Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

385. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 18, 1980, 10:36 a.m.–12:09 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Second Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
• Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for Middle East Peace Negotiations
• Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Robert Hunter, National Security Council Staff Member (notetaker)
• His Majesty Hussein I, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
• His Excellency Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
• His Excellency Ahmad Lawzi, Chief of Royal Court
• Lt. General (Ret.) Amer Khammash, Minister of Court
• Lt. General Sharif Zaid Bin Shaker, Commander in Chief of the Jordan Armed Forces
• His Excellency Fawaz Sharaf, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United States

Secretary Muskie began by asking His Majesty if he had enjoyed his visit to the Air and Space Museum.

King Hussein said yes; it had been his first visit.

The President said that His Majesty had had a good guide. Senator Glenn² had taken King Hussein and Queen Noor to the Space Museum after last night’s dinner.

King Hussein said that it was extremely interesting.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the capsule was interesting.

The President said that now we are working on the space shuttle. It will carry a large payload, and is very flexible. Space on it will be leased to private corporations and governments. It will help with repairs to machinery in space and satellites.

King Hussein said that it meant a new era.

The President agreed. It is complicated to build one that can go out and back repeatedly. There is the problem of heat damage. He would be glad for His Majesty to go up in it sometime. We would try it out well, first (laughter)!

The Prime Minister said that next they should go to a naval museum; he had a preference for it.

The President said that this morning’s meeting could be brief, here, and then they could talk in the Oval Office while the others continued their talk here. He apologized for keeping His Majesty so long yesterday—he only realized how long when he read about it in the newspaper! It was so fruitful, and he had been enjoying it so much. So he apologized for keeping His Majesty. He presumed His Majesty would be discussing with Harold Brown on defense matters, which are important to us, to Jordan, and to others. He had talked with Brown before His Majesty arrived. We are grateful for His Majesty’s role. He (the President) will be going to Venice,³ and for two days before that he would stop in Rome, and would see the Pope. Venice is primarily about economics—e.g. the stability of the monetary system and dealing with energy. (At this point, Dr. Brzezinski brought a plastic model of the space shuttle into the room).

The President said that this is a model of the space shuttle, which His Majesty can take with him.

King Hussein said thank you.

The President (pointing to the model) said that it would be launched from here, and then separate.

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out the rockets and the solar panels.

The President said that this is a good-sized model; and is an interesting thing.

King Hussein said thank you.

The President said that at Venice they would talk about economic matters, such as inflation and unemployment—and particularly about energy. We have cut down our imports of oil. We have had a success since the Tokyo Summit.⁴ We promised to reduce imports by 5% and did so; we were the only country to meet its commitment. This year, in the first five months, we reduced oil consumption by 12%, which is about 1 million barrels per day. At Venice, they would discuss how to continue, and make a recommitment to reduce imports between 1980 and 1985. Also they would talk about how to produce more energy, from coal, nuclear, shale, the sun, crops—including trees. We got through the Congress an amount over 10 years equal to $227 billion in taxes for these purposes, and were setting up corporations to encourage synthetic fuels—technology we would share with our European Allies; we are eager to cooperate with Jordan on any projects it has. We are planning the biggest photo-voltaic project in history, jointly with the Italians. With other countries we will cooperate, and as technology evolves, we will be eager to share it with Jordan. We can learn both ways.

On other items at Venice, they will talk about how to deal with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; about Iran; and dealing with the LDCs, regarding the devastating impact of oil prices on their economies. Countries like Turkey and Brazil are importing about as much oil as their total exports. As a result, debt is a serious problem; inflation is high. How to accommodate to these problems and to share responsibility with OPEC—which is making the profits—will be discussed jointly. Then he will be going to Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal. After his visit, the world will see the communique—we don’t have any secret agreements—to analyze it, and to see whether we answer Jordan’s questions.

