Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

350. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State Vance and the President’s Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz)¹

Washington, March 19, 1980

SUBJECT

• Strategies for Managing the Peace Process Through 1980

In response to Sol’s request for personal thoughts on the autonomy negotiations, this memo looks more broadly at how we manage the whole peace process in its larger aspects through the remainder of the year because the autonomy negotiations must be dealt with in that context.

Four Premises

First: I am writing from the premise that Sol with the President’s full support will be pursuing his negotiations with every effort to conclude them as early as possible. A lot of good work is being done on possible solutions to the issues. I am leaving the issues and the tactics of the negotiations aside for a moment, although decisions on strategy could affect how Sol begins to talk with Sadat next week.²

Second: The main issue to be kept before us is how hard we can press to conclude the negotiations in May or June and how much attention we should give to the option of suspending negotiations. Whether or not we might choose that option, we have to address the issue soon because the Egyptians are already locking us into a May 25 final deadline and closing off options for keeping the negotiations alive beyond June or beyond 1980. Sadat may well be planning another dramatic initiative. If we are going to suspend negotiations this summer, we need to do so on the right issue.

Third: An immediate operational issue in the management of the larger peace process is how to deal with a number of issues outside the negotiations themselves. They will affect our ability to conclude them and to win Palestinian and Arab acceptance for them or to keep the door open for further peace initiatives if we cannot. I am thinking particularly of probable moves by the Arabs or the Europeans to bring the Palestinian rights issue back to the UN Security Council next month or after May 25. If we are going to shape those efforts we will need to make our views known soon.

Fourth: How we manage the peace process this spring will affect the cooperation we can expect on building our security framework in Southwestern Asia as well as Saudi cooperation in keeping oil production up and prices down.

My own view is that we should press the negotiations as long as substantive work is being done to define the issues and solutions to them. An active negotiating process is better than a void if it is serious. How big a milestone May 25 is will depend on how much we make of it—whether we and Sadat choose to make it a cut-off point or whether we continue and try to convince others that serious work is still going on.

However, there is a very real alternative of suspending negotiations over the right issues.

Given the elections here and the shaky political situation in Israel, we may very well not be able to achieve an agreement this spring on terms that will meet our larger interests or Sadat’s. Because that likelihood is so great, I believe we must carefully examine a strategy of deciding before May how the negotiations might be put into neutral or low gear through November while making fairly firm—if not precise—commitments on what we will do in early 1981 assuming the President is re-elected.

Some General Propositions

Even though all of us understand the larger context in which our decision on overall strategy will be made, it is worth having the larger considerations in front of us:

1. The autonomy negotiations have a wider purpose. The effort to achieve full autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is our response to the plea from most of the people of the Middle East to promise the Palestinians a state of their own. Since we are offering far less than that—even if we achieve the full goals of Camp David—we must achieve everything we envisioned at Camp David or we will have little hope that an agreement on autonomy will achieve our larger purposes in the Middle East. A lesser achievement will further isolate Sadat and assure that the Egyptian-Israeli peace cannot become the nucleus of a moderate coalition in the Middle East; achieving our goal is necessary to vindicate Sadat’s policies—and ours. Vindicating Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty should be as important to Israel’s interests as to ours because—whatever might be wished—the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty and normalization of relations was never intended to stand on its own without progress for the Palestinians.

2. A larger U.S. purpose in the Middle East is to demonstrate American diplomatic power and continued Soviet inability to solve one of the area’s main problems in a just and secure way. This has been true for a long time, but the point has been underscored by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.³ It is unrealistic to think that we will be able to realize our plans for building our security position in Southwestern Asia if we cannot demonstrate our power by dealing effectively and fairly with this problem. The Soviets in the period from 1954 through 1973 sought to strengthen their position in the Arab world by demonstrating that their military and economic assistance provided the answers to the Arab-Israeli problem and to the area’s (particularly Egypt’s) economic development needs. Three wars in that period demonstrated that Soviet arms were not the answer and Soviet economic aid showed little understanding of the development process. In 1973 Sadat went to war not to win a military victory but to get the United States involved diplomatically. American diplomatic power is not—as the Arabs see it—our ability to force Israel to make concessions but rather our ability to bring about a viable solution for all parties. It will serve Israel’s interests far better to have a strong U.S. as the predominant extra-regional influence than to have Soviet-supported radical movements with no moderate counter.

