Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

351. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, March 20, 1980, 1257Z

6278. Subject: Letter From President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin.

1. (S-entire text).

2. I was summoned on short notice to see Vice President Mubarak at 1100 local today. Purpose of meeting was to provide us with the text of a letter dated March 17 from President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin (para 3 below) which Mubarak told me he will be giving to Israeli Ambassador Ben Elissar later today. Mubarak stressed that GOE has no repeat no intention of publicizing this letter and was providing us a copy in confidence. In response to my question as to whether he would tell Ben Elissar a copy had been given to us, Mubarak said he would do so if asked. The letter deals with the negotiations, in which the U.S. is a full partner, so there was no reason why we should not have a copy.

3. Begin text. Dear Prime Minister Begin.

—In our last meeting in Aswan,² we pledged to do everything possible to ensure the success of the efforts we have been exerting along the road to a comprehensive and lasting peace. I need not reiterate, here, the factors which make it imperative for all of us to reach that goal without delay. Strategic considerations, both regional and global, render the continuation of the present situation most detrimental to the cause of peace and stability. This makes it all the more important to make real progress every day in the negotiations on the establishment of the self-governing authority for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. That is also why we agreed to step in, when the need arises, and give the necessary directives to our delegations to the negotiations.

—It is with this in mind that I am writing to you today. I have been following very closely the course of the negotiations with hope and faith. I firmly believe that both our peoples are firmly committed to the cause of peace. It is my clear conviction, also, that they are aware of the necessity for reinforcing the historic step we took on the road to peace. That is precisely why we have been exercizing patience and restraint even in the face of several discouraging and alarming signs. We had hoped that, in the course of the negotiations, a way would be found to give the process the shot in the arm it badly needs. However, I must tell you, in all candor, that I am deeply concerned over the present state of affairs. Enough time has passed without making any tangible progress on major substantive issues³ of special significance. Several months were spent merely on defining the positions of the parties and identifying the areas of agreement and disagreement. On the other hand, we noticed that certain attempts have been made to depart from the Camp David formula and treat it lightly. All this has been taking place despite our positive policy of taking every conceivable action to bolster the bridges of confidence between our peoples and eliminate any remaining barriers. We have been faithful not only to the letter of the peace accords, but also to the spirit of Camp David and my mission to Jerusalem. With all the good will nations can command, we accepted the early implementation of the provisions on normalization.

—Nevertheless, we see no signs of any meaningful progress in the negotiations. The twenty sixth of May is approaching in a matter of a few weeks. If the negotiations fail to produce the necessary progress to keep the process alive, the consequences will be very grave indeed. Many people will question the wisdom of continuing the talks.⁴ On the other hand, the violation of the fixed date, be it a target date or a deadline, might give the impression that the talks have become open-ended since no other date is fixed. All this will expose us to charges and suspicions of procrastinating or lacking the sense of urgency which is required under the circumstances. The door will be wide open before any other efforts to seek a solution to the problem. It would be quite difficult for us to oppose such efforts or prevent any move within the United Nations for the purpose of establishing new terms of reference.⁵ On the other hand, this will give credence to the allegations that the peace accords we signed constitute a separate peace arrangement. We reject this categorically. As I told you in our first meeting⁶ in Camp David, I would never accept a separate or partial agreement. I need not emphasize this any further.

—Likewise, the success of our endeavor necessitates that you refrain from taking any action or making any statement that might poison the atmosphere or exacerbate the situation. Certain actions taken by your government lately have not been sensitive to the delicate stage of the negotiations. Statements made by Israeli officials lately have not been helpful, to say the least. This is not likely to generate the kind of response we would like to see on the part of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, whose cooperation is vital to the success of our mission.

—In the coming few days, our representatives will be meeting to pursue their discussion.⁷ These talks will provide an indication of the manner in which the negotiations are developing. It is essential that they address themselves seriously to the major issues of substance with full awareness of the consequences of success and failure. It is also essential to set up a commitee that would be entrusted with the task of discussing the issue of security⁸ for it is obvious that such issue is adversely interferring with many aspects of the negotiations. Hence, a real attempt to define it and clarify it would be a good step in the right direction. If the committee on security starts its function promptly and in a positive manner, it will provide a hopeful sign that would contribute to the creation of a more favorable atmosphere.

—I am certain that you will take these thoughts as seriously as I am taking them. We both have a stake in strengthening the structure of peace by every feasible means. Accordingly, I expect to hear from you positively.

—With best wishes for good health and contentment.

—Mohamed Anwar El Sadat. End text.

4. At the end of Sadat’s letter there is a handwritten addition reading: “Jehan joins me in extending our best wishes to Mrs. Begin and the family.”

Atherton

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Mid-East, 4/79–12/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, indicating that he saw it.
2. See Document 327 for a summary of the meetings in Aswan.
3. Carter underlined “I am deeply concerned over the present state of affairs. Enough time has passed without making any tangible progress on major substantive issues.”
4. Carter underlined this and the previous sentence.
5. Carter underlined this sentence.
6. See footnote 7, Document 28.
7. See footnote 5, Document 353.
8. Carter underlined this sentence.