We have discussed the Middle East. His Majesty has seen the European resolution. We do not see it as incompatible with the Camp David process. There was a resolute attack by the Israeli Cabinet and the PLO on the European resolution. Therefore, it must be fair and well balanced (laughter)! He doesn’t know what can be done on the Maqarin Dam.⁵ Habib had been to see His Majesty and others. Would His Majesty like to comment? We do not want to interfere. We are trying to eliminate some obstacles that exist. He has studied the problem, including water rights for the West Bank and Syrian cooperation. We have gone as far as we can, without some agreement between Jordan, Syria, and Israel on what to do. Does the project have a life?

King Hussein said very much so. They have agreed to address themselves to the question of the West Bank, and prepare an answer for Phil (Habib) soon.⁶ He hopes the U.S. will continue. Would we please clarify the rules and the guidelines on shares so that they can tackle the problem of getting Syrian cooperation.

The President asked about the possibility of direct Jordanian dealings with the Israelis.

King Hussein said that they do this in the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistic Commission (IJMAC), concerning the waters of the Yarmuk River and the Jordan Valley. There are direct and indirect contacts.

The Prime Minister said that they had had a meeting yesterday. Ambassador Veliotes said that they had solved a technical problem, and they met under the auspices of IJMAC.

The President said good.

Ambassador Veliotes said that these were technical issues.

The Prime Minister said that there is now no problem. He assumes that issues with Israel can be managed. Habib raised issues on which there was agreement. There was only one, raised by Israel, on water for the West Bank. Jordan is not ready to go into details. This must await a broader settlement. How Jordan talks with Israel about West Bank water is for the future. The project has several stages. They are now working on the second stage, and water that exceeds the second stage should go to the West Bank. They can agree if the Israelis do not have a problem.

King Hussein said that Jordan is worried about becoming involved in greater discussions. Then there is a danger.

The President said he had no objection to such discussions (laughter)!

Ambassador Linowitz said that the issue is discussed under Camp David, concerning water and the West Bank. We feel it is desirable, in determining allocation, that Jordan be represented, along with Egypt, the Self-Governing Authority, and Israel, to get agreement. Is this possible?

King Hussein said not now, there is a problem, but maybe later, in the context of movement toward self-determination.

Ambassador Linowitz said that suppose there is already a Self-Governing Authority. . .

The Prime Minister spoke briefly about Jordan’s use of water. Now, he said, non-allocated water, that Jordan did not use from the dam, would go to the West Bank in the future.

King Hussein said that it is an old story, the idea that some water would go to the West Bank from the Jordan River. He is a little worried about the possibility that Israel wants to discuss the future of the West Bank, and then Jordan will have to talk about their taking water from the Jordan River for the West Bank. Therefore this is difficult. Jordan needs to limit the talks now to Israel’s and Jordan’s share of the water, without prejudicing the future water supply to the West Bank.

The President said that as more water is taken from the Jordan River, the Dead Sea is drying up. Israel is assessing the possibility of bringing water from the Mediterranean. It is possible that this issue would affect Jordan.

King Hussein said that it would require. . .

The President said that there would need to be an assessment of the environmental impact. There would be some power generation. This would stabilize the level of the Dead Sea at a proper point. This is not happening now. It is being analyzed; and it involves Jordan.

King Hussein asked whether the water would come from the Mediterranean or the Red Sea?

The President said the New York Times said the Mediterranean.

Ambassador Veliotes said it was possible it would come from the Gulf of Aqaba. We are exchanging technical information with Jordan on a quiet basis.

The President said good.

Ambassador Veliotes said he hoped it would not show up in the Israeli press!

King Hussein said that this project could be done in the context of peace.

Secretary Muskie asked whether there were any problems with the authorization bill for the Maqarin Dam; Congress asks about it each year.

Ambassador Veliotes said that this is a problem.

The President said he knew.

Ambassador Veliotes said that there is $50 million this year and previous appropriations. If agreement is not reached in this fiscal year, then we will have to tell the Congress we can’t swing it. Hal Saunders and he will discuss this with the Prime Minister. The last issue with Israel is that Israel is asking a specific figure, concerning water Jordan would take from the Yarmuk to the West Bank. This is hung up.

The President said that if U.S. funds are available, we will need something for Congress to keep them.

