357. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Summary of the President’s First Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin

PARTICIPANTS

  • President Jimmy Carter
  • Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
  • Ambassador Samuel Lewis, United States Ambassador to Israel
  • David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
  • Ambassador James Leonard, Deputy Negotiator for the Middle East Autonomy Negotiations
  • Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)
  • Prime Minister Menachem Begin
  • Yitzhak Shamir, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Dr. Yosef Burg, Minister of Interior
  • Ambassador Ephraim Evron, Ambassador of Israel to the United States
  • Chaim Kubersky, Director General, Ministry of Interior
  • Jacob Nehushtan, Minister, Embassy of Israel
  • Yehiel Kadishai, Director, Prime Minister’s Bureau
  • Brigadier General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
  • Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister
  • Elyakim Rubinstein, Assistant Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Professor Ruth Lapidot, Legal Adviser to Foreign Ministry
  • Gilad Stern, Assistant to the Minister of Interior

(Prime Minister Begin began by presenting the President with a book).

Prime Minister Begin said that this book shows how great is peace. It quotes ancient sources. It is dedicated to “President Jimmy Carter, the architect of the peace treaty, in gratitude and admiration.”

The President said that Prime Minister Begin was too generous.

Prime Minister Begin said that the book contains their greatest sayings.

The President said that he is grateful, and will keep the book the rest of his life. (The President presented a book on a section of Georgia called Jerico). He said that, since he had read about Jerico in the papers, he wanted to give Prime Minister Begin this book! (laughter) It is about the Southland, where the President lives.

Prime Minister Begin said that he understands the President has the right to live there! (laughter)

The President said that Jerico has a special meaning in the South. The book was written by James Dickey, who is a Georgian. It is beautiful. He wants to say that we are grateful and honored to have Prime Minister Begin here and his group. He (the President) is grateful that Prime Minister Begin has brought his new foreign minister to meet with us. He is also thankful that Minister Burg is here. The President has had reports that Minister Burg has been doing constructive work. He will say in public the comments he made to Prime Minister Begin in private. They covered the crucial elements of our relations. Our security is intimately tied together, in the Middle East and also in other parts of the world. Our purposes are the same; and enhancing the security of Israel also enhances the security of the United States. He would repeat: the U.S. is committed to the security of Israel. We have promised that we will not negotiate with, or recognize, the PLO until and unless it recognizes Israel’s right to exist and endorses Resolution 242, which is the basis for peace. We are adamently opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank. This is felt strongly by Sadat, as well, and Sadat said it here last week. He (the President) had outlined to Prime Minister Begin Sadat’s views. Sadat is eager to finish all of Camp David soon. Sadat wants continuous negotiations, for 40 days until the 26 May target date. Sadat is aware of Israel’s special concerns with security. And Sadat deplores, with him (the President) the constant threat to Israel of terrorist acts. We have common purposes, both in the immediate security of Israel, and also of the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has changed adversely the alignment of forces there—which contains 90% of the [Page 1168] world’s exportable oil. U.S. positions are well known, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. We are taking strong steps to induce Soviet withdrawal. We do not see them getting out soon, if ever. Its forces are not going down, but up. Several units have been increased during the past week. The Soviets are killing thousands of Afghans a month, destroying entire villages, and directly and brutally violating the rights of the brave people of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union underestimates the Afghans’ bravery and commitment to fight. It underestimates the revulsion in the world at the invasion; and it underestimates the condemnation of the Arab world.

We have a specific interest in the peace process—in addition to our friends Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. We have a direct interest in its success. Sadat is for it. He (the President) will add his own voice: we should carry out the Camp David Accords meticulously, at the earliest possible time. He is concerned about the Europeans—the Austrians, French, Germans, and to an extent the British—over their tendency to turn away from their historic support of Israel, and to accept increasing relations with the PLO and the militant groups. But to avoid this trend, we must carry out the Camp David Accords: including refugees, the Palestinian problem in all its aspects, and also the security of Israel. The Camp David Accords are complex, and difficult issues remain. Prime Minister Begin said that some minor issues have been solved. The major ones are left for intense negotiations. The American public is deeply committed to the peace process. If there is a failure to succeed, the American people will condemn all of us who are involved: him (the President), and also Israeli and Egyptian leaders, for sure, if we do not carry out all of the Camp David Accords.

We have a serious problem with the hostage crisis, and this is his (the President’s) constant preoccupation. He gets advice, varying between taking strong action and exercising patience. He accepts the need for patience. He has called on the Allies to exert more pressure on Iran. After stronger economic efforts later, then we will need to decide on military moves. This option is open under international law. He will take it if he needs to.

