possible options to speed up delivery of arms requested by the Egyptians within definite limits on funds and financing arrangements. Once you approve these limits, we would propose to present the relevant options to the Egyptians and have them make the necessary trade-offs. OMB and State comments are at Tabs B and C respectively.⁴

The package is sufficiently complex that it might be helpful to explain how the options were put together and the key issues that emerge for your decision. The principal considerations are:

—Timing: to be responsive, we want some options that will begin deliveries in 1980.

—Composition: the options should include both advanced aircraft which are important for overall political effect and tanks which are essential to strengthen Sadat’s position with the Army—the main Egyptian military force.

—Production constraints: unless the Egyptians acquire more than 40 M–60 tanks, that production line will close forever and we have nothing to replace it. Over the next five years, 700 Soviet-built Egyptian tanks are projected to wear out and need replacement.⁵

—Our relationship: the military—the army in particular—is the most important political force in Egypt. We have replaced the Soviet Union as their main source of equipment; a long-term consistent supply relationship will not only help Sadat, it will advance our interest in the negotiations with Israel and enable us to count on Egypt, which is crucial to fulfilling the Carter Doctrine.⁶

OMB identifies two sets of issues. The first is whether we can separate acceleration of deliveries from an increase in the program. The analysis set forth below indicates that this is possible but not entirely feasible. The second set of issues is key to determining which options should be presented to the Egyptians:

—Are we prepared to increase FMS financing in FY 81 by $200 million?

—Are we prepared to increase the limit on cash flow financing from $1.5 to $2.7 billion?

The options are set forth in Tables I and II at Tab A. I suggest you take them out for reference as you consider the analysis which follows. The two tables represent different FY 81 FMS levels but mix up the issue of the limit on cash flow. For this reason, I have reordered the options in the following analysis of the impact of different financial arrangements on the options and the implication of the various options themselves.

1. No change in funding or financing arrangements will enable us to offer Options 1 and 3 from Table I.

Option 1	First Delivery Date
19 F–16s	Dec 81
280 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80
Option 3	First Delivery Date
19 F–16s	Dec 80
40 M–60 Tanks	Dec 81

The problem with Option 1 (from Table I) is that there would be no aircraft delivery for almost two years. Option 3 (Table I) would solve that, but the tank buy (40) is too small to keep open the production line for M–60s. For this reason, Defense suggests increasing the level of cash flow financing.

2. An increase in cash flow financing permits us to offer Options 2 and 4 from Table I.

Option 2	First Delivery Date
80 F–16s	Dec 82
550 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80
Option 4	First Delivery Date
19 F–15s	Dec 83
370 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80

Option 2 requires raising the cash flow limit from $1.5 to $2.7 billion. Option 4 raises it to $1.7 billion. Both would meet the need for early strengthening of the Egyptian army. However, neither option would provide advanced aircraft in the next three years

3. An increase in FY 81 FMS by $200 million would permit us to present Options 1 and 3 from Table II.

Option 1	First Delivery Date
19 F–16s	Dec 81
700 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80
Option 3	First Delivery Date
19 F–16s	Dec 80
185 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80

Option 1 (Table II) would meet the Egyptian tank requirement and assure the Egyptian army of a long-term supply relationship but fails to deliver any aircraft for two years. Option 3 (Table II) meets all of our objectives and is DOD’s judgment of the best option.

4. Increasing FY 81 FMS $200 million plus raising the cash flow ceiling. This would take us to Options 2 and 4 on Table II.

Option 2	First Delivery Date
80 F–16s	Dec 82
700 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80
Option 4	First Delivery Date
19 F–15s	Dec 83
610 M–60 Tanks	Dec 80

These options lay out a comprehensive and long-term program of modernization, but they have the defect of no advanced aircraft deliveries for several years.

OMB concedes that if you are to choose, they would prefer raising FY 81 FMS $200 million rather than lift the ceiling on cash flow payments significantly. Jim McIntyre also raises other issues which must be put in perspective:

—Diverting F–16s and M–60s from U.S. forces; this is essential for any acceleration of deliveries and DOD believes the relatively small quantities involved are manageable.

—The program increases proposed by Harold are not supported by any threat analysis, and are unnecessary given the peace treaty with Israel; the external threat comes from Libya, which has powerful and modern forces, but this misses the point that Egypt is the major military power in the Middle East that we must count on for all our security interests. It is the key to implementation of both the Camp David Accords and the Carter Doctrine for the Perisan Gulf. Far more than the facilities in Kenya, Somalia or Oman, we will be dependent on Egypt for facilities (the air base at Wadi Kena, prepositioned stocks for RDF, etc.). We need a stable Egypt with strong links to the U.S. and that means engaging in a long-term military supply relationship. This, in turn, means we must be prepared over time to replace the Soviet equipment that is wearing out.

—We should hold up on aircraft delivery acceleration because the F–16 has engine problems, and the F–X might be a better long-term solution; the quantities of F–16s to be delivered soon are small enough that DOD believes the present engine shortage will not be significant. Waiting for the F–X means no advanced aircraft for at least five years since that plane is barely on paper.

—Any increased funding or improved financing arrangements will lead to greater pressure for Israeli increases; I believe it will give the Israelis another talking point, but I doubt it will change any votes. More important would be the impact on the Pakistanis.

Finally, there is the issue of the F–15. After reviewing the options, I strongly doubt the Egyptians will want them because they would have to wait four years to get them. But by merely offering them, we might assuage a growing symbolic discrepancy that is adversely affecting our relationship with Egypt. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that Mubarak was misled by the diffident response of Javits and Church, both of whom now firmly oppose offering the F–15. I suggest we inform the Egyptians that we are prepared to consider supplying the F–15s provided we and they can work together to develop sufficient political support in the Congress. In this connection, we would also make clear the long delay in F–15 delivery. The option we would present is Option 4 on Table I which involves a relatively modest increase in the cash flow funding ceiling from $1.5 billion to $1.7 billion.

RECOMMENDATION

I believe a prudent set of options can be presented if you agree to the increase in FY 81 FMS by $200 million and avoid any significant increase in the cash flow funding. This would permit us to offer four options (Options 1 and 3 from Tables I and II). In addition, we would offer Option 4 from Table I to cover the F–15s while at the same time explaining the four-year delay and the political situation as described above.⁷

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Egypt: 1980. Secret. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Zbig. J.” The memorandum was found attached to a February 9 memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, Brown, and McIntyre summarizing Carter’s decision.
2. See Document 335.
3. See Document 293.
4. The referenced tabs were not found attached.
5. Carter wrote “?” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
6. Carter underlined “Carter Doctrine” in this sentence. Articulated in his January 23 State of the Union Address, largely in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter summarized the “Carter Doctrine” as a “declaration that any foreign attempt to take over control of the Persian Gulf area would be a direct threat to the vital interests of the United States and would be met by armed military force.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 394) Brzezinski modeled the wording of the Carter Doctrine on the 1947 Truman Doctrine in an effort “to make it very clear that the Soviets should stay away from the Persian Gulf.” (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 444) See also footnote 2, Document 336.
7. Carter initialed his approval of the recommendation and added a handwritten note: “But tell Harold & Cy to be absolutely firm on these budget limits. J.”