Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

353. Memorandum for the Files by the President’s Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz)¹

Washington, March 29, 1980

RE

• Memorandum of Conversation with President Carter

On Saturday morning, March 29th, I received a phone call from Phillip Wise, the President’s Appointments Secretary, asking whether it would be convenient for me to come to the White House to see the President at 11:15AM. I had returned from Cairo about 7:30PM the previous evening, and obviously the President wanted to have a report as soon as possible.

I arrived at the White House and the President received me in the Oval Office. He was wearing a sweater and a jacket and was seated at his desk. I pulled up a chair and we talked for about 45 minutes.

The President started off by telling me of his recent meeting² with Moshe Dayan in which Dayan had come forward with the suggestion that it might make sense for Israel to put on the table its intention with respect to future settlements and then to indicate what the correlative anticipated right might be for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Dayan told the President that he thought Israel wanted about 15 or 20 more settlements; that he anticipated that all of the settlements would in due course have about 3,000 people additional; and that the Palestinians could be told that they could bring in about 50,000 Palestinians under the autonomy arrangement. The President thought this was a sensible idea, and I said that it was along the lines of Sharon’s suggestion about a limited number of settlements, but that obviously Dayan had gone beyond that to limit also the number of people at each settlement.

I then gave the President about a 10-minute report on my meetings in Egypt³ and Israel⁴ including the final session at Alexandria.⁵ I pointed out to him that there had been some real advances in a number of important areas which augured well for the future of the negotiations. He had read all of the cables and was, therefore, fully familiar with what had transpired except for the report of my last meeting with Sadat the day previous.

The President thought that making use of the Coordinating Committee⁶ for dealing with certain issues such as Water might be a good idea and at first blush felt that the addition of the United States to the Coordinating Committee would make sense. He agreed that this tactic might permit us to finesse the difficult problem of trying to work out details and answer Egyptian concern about trying to negotiate details for the Palestinians. I also told the President about the approach to avoiding the problem of transfer of authority by specifically listing the powers to be exercised and the notion of trying to shoot for getting Heads of Agreement agreed to by May 26th. He indicated that the term “Heads of Agreement” was new to him, and I explained it.

I also told him that we had made very little progress on the problem of the Arabs in East Jerusalem although Begin had seemed to be attracted by my reference to the absentee ballot to be exercised outside of East Jerusalem by the Palestinians who are now in East Jerusalem and who, as Jordanian citizens, apparently have the right to vote in Jordanian elections. As to settlements, I told the President that I had been unable to get the freeze until May 26 which I had tried to extract from Begin, but I thought it not impossible he would be willing to do something about it when he came to Washington. On the Security Committee I was confident that Begin is ready to agree to that and probably when he is in Washington. I also told him of Sadat’s suggestion of a Gaza First approach, and the President said he thought Sadat had long been too optimistic about his ability to get the Gaza Palestinians to cooperate.

I tried to explain to the President why Begin seemed to be so intransigent and that his primary concern is the possibility of an independent Palestinian State. I pointed out that Begin needs reassurance on that score and needs to be told that Israel’s security will be preserved. I also told the President that Begin feels that the President thinks that Begin went back on his promise to him about a settlements freeze following the Camp David talks. I pointed out that there was obviously some disagreement, and the President agreed that upon reflection and after the emotions had subsided there was probably misunderstanding between them as to just how long the freeze was to run. He said he would make clear to Begin that he understood the basis for the misunderstanding. I told him that I thought this would be helpful.

We then talked about how to move the relationship along and the fact that Sadat will be concerned with large issues while Begin will be cautious about details.

I then went through a number of other areas which Sadat had discussed with me. With respect to military aid and the F–15’s, I told him of Egypt’s concern that the price to Israel was so much cheaper than that to Egypt and also that Sadat wanted 4 destroyers on a lend-lease basis.

I also told the President that Sadat had told me the Shah was very bitter about the United States and felt he had been betrayed; that 14 months ago Sadat had suggested that he remove his planes from Iran and bring them to Egypt and the Shah had said that even if he wanted to do so they would not come unless the United States directed them to. Sadat said he was trying to temper the Shah’s feeling.

Sadat also asked me to convey to the President that he thought that there was now civil war in Syria and that Assad would be out by the end of the year. He thought that Iraq was working against Assad and cautioned the United States to be careful about Iraq.