We have a mutual interest in the security and peace of Israel; and also in the peace and security of Egypt. This is a three-way partnership: all are valuable. Sadat has shown both determination and patience. There is a difference of interpretation concerning the Camp David Accords. If there had been no flexibility in the language, then we would not have got agreement at Camp David. The Accords went far in specifics. We need to honor both the letter and the spirit of the Camp David Accords, and recognize the need for accommodation in resolving differences. What we get will be the measure of our success. There is some concern here that Sadat and Egypt are isolated in the [Page 1169] Arab world. Sadat is extraordinarily courageous, strong, and tenacious. He resists these pressures successfully. He (the President) is also full of admiration for Prime Minister Begin and Israel for their courage in carrying out difficult aspects of the peace treaty, often early. But we cannot rest on our laurels. There is an equal need for sensitivity, determination, and courage now. We need to get to determine the status of citizens on the West Bank and Gaza, and the terms under which the Israeli military government will get out, with adequate security for Israel, and with its troops in specified security locations. None of these issues are easy. There were some other points that Prime Minister Begin made—or would he (Prime Minister Begin) prefer to make them? He (Prime Minister Begin) is welcome. We are eager for progress in these two days, and to get continuing negotiations for 40 days. Ambassador Linowitz has proposed Washington; Prime Minister Begin prefers holding them in the Middle East. We would be happy to host them. Prime Minister Begin says that there are a number of cabinet members—such as Khalil—who have other duties. Therefore, Prime Minister Begin says that we should split the talks with 20 days each in Israel and Egypt.

Prime Minister Begin said that he is deeply grateful for the President’s invitation to come here, for these crucial talks—crucial for the Middle East, Israel, Egypt, the U.S., and maybe half the world. The President is preoccupied in all senses with the international situation. The Iranian situation causes them (Israelis) great pain, as it does the American families connected with the hostages, with the crisis going into its sixth month now. Customs that had been sacrosanct for centuries, not just during times of peace but also in wartime, are being trampled underfoot. Israelis, more than other nations, feel with the United States in their hearts. Israel has had experience with hostages, who are killed if it does not submit. Only 10 days before Prime Minister Begin came here, five children were taken hostage in the middle of the night.2 Four were saved, but were wounded, and one soldier was killed and 11 wounded, seven of them seriously. Israel paid with blood to try saving the four children. Therefore the Israelis feel this situation deeply. Given his time in Russia—which he did not love!—he should know them. What would have happened if their embassy had been seized? Russia would have marched to Tehran, with no concern for its [Page 1170] people held hostage. The American people cannot acquiesce in their people’s being killed. Therefore, the President has been patient for 160 days and more. The world has been astonished by this patience. Even Sadat—at Aswan—said that the U.S. had lost 50,000 lives in Vietnam. Prime Minister Begin had had to tell Sadat that in the U.S. life is sacred. He (Prime Minister Begin) did not think that direct action would help: though Khomeini’s army is weak, and would be crushed, the hostages would be dead. This patience honors America and the President. Israelis have the same pain, and the choices are difficult. Prime Minister Begin knows that it is a sacrifice for the President to see him (Prime Minister Begin). Therefore he is grateful for the President’s taking time to see Sadat and now the Israelis.

