Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

343. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Cairo, February 20, 1980, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting between David E. McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Kamal Hassan Ali, Egyptian Minister of Defense

PARTICIPANTS

• US Side

  • Assistant Secretary of Defense David E. McGiffert
  • American Ambassador Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
  • Lt General Ernest Graves, Director, DSAA
  • Vice Admiral Thor Hanson, Director, Joint Staff
  • Mr. Samuel R. Peale, State/NEA
  • Lt Colonel Edward C. Redican, OASD/ISA (NESA)

• Egyptian Side

  • General Kamal Hassan Ali, Minister of Defense
  • Lt General Ahmed Badawi, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
  • Maj General Gamal al Sayese, Assistant Minister of Defense
  • Maj General Mahmoud Kamal, Assistant Minister of Defense
  • Maj General Habib Shorab, DMI
  • Maj General Mohamed Harudi, COS Land Forces
  • Maj General Mohamed Abu Ghazala, Defense Attache, Washington

Meeting opened with Mr. McGiffert passing President Carter’s greetings and the Secretary of Defense’s greetings to Minister of Defense Ali. He then described his mission to Cairo as being one of the messenger to deliver President Carter’s final decisions on the current phase of the US security assistance program for Egypt. He pointed out to MOD Ali that President Sadat’s intercession with President Carter² had had a profound affect on President Carter’s thinking, thereby causing him to revise his original decisions; but, given financial constraints faced by the United States, both domestically and worldwide, President Carter feels that he has done all he can at this time. Mr. McGiffert then explained in a summary way the decisions the President had made, passing a written summary (Aide Memoire)³ of these decisions to Minister Ali. Mr. McGiffert continued by outlining the objectives of his current mission to Cairo; namely, that the Egyptian MOD fully understand the decisions that they were receiving as well as the opportunities and constraints offered by these decisions. A short explanation then followed of the implications of cash flow financing with emphasis on the fact that this is a highly unusual decision for the United States to undertake in security assistance. Ambassador Atherton then commented that he was very pleasantly surprised by the decisions, feeling that they represented much more than he thought would be possible at this time. He further stated that there was little doubt that President Sadat and Vice President Mubarak had had an impact on this program. Minister Ali then thanked Mr. McGiffert for having delivered the decisions and almost immediately focused in on President Carter’s decision to offer Egypt F–15 aircraft. He stated that the F–15 impact was definitely political in that the decision to offer to Egypt would have great impact throughout the entire region. He stated that “for the first time, we are in balance with Israel.” On the F–15, “The time will come when we will ask for it. Now you have offered us many variants (options) so now we must decide.”⁴

[Omitted here is discussion of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, area and regional military concerns, and McGiffert’s recent trip to China.]

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0446, DEM Memcons/Reporting Cables. Secret. The meeting took place in the Ministry of Defense. Drafted by Colonel Edward C. Redican, USAF (OASD/ISA (NESA)) and approved by McGiffert.
2. Reference is to Sadat’s January 26 letter to Carter. (See Document 333)
3. Not found. In a February 20 plenary meeting between the U.S. and Egyptian delegations, McGiffert described Carter’s decisions as falling into two categories: Financing and Equipment. “On the financing issue,” the memorandum of conversation summarized, “the United States would be willing to make available to Egypt $550 million FMS credit in FY 1981 and that a planning figure of $800 million FMS credit could be used for FY 1982. At this point, Mr. McGiffert pointed out that the United States was willing to allow cash flow financing of new programs contracted for the FY 1980 and 1981 period up to $1.5 billion.” On equipment, “McGiffert explained that the United States was willing to make available all the items requested by Egypt last August on the high priority requirements list except more F–4 aircraft and frigate type ships.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0446, DEM Memcons/Reporting Cables)
4. McGiffert repeated Carter’s decisions to Mubarak in a Febrary 23 meeting between them, stating “the President’s decisions were final for this budget cycle and that he [McGiffert] was not in Egypt to bargain.” Mubarak “told Mr. McGiffert that the United States must set the numbers of F–15s that will be made available. Mr. McGiffert pointed out that within the financial constraints of the President’s decisions, the choice was Egypt’s, but that Egypt should understand that these prices were only estimates. The Vice President then exchanged views with Mr. McGiffert on the psychological and political impact of the F–15 issue. He stated that Egypt cannot be left to appear militarily weak in front of ‘all these people,’ i.e. Libya, Saudi Arabia and Israel” and appealed for “more equipment and faster deliveries.” (Memorandum of Conversation, February 23; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0446, DEM Memcons/Reporting Cables)