With reference to Saudia Arabia, I told him that Sadat had said that the United States can control it whenever it wants to and that the Royal Family exists wholly because of the help of the United States. He said that Saudi Arabia could get Hussein to join the negotiations by a phone call, since Hussein and his family are on the Saudi payroll. Sadat did think, however, that this might be the time to improve Saudi-Egypt relations, and that the United States could undertake to do it.

The President then said that he was not surprised at the suggestion about Hussein; [2 lines not declassified] He also indicated that the Shah was a trouble-maker and was misstating facts to Sadat.

Quite clearly the President is eager to get back into the negotiations and said as much. He said that he had enjoyed the Camp David negotiations immensely despite their difficulties because except for his submarine duty it was the only time perhaps ever that he had devoted himself for an extended period to a single subject—entirely apart, as he put it, from the Congressmen on his neck, etc. He seemed to be immensely interested in every aspect of the negotiations and the attitude of the people involved. He is obviously not only knowledgeable but keeping current on every tactic.

The President then spoke again about Moshe Dayan’s suggestion which he said was the best idea he had heard for weeks about the situation. He said that what was needed was imaginative approaches such as Dayan’s, as well as my ideas with reference to religious sovereignty and Heads of Agreement as put forward, in addition to the absentee ballot for the Palestinian Arabs.

He asked me to work with Secretary Vance in putting together a briefing book⁷ for him preparatory to his meeting with Sadat and then said that he noticed that I wore cufflinks and wanted me to have a pair with the Presidential Seal. He gave them to me and I left.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Linowitz Papers, Box CL1, Government Service, Middle East, Carter, Jimmy and White House Staff 1980. Secret.
2. A copy of the memorandum of conversation for this meeting, held in the Oval Office from 2:30 p.m. to 2:59 p.m. on March 26, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 1–4/80.
3. Linowitz summarized his March 25 meeting with Sadat in Alexandria, covering the state of the autonomy talks and Sadat’s upcoming visit to Washington, for Carter and Vance in telegram 279 from Alexandria, March 26. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 3/80) Following the plenary session of the autonomy talks at Alexandria, Linowitz met Sadat again at the latter’s Giza residence on March 28; a draft memorandum of conversation is in telegram 6971 from Cairo, March 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2372) A copy of Linowitz’s report to Carter on this meeting, dated April 1, is in the Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Countries, Box 48, Foreign Countries—Egypt [1980]. The report was also sent to Cairo in telegram 84998, April 1. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 4/80)
4. A summary of the first meeting between Begin and Linowitz on March 23, covering the Israeli Cabinet’s March 23 decision to authorize settlement in Hebron, Sadat’s recent letter to Begin, Arab voting rights in East Jerusalem, security arrangements, and proposed legislative powers for the SGA, was sent in telegram 916 from Jerusalem, March 24. A copy bearing Carter’s handwritten notations is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 3/80. The second Begin-Linowitz meeting on March 24 is summarized in telegram 952 from Jerusalem, March 25. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 3/16–31/80) Linowitz summarized his March 24 meetings with Peres and Weizman in telegrams 277 and 281 from Alexandria, March 26. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 3/80) Linowitz summarized his last meeting with Begin on March 25, along with meetings with Sharon and Burg the same day, in telegram 281 from Alexandria, March 26. A copy of this telegram, bearing Carter’s handwritten notation, “This meeting confirms my concerns re Begin’s intentions. J.” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 36, Israel: 3/16–31/80.
5. Linowitz’s report on the March 27 Alexandria negotiating sessions, which were “marked by a clear desire on both sides to help the process and to understand the concerns of the other party,” as well as agreement between the participants to form a Security Committee, was conveyed to Carter and Vance in telegram 8 from USDEL AMVIP Linowitz Aircraft, March 28. In addition, it was agreed at Alexandria that Egypt would drop its demand that the SGA receive all of the powers currently accorded to the military government, and that “certain unassigned areas—such as water,” and “residual powers” be placed under the aegis of the Continuing Committee. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: 3/80)
6. Reference is to the Continuing Committee.
7. The briefing book on U.S. strategy for the upcoming Sadat and Begin visits, forwarded to Carter under an undated 19-page covering memorandum from Vance and Linowitz, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 3, Egypt: President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, 4/80: Briefing Book.