Second, there are the Soviets in Afghanistan. This is one of the most serious events since World War II. Some people compare this invasion with Czechoslovakia in 1968. There was a tragedy at the end of its “spring,” when the Czechoslovak people had begun to breathe. Warsaw Pact forces crushed them, and then there came the Brezhnev Doctrine.3 Yugoslavia and Romania and others denied it. But anyway, Afghanistan is not in the Soviet orbit. It could go through Baluchistan to the Indian Ocean in a few days, and change the balance of forces in the world. There is no force to stop them. Therefore this is one of the greatest events, and it is difficult to handle. Declarations by the President, Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski—they still found time to talk to us (Prime Minister Begin and Sadat). Therefore he is grateful. And therefore he will do his best to bring about practical results, and has come here with concrete proposals to discuss. Israel agrees on intensified talks. He suggests holding them in the Middle East for 40 days. This is not a deadline, it is not a target date, as was suggested at Camp David and Israel did not accept. It had said we need to be careful, and therefore accepted, on his amendment, that the two countries pledged with good faith to go for the goal of finishing in one year. Then elections can be held for the Self-Governing Authority as expeditiously as possible. This was confirmed in the joint letter of March 26 (1979).4 So, in candor, maybe we will have to continue after May 26. It will be no tragedy. But he and the other Israelis would like to meet the goal. Let’s have intensive talks. As at Camp David, we can work every day and even day and night. There are 40 days, and they should be divided 20 [Page 1171] and 20 between Alexandria and Tel Aviv. This will place the talks near the governments, and there is a need for consultations. Thank you for inviting us to Washington. But communications are difficult. The Soviet Union listens to all international calls, and cables are sometimes slow. Minister Burg and Shamir—and the negotiating team—will need to consult with the Israeli Cabinet, and with Prime Minister Begin, too. We will need to do this quickly, and can send emissaries in 45 minutes, to take decisions. This is his suggestion. He accepts the objective of holding intensive talks. If questions are asked of the President, Sadat, and himself, then they can talk by phone. We can see perhaps whether we can reach the goal of 26 May. Israel wants to carry out autonomy, as faithfully as the peace treaty—as Sadat said: “faithfully and with honor.” For nine months, all the burden has fallen on the Israelis’ shoulders—land, the removal of the flag. They don’t regret it. They gave back the Alma oil field, and now pay $650 million a year to Egypt for oil; and next year it will be $800 million, as the price goes up. This is equal to all of American aid. Israel spends 30% of its gross national product on defense: there is no precedent for this. This (the oil) is a burden on the Israeli economy, and is difficult. But they do it without complaint; they did it for the sake of peace. The treaty has been carried out scrupulously, and they will with the first (sic) part of Camp David—autonomy. If we carry the negotiations forward, he hopes we can succeed. As at Camp David, three months were provided to complete the treaty, but they kept at it for three months more. It was a pity, but what tragedy was there? In March 1979, at the treaty signing here, all were happy, those were great happy days. He hopes that more will come with effort.

Thank you for inviting us. We shall do our best and try to meet the goal. There will be intense daily negotiations in Alexandria and Tel Aviv. Let us try—we may succeed.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether Prime Minister Begin understood that we had proposed holding the talks here for one week, and then going to the Middle East. The U.S. feels the need for 8–10 hours of negotiations every day. We can’t do it there. It will be tough if Khalil is in Egypt—he could give one or two hours at most at a time because of his other responsibilities, as is also true of Ministers Burg and Shamir. He (Ambassador Linowitz) thought that only 2 or 3 people from each side would come here.

Prime Minister Begin said that his answer is “no.” He understands the idea of meeting in Washington. Ambassador Linowitz’s remarks do not matter. If Khalil were here, he would have to go home after a day or two. It would not be serious if we have to extend the negotiations a day or two. Let’s decide to start the day after tomorrow, or next week, in Alexandria and Tel Aviv. There are lots of people in the Israeli delega[Page 1172]tion—ten or twelve—like Egypt. Let’s do it a simple way: with the teams there, and only 45 minutes to be on the spot.

The President said that he had no objection. But Sadat favors having the first week in the United States. We can ask Sadat (about Prime Minister Begin’s suggestion), or Prime Minister Begin can do so through the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. We can find this out today.

Prime Minister Begin agreed.

The President asked Secretary Vance to ask Sadat if Prime Minister Begin’s proposal is all right.

Secretary Vance agreed.

The President said that there are some key issues, which Prime Minister Begin had described to him. They are controversial in some instances. Prime Minister Begin is talking from an Israeli paper. Israel is inclined to see the Self-Governing Authority as an administrative council—and no more—as a cabinet, with one person for each function to be performed. Sadat sees a much broader approach, with several hundred members: 200, he (the President) thinks. His response to both leaders is that the delineation of authority and responsibilities is more important than how they are identified. Ambassador Linowitz has language, so the group will not have allocated to it legislative authority. The idea of legislative, executive, and judicial would make (the SGA) like a nation. We agree with Israel that there should be no nation, or in effect an independent government. It will be difficult how to ascribe to the group some powers and responsibilities. Egypt wants it to have more members. The number is arbitrary. We suggest 40, elected in a free process. Obviously there are difficulties: e.g. settlements on the West Bank and Gaza and the Israelis living there. The U.S. understanding, under the Camp David Accords, is that when the Self-Governing Authority is formed, then the Israeli military government will withdraw and the Self-Governing Authority will have broad responsibilities. Israeli security is a special subject; the Camp David Accords guarantee Israel’s security. A difference of opinion was inevitable in defining that security relationship. We have interpreted this, in the past, as covered in the “designated security locations,” with strong police forces under the aegis of the Self-Governing Authority. Prime Minister Begin goes to subversion and violence, which can again lead to terrorist acts. This is a broader scope than Egypt has in mind. There is a dispute on who, how, and in what circumstances

Israelis can live in the West Bank and Gaza. The right to settle; the official nature of the settlements; and Israeli government financial support—all these will be well discussed in the future. The U.S. positions are well known. He is trying to get this right. Would Prime Minister Begin like to comment?