The Prime Minister said that several issues have been resolved: the Yarmuk triangle, the weir, and others. Only one remains, which Israel raised recently: water for the West Bank. The major political issue is can Israel speak for the West Bank? We can find a formula.

King Hussein said that there are other issues with Syria.

The President said he knew. These are his items. Perhaps they could talk privately about self-determination. He wants to understand. He has listened carefully, but does not see how His Majesty sees this in a broader context. Perhaps they should talk privately?

King Hussein said: as you wish.

The President suggested that they stay here.

King Hussein said that they had talked about all subjects that had been raised; they should try to work them out together. Jordan’s feeling now: as far as what else happens, they accept developments and progress in some areas to establish a comprehensive peace (i.e. the Egypt-Israel peace treaty). Now is the point to think again about what to do. In the Arab world, there is a division. Some—either in their thinking or from external suggestions—want to undermine all that has been done recently. Jordan’s feeling is that what has happened has happened, and they would like to see how to go forward. Their object is a comprehensive peace settlement and security, to transfer the area to greater stability and hope.

Some points were raised yesterday on the Palestinians: can anyone speak for them? This is a dilemma. The natural answer is the PLO. Then there is the second point, that the PLO would have to recognize Israel’s right to exist before it could speak. The PLO counters that Israel should recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. Jordan’s impression is that the President’s suggestion is to see if there is a Palestinian body which can come out with the Palestinian position. (By this idea) Jordan would be in touch with the PLO and others to encourage them to make a Palestinian contribution, at least at the initial stage. After yesterday’s meeting, the Ambassador told them that this would need to be in the context of Camp David—with Palestinians in the Jordanian or Egyptian delegation. This would be very, very difficult to convince anyone to do now. If this could be clarified, it would be very important. He is very anxious that there be no misunderstanding. Should we go back to talk?

The Prime Minister said that it should be free from a specific mandate.

The President said that his thoughts could be difficult. First, we will continue with the Camp David process as long as it can succeed—and he can see that the Jordanians see it as inadequate. Second, he presumes that Jordan is not willing to join the talks—formally or informally, now. He would like it to be different, but will not try to change their minds. Third, the provision in the Camp David Accords is that Palestinians could be in the Jordanian and Egyptian delegations, plus others as mutually agreed. This is covered in Camp David. To get past the problem, he hopes there could be a responsible group of residents from the West Bank and Gaza who would meet with us, Egypt, or Israel, and present to us and to the world the Palestinian positions: the need to hold elections, to choose their own leaders, how to take over responsibility when Israel is out—for police, schools, highways, etc. Until now, the Palestinians are either too timid or intimidated. The mayors won’t do it. He hopes that His Majesty and other leaders of the Palestinians—even the PLO—in Jordan will encourage the mayors, three, five, seven of them—he doesn’t care, it is their initiative—to say that they will speak with us, Egypt, or Israel and Jordan later—if Jordan agrees—to be sure that Palestinian views are adequately considered. Now there is no effective consultation. If the mayor of Gaza City, who knows His Majesty and Arafat, says he will consult with Ambassador Linowitz, Secretary Muskie, himself, Foreign Minister Ali, or the foreign or prime minister of Israel, then we would not inadvertently not take account of the positions, desires, and interests of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza. Also this could expedite the withdrawal of the Israeli Military Government, turning it over step by step, giving responsibility to the Palestinians. Some of this has been tried in Gaza. Dayan says he is eager to get the Israeli Military Government out. Weizman feels the same way. When they tried to deal with the mayor—saying you take over the schools, police, etc.—they found reticence. The mayor was fearful of being seen as betraying the Palestinian cause.

Maybe this (i.e. consultations) is a fruitless effort. He understands the difficulties of having a formal group. Perhaps 5 or 6 mayors would be willing, collectively, if they know they had the tacit approval of the PLO and of Jordan. They could speak for the residents, and demand that the Israeli Military Government be removed. They could demand responsibility to run their lives, to have elections, and for the Self-Governing Authority to have full responsibility. So far, we are playing into Israel’s hands, by not being able to carry out the Camp David Accords. If Begin wants to slow down the process, he can blame it on the Palestinians, and say that he wants to do something, but can’t get the Palestinians to take responsibility. This (i.e. the consultations) would be a public relations achievement, at least in the U.S., if the West Bank and Gaza mayors were trying to take their own rights under the Camp David process. Now it is felt here, in the press, that the Palestinians are not willing to negotiate, but rather are terrorists.

