Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

339. Summary of Conclusions of a Senior Level Meeting¹

Washington, February 12, 1980, 8:03–9 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• • President Jimmy Carter (8:07–8:09 a.m., 8:10–8:18 a.m.)
  • Vice President Walter Mondale

• Vice President’s Office

  • A. Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

• State

  • Cyrus Vance (Chairman) Secretary
  • Harold Saunders Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs

• OSD

  • Harold Brown Secretary

• Personal Representative of the President

  • Ambassador Sol Linowitz

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

• NSC

  • Robert Hunter

Both Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski indicated the importance of the May target date for concluding the autonomy talks on the West Bank and Gaza. While there is some flexibility in that date if real negotiations are clearly seen to be going on, it is important in terms of convincing the Arabs that the process has a real chance of success. Secretary Vance also indicated that, after the May target date, the EC–9 would very likely take an independent line,² including a UN resolution on Palestinian rights. Mr. Saunders sketched two basic courses of action: pursuing the talks vigorously in hopes that success will isolate the PLO; or having some lines out to the Palestinians—and implicitly to the PLO—as a way of supporting the process politically beyond the target date and encouraging the West Bankers and Gazans to participate at the right moment. The Vice President and Ambassador Linowitz stressed the political factors of any involvement with the PLO, particularly the importance of not upsetting the Israelis in a way that would distract them from the Autonomy negotiations. It was agreed: that there should be no second Camp David,³ without complete assurances of success; that Ambassador Linowitz should continue to try gaining as much agreement as possible by the May target date—although a full agreement is most unlikely by then; that there should be repeated emphasis on conveying an impression of progress⁴ to the Arab world; that Ambassador Linowitz (and others) should step up their visible contacts with non-PLO Palestinians; and that there should be continued efforts with other Arabs to gain Palestinian openmindedness⁵ towards the Camp David process. We should consider what else will be needed if agreement is not reached by May.

On settlements, it was agreed that State will put out a strong public statement today,⁶ confirming our position and indicating that the Israeli Cabinet decision⁷ is a backward step and will have a negative effect on the negotiations. It was also agreed to recommend that the President take a similar line of disapproval in tomorrow’s news conference,⁸ while being up-beat on the course of the Autonomy Talks.⁹

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: Breakfast 2/12/80 Meeting: 2/80. Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. The meeting took place in the Roosevelt Room. In the upper right-hand corner of the summary, Carter wrote: “Zbig. J.” The summary was found attached to a February 13 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Mondale, Vance, Brown, and Linowitz, informing them of Carter’s handwritten comments and instructing them to “insure that this report is held closely.” A verbatim transcript of this meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 143, Middle East: 2/77–1/81.
2. In a February 6 memorandum, Hunter wrote to Aaron that European countries “have been getting more and more nervous about the prospects for the autonomy talks, and are thinking about defensive actions they themselves might take to lessen the damage to themselves if the talks fail.” Hunter continued: “The British have been fooling around with the idea of a new UN resolution on Palestinian rights—which even the Arabists in State agree would be disruptive politically at this time. In general—with a German lead—there is also more pressure for a European-Gulf ‘dialogue’ in order to get a greater share of the oil pie (presumably with more ‘flexible’ attitudes on the Palestinian question). And all of these folks are fooling around with the PLO—with the French close to having Arafat for a visit.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 4, Autonomy Talks: 2/1–12/80)
3. Carter underlined “no second Camp David” and wrote “?” in the right-hand margin.
4. Carter underlined “an impression of progress” and wrote “?” in the right-hand margin.
5. Carter underlined “non-PLO Palestinians” and “Palestinian openmindedness” and wrote “?” in the right-hand margin.
6. In his press briefing on February 12, Department of State Spokesman Hodding Carter III stated that “any steps, such as the movement of Israeli settlers into the city of Hebron would be a step backwards in the peace process and could well have serious consequences for the autonomy negotiations. It would damage the confidence of the parties, particularly the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in the peace process because it raises a basic question of Israel’s commitment to full autonomy.” For the full transcript of his remarks, see telegram 39160 to multiple posts, February 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800076–0866)
7. See Document 338.
8. The text of Carter’s February 13 press conference is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 307–315.
9. Below this sentence, Carter wrote: “This approach is ok for now, but will be inadequate. J.”