[Page 1173]

Prime Minister Begin said that he will read his proposals.5 (See attachment). Some of them are open-ended. It is not correct that they are agreed, for the heads of agreement, but they are proposals. The first is about the Self-Governing Authority and its essence of government. First is what was at Camp David, and a number of proposals which he will read: “1) The self-governing authority of the Arab inhabitants in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, will be an Administrative Council freely elected by the aforementioned inhabitants.” This makes clear that it is an administrative council. What it is based upon is at page 22 of the State Department book on Camp David,6 at point A/1/(c). Thus the only establishment is of an Administrative Council. If it were not so, the words “administrative council” would not be in parentheses. Therefore, how should it be interpreted where the words “self-governing authority” appear elsewhere? It was clear, when the President talked at Camp David with Barak and el-Baz—who are good lawyers. The suggestion was made by Barak in the President’s presence. Barak says that everywhere the reference is to an administrative council. This is in the minutes, to which we can refer. Therefore, now at the moment of considering the most basic issues, there is a need to state what the self-governing authority is. Israel says it is an administrative council, freely elected. Then there is the number. In an Egyptian document,7 it is called an assembly, with 80–100 members, and with an executive of 11 members. Therefore, that clearly is legislative, and with a judiciary. According to Montesquieu,8 this would be a Palestinian state in all but name. It is a division of power (which exists here in the U.S., but not in Britain: Montesquieu was wrong about that).

Minister Kubersky said 1762.

Prime Minister Begin said that Israel does not want a Palestinian state, nor does the President or Sadat. But it would be that in fact. Ambassador Linowitz says that Egypt does not stand by its document. He (Prime Minister Begin) has not heard from them that they have withdrawn it, and would like to hear it. It is unacceptable, and contrary to [Page 1174] Camp David. Camp David provided for no legislative council and no judiciary. The President will bear him out. Secretary Vance will bear out that there is to be “a” withdrawal of forces. The President accepted it. “A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.” We weighed all the words at Camp David. If it (the SGA) had legislative, executive, and judicial functions, that is a sovereign state. Israel doesn’t want that. Therefore, it must not be that in fact or in name. On numbers, Egypt wants 80–100. Ambassador Linowitz says 40, and Ambassador Lewis, too. These are arbitrary numbers. It is casual—why not 30? Or 50? Why 40? Israel is trying to draw the number from reality. How can it be done? Therefore Israel suggests that the number equal practical functions of the proposed Israeli model, with powers and responsibilities. He will not take time on this now, or Minister Kubersky can make a presentation.

The President asked if this model describes the powers and responsibilities of the central government.

Prime Minister Begin said that it says there are 11 functions. If there are 30, that is all right. If there are 15, that is all right. The number of members depends on the number needed to administer, not to be a debating society which one day will take us by surprise and declare itself independent. There is no wisdom for Israel in using force to oppose such a step. This would lead to world pressure on Israel. Israel does not want that. If in the self-governing authority, the members only administer, then Israel will not interfere. He hopes it will not be double the number of the U.S. cabinet, or of Israel’s 17. Does the U.S. have about 11 or 12?

Dr. Brzezinski asked if he could ask a question?

Prime Minister Begin said that he has one or two sentences more. Therefore, Israel will not stand on the number, that is not important. But the number of members must result, in the Administrative Council, in corresponding to the number of functions. If that is 15, all right. If it is an administrative council, that is proper, but not if it is a quasi-parliament. If all it does is carry out its duties, then Israel will not interfere.

Dr. Brzezinski referred to Prime Minister Begin’s reasoning. Is the question that he (Prime Minister Begin) is concerned that the number of members correspond to the number of functions, because he fears a precedent in a larger number?

Prime Minister Begin agreed.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that maybe it would be better to have a larger number, since this would provide more political support and therefore make the agreement more acceptable—which is in Israel’s interest. Why does one function have to equal one person? Why not have [Page 1175] one person and two deputies? This would still be administrative, but it gets a larger number. Israel gets the principle: 13 functions could lead to 39 people.

Prime Minister Begin said: Professor Brzezinski, he (Prime Minister Begin) appointed a deputy, and was told by parliament that this was a waste of money. Minister Burg will answer in detail.

Minister Burg said that here the quantitative begins to be qualitative. A large body has to be seen as a parliament. On this rationale, we can derive 11 or 12 or 30. It is a question of quality expressed in quantity. And an individual would like to say who is his deputy. For example, Secretary Vance would like to name his deputy. In the elections, would there be 13 districts or 39 in Dr. Brzezinski’s model? Where would they take place: 13? 39? Dr. Brzezinski says that there would be deputies, but if they do not respond to the temperament of the principles, that would not be good. If the 13 want deputies, they can appoint them.