3. The Palestinian issue is a security issue for the Saudis and Gulf Arabs. The Saudis and Gulf Arabs are increasingly blunt in telling us that their ability to stand with us on security issues in Southwestern Asia will depend on our ability to deal honorably with the Palestinian issue. The same point will be increasingly heard about oil production and prices. The Arab point is not simple blackmail for an ideological political purpose. Some parts of the Palestinian movement have roots in radical political philosophies and movements dedicated to the overthrow of traditional regimes. The Palestinians in the traditional societies of the Peninsula and Gulf are one of their principal security problems. The regimes there feel unable to identify with us on security issues when we do not appear to their sources of political support to be dealing with one of their main security issues.

4. A significant part of persuading those Arabs will be persuading them that we take the Palestinians seriously. That brings us to one of the toughest propositions of all—the question of how to deal with the PLO. I am not one of those who argues that a direct dialogue with the PLO would by itself resolve our problems. My long-term strategy towards the PLO would be to try to win their support for the autonomy in the transitional period and then to use that period to bring forward moderate leadership in the West Bank and Gaza so that the moderates in the Palestinian movement would ultimately have the capacity to isolate the radical elements. The PLO will probably split in that process, and that could be all to the good. But there has to be a subtly designed strategy for giving the PLO a sense—one way or another—that we regard them as part of the picture. Recognizing the Israeli side of this problem and the fact that a serious dialogue with the PLO is not on in 1980, I believe there are ways of doing just enough this year without the big splash of open meetings with Arafat’s lieutenants. But doing something on this front will be almost essential at some point when we have decided on our strategy.

5. We do not have to give the Arabs everything they want. Although the Arabs will continue to insist publicly on an independent Palestinian state and restoration of the pre-1967 Arab role in Jerusalem, I believe we can convince them of progress with less. Most moderate Arabs will tell you that they are prepared to go along with us in a transition to a Palestinian solution once they believe that our objectives are in the right ballpark and once they see again a U.S. ability to deliver. Although the Baghdad group will still not accept full autonomy, I believe in the end that the key Palestinians, the Jordanians, the Saudis, and the Egyptians will recognize that Palestinian autonomy and a lifting of the Israeli civil/military occupation could be an important step forward—if they are genuine.

6. Israel can be approached by recalling to Begin his oft-repeated promise to fulfill everything agreed at Camp David and by negotiating in detail. We cannot ask Sadat to accept less, but we have to ask him to cooperate with us in detailed negotiation as long as we pursue the negotiations. Begin himself, as I remember, was the author of the phrase “full autonomy”—which must have differed even in his mind from “self-rule,” which was his own earlier formulation. This coupled with the Israeli negotiating team’s statement that their proposals are negotiable provides a basis for insisting on achieving the fullest autonomy envisioned at Camp David. We must always keep in mind—and explain to the Egyptians—that the only way to move the Israelis to decision is by presenting detailed textual proposals. Neither the Israeli mind nor the Cabinet can make decisions on broad principles. Understandable Israeli fears can only be met, to the extent that is possible, by pinning down agreements in detail. Only if we can provide the detailed proposals needed for the Israeli decision-making process and convince Begin that the proposed agreement is within the limits agreed at Camp David do we have a shot at Israeli agreement. Despite predictions to the contrary since last fall, we cannot assume that Begin is dead politically even though the old spark may be gone and even though the government faces serious political and economic difficulty this spring. In any case, we must present our position as fully within the Camp David Framework.

The Situation Ahead: The Central Issue

The big issue through May 25 is how much to invest in pressing the autonomy talks to agreement by that date. While a maximum effort is desirable, I believe we would make a big mistake to lock ourselves into a May 25 cut-off point. For one thing, I doubt it is physically possible to put together a signable agreement by that time. For another, we can manage in the Middle East as long as serious work is going on. The important issues are whether the process can be serious enough to keep Sadat with us, to focus Israeli decision-making on the issues, and to sustain our involvement, including possible disagreements with Israel, here at home. In dealing with the May 25 date, we all should remember the three-month “deadline” in the Camp David Framework for the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. Because serious work was in progress when that deadline came, it was possible to keep going and conclude the negotiations three months later. It seems to me that the issue is not whether we can conclude the negotiations by May 25 but whether we can say with conviction that serious work is still going on with a prospect of achieving a reasonable agreement. But we need an early understanding with Sadat and Khalil on our longer term strategy so that we may maintain flexibility about the target date.

We can probably assume that Sadat is pressing the May 25 deadline and hinting at suspending the negotiation in order to get us more fully engaged. The choice we will need to discuss with him is whether he will play ball with us in conducting the negotiations our way or whether we should agree on suspension until 1981 with promise of a big push then. Proceeding with the negotiation will require more cooperation from Sadat and Khalil than we have at the moment. Khalil has never understood why we have to negotiate in detail, yet not to do so is to prevent our making a serious effort to get to the tough issues in ways that would enable the Israelis to deal with them. Sadat seems to be on the brink of calling the negotiations at an end without letting us get to the end. So the immediate need is an agreement with both Sadat and Khalil that wins their cooperation on negotiating strategy without making them look as if they have made unacceptable concessions on Palestinian interests. To have that exchange with Sadat, we must decide on our own long-term strategy.

