361. Summary of Discussion and Conclusions of a Senior Level Meeting1

SUBJECT

  • Middle East Autonomy Negotiations (U)

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Cyrus Vance (Chairman) Secretary
    • Warren Christopher* Deputy Secretary of State
    • Harold Saunders Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs
    • Michael Sterner Deputy Assistant Secretary
  • Personal Representative of the President

    • Ambassador Sol Linowitz
  • White House

    • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski*2
  • NSC

    • Robert Hunter
    • *Attended only part of the meeting

Secretary Vance said that there are several areas that we should pursue in the next 30 days: voting rights, land, security, jurisdiction over Israelis in the territories, legislative authority, and the Continuing

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Committee. Ambassador Linowitz said that water was the most amenable for solution, with security next. He expects that there will be little or no movement on land and East Jerusalem voting rights (Secretary Vance thought the latter issue was dead). It might be possible to get something on private lands, since the Israelis have not so far made a point of this issue. He would try out a new formula on East Jerusalem, permitting Jordanian citizens, in general, to vote. He also hoped to skirt the issue of legislative authority. The object should be to get enough agreement to keep Sadat interested in continuing the process, and to deflect any European efforts.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he doesn’t expect very much on this 10-day trip,3 since both parties are still testing one another. Begin, for example, was chided in Israel for giving away too much here in Washington, and therefore is not ready to make concessions. The Ambassador is worried that the Israelis might not make a security presentation on the first day. If so, the Egyptians might go home. But if this issue can be resolved early, other issues could be easier. Mr. Saunders pointed out that this would be particularly so with regard to land, because of the security implications tied up with land issues.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what we should do if the parties prove too unyielding to get agreement before May 26. Secretary Vance said that then we would have to consider how to cut back our expectations, in order to get something to claim a partial victory. Ambassador Linowitz said that he might have at some point to go to Begin and indicate the risks of a breakdown unless Israel is forthcoming. Mr. Saunders said that a “pause” might be possible after May 26, if there are a few tough issues to be settled—as happened with the 1975 disengagement negotiations. Secretary Vance said that conditions are different: the press has made a lot of May 26, and the Europeans are waiting in the wings: that might not directly affect the situation in the area, but it would affect our interests. It is one thing to pass the date in a state of serious negotiations; it is another to have a pause. We should also not jump ahead too soon.

Ambassador Linowitz said that in his first meeting with Begin, he would try to disabuse the Prime Minister of the notion that the “four points” tabled here in Washington are conditions for forward movement.

He said that he would proceed on this trip by talking through issues for a couple of days, and then be prepared to table papers on in[Page 1217]dividual subjects. First, he would like to get agreement on a list of subjects for a Heads of Agreement. Second, he would try to fill in each of the subjects. Third, he would try to sharpen up the issues within this context. And fourth, he would try to resolve as many issues as possible. Mr. Saunders suggested that we build an agreement cumulatively, as in the peace treaty negotiations. It was agreed that the nature of the issues do not lend themselves to “trade-offs” within an overall package, as opposed to a constant paring down of difficult issues. Mr. Saunders suggested—and it was agreed—that a drafting group be set up early, so that the delegations could be working from actual drafts (e.g. on the Heads of Agreement) as they move along.

There was a lengthy discussion of the Gaza-first option. Secretary Vance reported Peres’ view that the issues in Gaza are easier to resolve, and that an agreement could attract significant support. Egypt can influence the Gazans, and this would be an achievement for Sadat. Peres had also reported that King Hassan had spoken favorably of Gaza-first. The Secretary also reported Ambassador Evron’s view that Begin might be prepared in time to see the value in negotiating and implementing Gaza-first, provided the precedent problem could be overcome. Begin’s objection would be more to having an overall agreement first, and then merely implementing Gaza-first.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we should try first to get a real agreement for both the West Bank and Gaza. In this coming round of talks, Egypt would not be ready to back off emphasis on a full agreement, and Israel is not ready for Gaza-first. Secretary Vance suggested overlapping the two efforts: building the list of powers to be transferred and tackling tough problems; and having the ability later to convert the effort to a Gaza-first approach. Sadat could probably be delivered on Gaza-first. On the timing for talking about Gaza-first, Mr. Saunders warned of the risks of introducing the idea too soon, because this deflects concentration from a full agreement. At the same time, Secretary Vance argued, the idea couldn’t just be dropped in at the end. Also, with only about 16 days left after Ambassador Linowitz returns on his second trip, there will not be much time to play with. It was agreed that Ambassador Linowitz should use his best judgment—or ask for guidance—on whether to introduce the Gaza-first approach before returning here at the end of this trip.

Secretary Vance said that we should think seriously of “sweeteners,” in terms of Israeli confidence-building measures on the West Bank. Weizman’s credibility is already at stake on this issue. Having these gestures—which needs to be sold to Begin—could be particularly important with a Gaza-first solution. With regard to the U.S., the Secretary said, there could be no “sweeteners” that cost money. Ambassador [Page 1218] Linowitz said that thinking about the general idea would be useful, and that co-production of the aircraft engines would be positive.4

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: Senior Level 4/24/80 Meeting: 4/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
  2. Brzezinski recalled in his memoirs that he was called out of the meeting at 4:20 p.m. to receive a message from Brown on the status of the Iran hostage rescue operation which was then in progress. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 497)
  3. April 27–May 8.
  4. On May 10, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv that Carter had approved in principle Israeli co-production of jet engines intended for Israel’s Lavi fighter aircraft project. (Telegram 123665 to Tel Aviv, May 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800231–0004)