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that there be 13 three-man districts.

Prime Minister Begin said that if there were 15, there would be 45. What would be the result?

Dr. Brzezinski said that this would get Israel the principle, and they (the Egyptians) would get what they want in the number.

Prime Minister Begin said that Ministers Burg and Shamir have no deputies. There is one non-military deputy in the Defense Ministry, and there was objection in the country, which saw it as a waste of money. This way results in a quasi-parliament. Then there is the need to hold elections. Say 13 or 15 districts—then there are 13 or 15 members. It would depend on the number of functions, to be decided in negotiations, not in an arbitrary way.

Ambassador Linowitz said he would speak with candor. We believe that if numbers are being used as a target, then Israel won’t get its objective. Israel wants no parliament with legislative powers. Israel is worried that it would declare a Palestinian state. We will say—in any form Israel wants—there can be no Palestinian state in this period. He doesn’t care for calling the group an administrative council; and is not happy in Prime Minister Begin’s definition of the Self-Governing Authority as an administrative council.

Prime Minister Begin said that this is Camp David, not him.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we agree on the need to convey certain powers to the Self-Governing Authority. Is this consistent with Prime Minister Begin’s definition?

Prime Minister Begin agreed.

Ambassador Linowitz said next, what powers should go to the Self-Governing Authority? We will meet your concerns, and also do so within Camp David. The Egyptian model is not worked on; it is out.

[Page 1176]

Prime Minister Begin said he had never heard this from Egypt.

Minister Burg said that Ambassador Linowitz is partly right. They had talked about 1) transferred powers; 2) shared (like water) or coordinated powers; and 3) residual powers (like internal and external security) for Israel. Israel agreed on this. But Khalil got cold feet, and said that he can’t agree on residual powers for Israel. His need is to see them all transferred. Israel says that what is security is Israel’s.

The President said that he is not sure about the definition of internal security, but the rest is all right.

Minister Burg said that three categories. . .

The President said that with Ambassador Linowitz, Minister Burg had used the term “reserved.”

Minister Burg agreed.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we are not very far apart. We proposed that there be a list of transferred powers; and some for Israel, like security and foreign affairs (if anybody has the latter). This we agree on. And there should be a Continuing Committee to deal with a middle group—like water, internal security, maybe land. Why is there a problem? He thinks there is a misconception, from talks with Minister Burg, about the Continuing Committee. The idea is that there should be an agreed list of powers to go to the Self-Governing Authority. The Self-Governing Authority would then be chosen by the residents of the West Bank and Gaza. It would be understood that some powers—e.g. Israel’s security—would go to Israel. The Continuing Committee would be set up—and Egypt says that the U.S. should be in—and it would take issues like water, economic arrangements, and maybe land. It would reach decisions on a unanimous basis, and if there were no agreement, then existing arrangements would continue.

Prime Minister Begin said he would come to the concept of the Continuing Committee—in the seven points9 (the U.S. had shared with Israel)—later. The issue of greatest important is security. First, the Self-Governing Authority is an administrative council—not within the spirit but within the letter of Camp David. They had weighed every word for 13 days and nights. Second, the number of members (of the SGA) should be equal to the number of functions. The U.S. and Egypt should think this over. Israel stands by it. It is in accord with the Camp David Accords. On the seven points, he wants to quote one: “It is agreed that Israel will have sole authority to exercise the power of external defense and foreign affairs.” This says “defense” instead of “security”—why? It is narrower. “Defense” refers to attack; and then Israel will defend itself. “Security” is another problem. There are Israel’s [Page 1177] eastern and northern frontiers. There are 5000 tanks in Syria, including T–72s. In Jordan, there are 400 Chieftains, among the best on earth. Saudi Arabia has the F–16, etc. What is its army worth? But the advanced weapons are there. Iraq has 1000 tank carriers it got from West Germany. It could move four armored divisions in 48 hours, whereas before it took them a week, and they were wounded when they got there (to the Syrian front). Israel is not frightened by all this. This comes under “defense.” But there is also infiltration—as at Misgav’am. This is “security.” Camp David always used “security.” “Defense” is not there. Therefore, we must not change Camp David. Foreign affairs is not a matter for this document. Of course there will be no foreign minister or ambassadors. This is only a transitional period. After five years, everyone can claim rights. This is five years long, and we should let it work.

Therefore, we should leave foreign affairs out.