On the Israeli side, as I suggested above, the approach has to be on the basis of fulfilling the Camp David commitments. We can show understanding of Begin’s political (including economic) problems and concentrate on asking him to tell us how he can conclude the talks on a fair basis. In this context, we need to know how we would suspend the talks if that happens because the greatest pressure on Begin will not be anything we say but rather his assessment of the situation he will face in the light of how the issues will be positioned if and when the talks are suspended.

As we move toward decisions on how to deal with Begin and Sadat looking toward May 25, a central issue will be how to state our objectives so as to avoid politically unsustainable confrontations and to describe an achievable outcome. We will also want to give careful attention to sharpening the issues in such a way as to allow them to be the main sources of continuing pressure if negotiations are suspended.

The Situation Ahead: Managing Other Initiatives

In addition to the imperative exchanges with Begin and Sadat through a variety of channels, we will have to deal in the next three months with the following initiatives from other quarters:

1. We believe the Arabs (possibly stimulated by the PLO) will request a Security Council meeting⁴ on Palestinian rights at the end of March or the beginning of April. Very simply, the issue for us is:

—We could write a good resolution that would be intellectually responsible in taking into account both sides of the issue, but it seems unlikely that we want to take that issue on now, given our experience on this subject last August, the recent reaction to the latest Security Council resolution, and the other larger efforts in which we will be engaged. We do not need charges on top of the recent ones that we are now trying to “change 242.”

—If we do not introduce a resolution of our own, one will be produced which will face us with another difficult choice.

—I am already recommending separately that we try to get such a Security Council meeting postponed but to do so we may have to have some indication that we are prepared to handle this issue in some alternative way at a later time. Our credibility in seeking such postponements is worn.

2. The “European initiative” is gaining momentum. Key Europeans believe they have a signal from us that, after May 25, some noise from them might be useful.

—At worst the Europeans will seek to curry Arab favor by supporting objectives that we cannot support without any prospect of improving the situation on the ground. The Europeans may marginally help themselves while putting us on the spot without helping us to move any negotiation forward.

—At best, a party like the British might try to use the exercise to gain PLO acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 and Israel’s right to exist in order to fulfill our Sinai II commitment.⁵ At some other times this might be helpful, but it seems unlikely to me that we really want to open a dialogue with the PLO in 1980.

—One approach worth considering is whether we might propose to the British that they try to engage the Palestinians in a serious dialogue about how they could see themselves being woven gradually into the negotiating process. If the Palestinians knew we were behind the British initiative, they would view this as a significant step.

3. We have received and will probably receive further suggestions on strategy from Arab leaders that they will accept a hiatus in the peace process in the latter half of 1980 if we can tell them what we will do in 1981. We will have to deal with this question first with Begin and Sadat, but we should keep high on our agenda consultations with the other key Arabs lest the negative post Camp David reaction be repeated. Oil prices and our security framework in Southwest Asia are at stake.

—Fahd has already sent such a message to the President.⁶

—As early as last August when the Palestinian rights resolution was in the Security Council, intelligence reports indicated that Arafat recognized that the U.S. might well not be able to make serious moves until early 1981.

—Sadat, in presenting May 25 as a “deadline” and in wanting exchanges with us on strategy toward the autonomy talks, might well be on the verge of proposing some such strategy.

—If we are to move in this direction, we would want to talk along these lines with King Hussein when he comes in the second half of April

4. Throughout this period we will probably see continuing Israeli moves to expand their settlements in the West Bank. This possibility highlights the need to consider further how we might take a stand for restraint of some kind on new settlements. The ideal way to achieve this would be a sensible resolution of the land issue in the autonomy negotiations. But if these negotiations were to be suspended, there would be at least an argument for either positioning the talks so they will break down over the settlements issue or, as one means to that end, seeking a well-defined moratorium on specified actions during the period when the negotiations are suspended. The Israelis would not agree, but the issue would be clearly put.

The Decisions We Face

1. The basic decision that needs to be made is whether to press for an autonomy agreement this year.

—One possible strategy is to press the autonomy talks as far as they can go with the intent to bring substantive issues to a head whenever they are ready. This might require our putting forward our own draft agreement at some point in some form, knowing this would produce another serious crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. This would also require pressing Sadat not to lock us into the May 25 date and to cooperate with our strategy of negotiating in detail.

—The alternative strategy is to press the negotiations as far as they can be pursued seriously in order to complete the foundation but consciously pave the way for suspension of the negotiations in the most favorable way possible with an eye to significant action in 1981.