There is his other point (in his 4-point proposal): internal and external security are linked, including anti-terrorism. This is Israel’s. It is in accord with Camp David. At page 24 (of the booklet), point two says: “All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors . . .” That includes “neighbors,” too—why? With regard to Jordan, the PLO can do things to them, as it did before Black September.10 He would not want Palestinians to go from Israel to Jordan, to kill the King. This is the reasoning behind his proposal. If “External and internal security, including the fight against terrorism, conspiracy to commit acts of violence and subversion, will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities” is not the case, then in Israel there will be permanent bloodshed. Lebanon will be a playground in comparison. Last year, Israel captured thousands of detonators, and hundreds of kilograms of explosives, including 1000 half-kilogram bricks of delay-explosives. Therefore, Israel prevented their use. But it might not always do so. If Israel does not have responsibilities, and the police have it, they would not do it. Israel has had experience with police—as in Hebron where a student was left to bleed to death by the police until the IDF arrived. Therefore, Israel can’t rely on police. Then we can assure peace for all time. There is no need for foreign affairs; “defense” should not be substituted for “security”; and internal and external security should be combined.

The President said that he is deeply concerned. At Camp David, they talked of “specified security locations,” and talked about between three and twelve locations. If security is seen as anything that could [Page 1178] lead to a threat to peace, then Israel could say that it has to be on every block in Jerico and Nablus. Thus he is concerned.

Prime Minister Begin said that with all respects, he did not refer to the Army with any of this—as it is written. The President will know how many there will be in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza District. He will give numbers and numbers on a map.11 The rest will be redeployed to specified security locations. (The President said: yes). He will give the President a map. Secretary Vance knows that they changed “agreed” to “specified.” This is a matter of Israelis’ lives. Therefore, it is not written down, but Israel will show it on the map. When the Self-Governing Authority is inaugurated—or even earlier—Israel will take some forces out. A number will stay, and be redeployed to specified security locations as on the map. This is a question of the Army. The question of incursions is wider. It is a daily problem. And there will not always be the Army there to deal with it.

Secretary Vance said that in the call to the Camp David Accords, it says: “A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order.” Therefore, this is to be worked out between Israel, Egypt and Jordan—if it is in; it is not specified how it is to be worked out.

Prime Minister Begin said that is a separate sentence—but he accepts Secretary Vance’s reading. Therefore, Israel will make proposals (on external and internal security and public order), and agreement will come. But not on the specified security locations.

The President and Secretary Vance agreed.

Prime Minister Begin said that arrangements on the rest will be agreed. Now on the Continuing Committee: it is in Camp David. He saw the U.S. words—in the seven points. In the Camp David Accords, the Continuing Committee is only given one task—“to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 . . .”

The President asked Prime Minister Begin to read the rest.

Prime Minister Begin said: yes. “. . . together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.” Judea and Samaria are not in it.

The President asked if that is all. Please read it.

Prime Minister Begin read: “Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.”

[Page 1179]

The President said that this is a broad charge.

Prime Minister Begin said that means during the transitional period. That is the time to start it, when the Self-Governing Authority is established and inaugurated. First, elections will be held. Second, there will be the withdrawal of the military government. Third, then the Continuing Committee will be set up “during the transitional period.” It could be after four years, but that would be a distortion. It should be in the next few months. The question should be: what do we do about the Continuing Committee now?

Ambassador Linowitz said that we want agreement on what will be submitted for approval (of the Palestinians). Therefore, it can be set up after inauguration of the Self-Governing Authority. Is this agreed?

Prime Minister Begin said certainly: it is written. He says this in the President’s presence. Israel will not deviate from the Camp David Accords—they feel, however that it (the Continuing Committee) should be at the proper time.

Ambassador Linowitz said that the agreement among the parties calls for a Self-Governing Authority. It must be approved by the Palestinian people. Through the agreement—therefore as part of it—once the Self-Governing Authority is in being, there shall be a Continuing Committee, and to it will be referred water, economic relations, maybe land, for unanimous agreement.

Prime Minister Begin said that this is in “other matters.” It is agreed. (There was then discussion among the Israeli delegation). We agree. But we will not do it today (i.e. start the Continuing Committee). When it is agreed.

Minister Burg clarified: when the Self-Governing Authority starts functioning.

There are two things to try to keep up the momentum. First, here there was a misunderstanding of the Continuing Committee’s functions. It has been solved. Israel will abide by the agreement. Second is the question when it should start working; that is only after the Self-Governing Authority is set up.

The President said but we should delineate what it will do, and decide that now.

Prime Minister Begin said it may. We should have wide discussions.