—These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. The issue is exactly how to bring them together so that the second is a natural fallback from the first and so the issues are correctly positioned.

2. In making that choice, we need to consider carefully that a decision to try to conclude the negotiations this year will force a choice between:

—Pressing Sadat to accept a deal that will have enough compromises in it to preclude selling it to the Palestinians and other Arabs. The temptation would be great if we set our sights on an agreement for agreement’s sake and have to fall back to get agreement. Such an outcome could have serious consequences for Sadat’s tenure and for our relationship with Egypt and the other moderate states in the area.

—Pressing Israel to decisions that would put in suspense the current government’s policy of steadily tightening its grasp on the West Bank and Gaza. This could well provoke a government crisis in Israel where such a crisis may already be imminent for entirely separate economic and political reasons. Such a course would have serious repercussions in the U.S.

—The unfortunate aspect of this choice is that while we would be pressing Sadat for concessions on negotiating strategy, we would seem mainly to be leaning on Israel to make concessions with nothing concrete on the Jordanian or Palestinian sides.

3. If we were going to press ahead and try to achieve agreement this year, we will have to take some specific steps to pave the way on the Jordanian/Palestinian/Saudi side. Parenthetically, we should note that the need for a serious effort on this front argues for not locking ourselves into a May 25 deadline.

—The centerpiece of a serious effort on this front would be a dialogue with the Palestinians. Since there are strong arguments against taking on the burdens of a direct dialogue with the PLO this year, we need another approach. I see four complementary possibilities: (a) Set up a series of in-depth discussions with a group of non-PLO Palestinians or Americans close to the Palestinians. (b) Ask the British to hold in-depth talks with the PLO. (c) Ask Hussein when he is here to put certain questions to Arafat, implicitly on our behalf. (d) Sit down for a couple of days with one non-PLO Palestinian close to Arafat (a professor now in the U.S.) to brief him in detail on the autonomy talks and to ask whether there is any way the course we are on could intersect at some point with a course the PLO could endorse.⁷

—Whatever we do along the above lines with the Palestinians or with Begin and Sadat, we must tell the key Saudis as well as Hussein in depth what we are doing.⁸

4. As soon as we know where we are going this spring, we must tell the Europeans soon in order to fend off initiatives that might cut across our efforts. Our friends and allies will be highly skeptical that we can succeed in our negotiations, but they will probably stand back as long as a serious effort seems to be taking place. If we were to engage the British with the Palestinians, this would keep them constructively engaged.

5. If we are not going to go beyond the point where serious discussion is stalled and if we are prepared to let serious negotiations go into neutral for the remainder of 1980 and then to resume them in earnest in 1981, we would want to decide that as early as possible so we could position ourselves to use the prospect of movement in 1981 to fend off such initiatives as the Europeans may mount or as the Arabs may bring to the Security Council on the Palestinian rights resolution. We would also want to bring about a suspension in the most constructive way possible with the intent of resuming negotiations early in 1981.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 51, Middle East: 1/80–1/81. Secret; Eyes Only; Super Sensitive. Drafted by Saunders. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Vance wrote: “Mr. President—I believe this paper is worth reading. Cy.”
2. Linowitz was scheduled to leave for the Middle East on March 21 for six days of talks with the Israelis and Egyptians.
3. See footnote 2, Document 325.
4. The Security Council met seven times between March 31 and April 30 to consider the issue of Palestinian rights. For a summary of those meetings, see the Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, pp. 377–380. On April 28, Tunisia submitted a draft resolution on Palestinian rights to the Security Council. For the Security Council’s consideration of that resolution and the April 30 vote which followed, see Document 365.
5. See footnote 5, Document 97.
6. Brzezinski sent the Saudi aide mémoire containing the oral message from Fahd to Carter under a March 3 covering memorandum. The message conveyed Fahd’s deep concern that “with the end of May and the possible collapse of autonomy talks, the environment will be created for serious regional developments. In particular, the mood of any new Arab summit is likely to be immensely more difficult than the last two. The economic rationale for significantly lowering oil production is already being pressed with great vigour and persuasiveness. HRH’s lack of visible political ‘support’ by Washington on the Arab-Israeli issue compounds his constraints in these areas as well as in others related to cooperation in the face of Soviet encroachment.” Brzezinski reported the oral comments accompanying the message “indicate that the Saudis are fearful that they will no longer be able to support us,” to which Carter wrote: “a) That will be a decision for HRH to make b) We are doing the best we can. J.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Country File, Box 68, Saudi Arabia: 3/80)
7. Vance underlined this sentence.
8. Vance underlined this sentence.