Minister Burg said we can get our people—maybe 3 or 4 of them—today to work it out.

Prime Minister Begin said that his third point is that “Israeli citizens, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be under the jurisdiction of Israel.” It is clear that autonomy is for the Arabs.

The President asked if this included the settlements?

[Page 1180]

Ambassador Linowitz suggested something like our Status of Forces agreements.

Minister Burg said he had not heard of this idea.

Prime Minister Begin said that Minister Burg speaks Rococo style.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Status of Forces agreements apply to our military people abroad, and mean that they are subject to our laws.

Minister Burg said that Israel’s settlers are citizens, not soldiers.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he knows that Israel wants the law to apply to citizens, not property.

Prime Minister Begin said they will think it over. The Vice President had said,12 and the President had said on European TV,13 that Israelis have the right to live on the West Bank, though they differ on the question of settlements. On an individual basis, they can’t send their people to Jericho, though they have the right to live there (as Arabs live in Israel). When Sadat came to Haifa,14 Sadat said that he saw Jews and Arabs living together. If a man goes to Jericho and buys a house, he will be killed by the PLO. Therefore, historically, Israelis have lived in groups, with a fence. But at Misgav’am the Palestinians broke through. This was a technical failure. Therefore, the settlements should be under Israeli jurisdiction.

The President asked if this meant that, wherever an Israeli lives, Israel has jurisdiction.

Prime Minister Begin said that this is true in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district, not everywhere.

Minister Burg asked whether the President meant individuals or settlements.

The President said both.

Prime Minister Begin said that this does not apply in the U.S.—a person can become a citizen here after 5 years.

The President said he meant this.

[Page 1181]

Prime Minister Begin said that Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district are different from the U.S. They have left the question of sovereignty open for five years. Therefore, Israel has to carry out its obligations.

The President said that there is a difference between individuals’ living in Jericho, and their being financed by the government.

Minister Burg said that if someone went to an Arab village, and buys a house, he does so as an individual. Many of his friends were killed in 1948—including only 20 kilometers south of Jerusalem. There are settlements there now. Surely these are under Israeli jurisdiction and not under the Self-Governing Authority. Since they are there as a group, surely this applies to Israeli settlements. There is a basic difference—Israel says that settlements are legal; he will not say what the U.S. thinks! (laughter)

The President asked whether they intend, during the transition period, to have military occupation and Israeli rule over the Palestinians there.

Prime Minister Begin said that “military occupation” does not apply to Judea and Samaria, although there is a military government. In practice, they have promised to withdraw the military government.

The President said: right.

Prime Minister Begin said that therefore there will not be a military government. The Self-Governing Authority (Administrative Council) will decide daily affairs.

The President said he did not want to talk semantics. He asked whether the area of the West Bank and Gaza would be demilitarized. Will Israel relinquish government control over them?

Prime Minister Begin said that one can’t say “demilitarized,” as at Camp David, with the specified security locations.

The President asked: only those?

Prime Minister Begin said: yes. Israel must have them for security.

The President said that the government now for the West Bank is the Israeli military government and civilian administration.

Prime Minister Begin said that Israel will withdraw them.

The President asked whether it would be left to the Self-Governing Authority.

Prime Minister Begin said: yes.

The President asked whether it would have authority and responsibility adequate to replace the military government.

Prime Minister Begin said yes. What will be transferred should be a solid completion (of the discussions). Other powers will be shared; and others will be kept by Israel.

The President said therefore the issue is defining full “authority.”

[Page 1182]

Prime Minister Begin said that that word (“authority”) is not in the Camp David Accords.

The President said that if Israelis and settlements—which have gone up rapidly under Prime Minister Begin’s government—are under the jurisdiction of Israel, the percentage of land—10 to 20—is under Israeli jurisdiction, therefore this is a subversion of the Camp David Accords. This is a matter of how much land and water. Any settlement, under Israel’s jurisdiction, is a subversion.

Minister Burg said that 20 per cent is too high.

The President asked if 15 per cent is better.

Minister Burg said it is much lower, primo, and secondo. . .

The President said he understands (what Minister Burg is saying).

Prime Minister Begin said that the President reads the Bible in Spanish!

Minister Burg said that secondly, Jews and Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza are about 2 per cent of the Arab population. Therefore, this is not as important as the President’s understanding.

The President said: yes.

Minister Burg said that there is a difference between individuals and settlements, because all governments since 1967. . . and he has been in almost all of them. . .

Prime Minister Begin said: 31 years in the government!

Minister Burg said. . . all say that these are in Israel’s jurisdiction, not any other. Therefore, there are two points: first, the percentage of inhabitants, and second, individuals vs. settlements.

The President said he understands. Will they apply Israeli jurisdiction to all Jewish settlements and citizens?

Minister Burg said that if a citizen goes to Ramallah, there is no Israeli jurisdiction there.

Ambassador Lewis said that there are no individuals on the West Bank; only settlers.

Prime Minister Begin said that autonomy is for the Arab inhabitants. Israelis do not need it: they are citizens of Israel.

The President said that he is concerned. Israelis have the right to live anywhere—Arabs, too. If Israel says that, wherever Israelis live, Israel has jurisdiction, therefore this will subvert (the agreement) on Israel’s withdrawal. Therefore if there is Israeli authority wherever they live, all of the West Bank is involved.

Prime Minister Begin said that he had told the President why they can’t settle individuals: for security, there must be groups. They will be in a limited number of places, and not be subject to the Self-Governing Authority’s jurisdiction over them.

[Page 1183]

The President asked whether Prime Minister Begin can see his (the President’s) concern in Prime Minister Begin’s third point: “Israeli citizens, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district will be under the jurisdiction of Israel.”

Minister Shamir said that Israelis in the territories will not vote for the Self-Governing Authority. Therefore, they will not be under its jurisdiction.

Minister Burg said it can be clarified.

Secretary Vance said he has one question. “The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn”—from Camp David—adds “as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government.”

Prime Minister Begin said: exactly.

Minister Kubersky said that it also says that powers and responsibilities are to be defined.

Secretary Vance agreed, but this replaces the military government.

Prime Minister Begin said: absolutely. But the powers are to be defined. If they have to be defined, then they are not transferred automatically or completely.

Minister Burg said that he and Ambassador Linowitz would be out of a job if that were so!

The President asked if they could meet again at 3:00.15

Prime Minister Begin agreed.

(The meeting ended at 12:07 p.m.)

  1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(4/15/80–4/30/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum of conversation was found attached to an April 25 covering memorandum from Hunter to Brzezinski upon which Brzezinski indicated his approval of the memoranda of conversation from Carter’s meetings with Begin. Also, in the covering memorandum, Hunter stated that copies of the memoranda of conversation were to be sent to Linowitz and Moses. (Ibid.) Carter’s handwritten notes related to this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81.
  2. Reference is to the April 7 attack on the Israeli kibbutz of Mishgav Am near the Lebanese border in which a group of kibbutz children were taken hostage by members of the Arab Liberation Front, an Iraqi-backed Palestinian group, in a bid to win the release of Palestinian guerrillas held in Israeli prisons. The hostage siege was broken by the Israeli army the same day, after an earlier attempt failed. (David K. Shipler, “Israelis Retake Kibbutz Nursery, Kill 5 Terrorists, Free Hostages,” The New York Times, April 8, 1980, p. A1)
  3. As part of a speech he gave in Warsaw on November 12, 1968, Brezhnev justified the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia the previous August, as a necessary move to prevent capitalist encroachment on the socialist camp. This principle, by extension designed to apply to any similar military interventions in the future, was informally known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.
  4. See Document 239.
  5. The referenced Israeli draft proposal, attached but not printed, was comprised of four points: 1) “The self-governing authority of the Arab inhabitants in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, will be an Administrative Council freely elected by the aforementioned inhabitants;” 2) “The number of the members of the Administrative Council will be determined by and correspond to, the number and actual and practical functions to be fulfilled by the Council members;” 3) Israeli citizens, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be under the jurisdiction of Israel;” 4) “External and internal security, including the fight against terrorism, conspiracy to commit acts of violence and subversion, will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities.”
  6. Not further identified.
  7. Not further identified.
  8. Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède de Montesquieu, eighteenth century French political philosopher.
  9. See footnote 3, Document 354.
  10. Reference is to the September 1970 clashes between the PLO and the Jordanian armed forces, culminating in the expulsion of the PLO headquarters from Jordan. For documentation on this, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970.
  11. Not found.
  12. Mondale was reported to have made comments during a March 23 speech in New York that the United States recognized the rights of Jews to settle anywhere, including the West Bank. When asked about these reported statements the following day during the Department’s daily press briefing, Hodding Carter III stated that he believed that Mondale had “in fact” made “a more general statement based upon some fairly universal statements about what should be the rights of human beings.” (Telegram 77927 to multiple posts, March 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800150–0663)
  13. A transcript of Carter’s April 13 interview with representatives of the British Broadcasting Corporation, North German Television (ARD), France Télévisions Antenna 1, and the Italian RAI–TV, is in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, pp. 668–682.
  14. See Document 288 and footnote 2 thereto.
  15. See Document 358.