He is eager for progress. It is hard for us to meet with West Bank mayors. They are reluctant to talk with us. (Speaking to the Palestinians?): How can we help Jordan take over the West Bank, and get the Israeli Military Government out? One mayor is coming here.

King Hussein said Khalaf.

The Prime Minister said he has a relative here.

The President said that his (Mayor Khalaf’s) brother is here. We will treat him,⁷ and hope it will succeed. We will try to break the stalemate (i.e. in the talks).

King Hussein said that there are many members of the PLO and other Palestinians who would be ready, if it worked out, to speak directly to the United States. The issue is how can they join the Egyptian delegation—there is no Jordanian delegation.

The President said that they do not need to be in a delegation.

King Hussein said it might be easy to discuss with them.

The President said that the problem is that if they are designated as representatives of the PLO, it will not work. If they come as individuals, we will not try to analyze whom they represent. Some mayors may be PLO members: we don’t know. If they say they will negotiate, but represent the PLO, it would be impossible for us. We can’t talk with the PLO.

The Prime Minister said that there is a practical difficulty for West Bankers to come in a context that would prejudge the result—i.e. the autonomy talks. This is virtually impossible. They can come to speak on the right of self-determination, freedom, and independence. This they can do; they can talk to others, in a peaceful channel. But within agreements whose end result is not clear, or is limited, what can they do? This is a block.

The President said that they do not have to acknowledge they are not getting all they want. They can demand that Israel get out, and that they take over their rights; that they want to take over their rights on land, etc. We will not say that they have to give up ultimate rights.

The Prime Minister asked whether Israel would permit a Congress in the West Bank? Jordan could arrange that. They could meet, and draw up a peaceful platform. Is this idea tolerable? Then Jordan would talk to other Arabs and the PLO. This is a peaceful channel. But it has to be outside of a presupposed course of action. If the Palestinians are asked just to take over providing services on the West Bank, we are not likely to get cooperation. They would say that this only relieves Israel of the burden, when Israel is going about annexing the West Bank. Therefore, this would only help Begin. Settlements would go on; absorption would go on. It is not likely that West Bankers would agree. Also there was the violence against the elected leaders.

King Hussein mentioned the expulsions, as well.

The Prime Minister agreed (and listed several of the expulsions). They were not engaged in violent acts; they would see Dayan and Weizman; they are not violent people. They could have been a rival force. The problem is that Israel is suppressive. If the Palestinians could assemble peacefully, have a Congress, write a platform, ask what they want, then they can talk with others, outside the Camp David context.

The President said that this is not prohibited under the Camp David agreements. The U.S. takes the Jordanian position. Israel wants only 12 people on an Administrative Council. Egypt wants it to be larger, and be a legislature or Congress. Nothing prevents the mayors or others from saying what they want to do as they proceed to get to ultimate goals: the right to vote, assemble, speak, exercise local responsibilities—as an interim stage.

Ambassador Linowitz said that when he met with His Majesty in London,⁸ he (His Majesty) had wished us well, but could not say we would succeed and we were not responsive to Palestinian needs and self-fulfillment. Since the Palestinians are not there, how can we respond? Israel says: how can the U.S. and Egypt know what the Palestinians want? Therefore there is the President’s suggestion, to help us advance Palestinian positions, and ensure consultations—however they get their views across. If not, the Palestinians will suffer most: they will be held responsible for failure. The Israelis say they want to go forward, but the Palestinians do not—Israel does not hear their demands.

King Hussein said that there is a dilemma: Camp David dealt with two areas, Egypt-Israel in one and the Palestinians in the other. The Egypt-Israel treaty many see as progress and as a solution to part of the problem.

The President underlined that it was a part.

King Hussein said that the Palestinian side, unfortunately, was done in the absence of the Palestinians and Jordan. Egypt was unable to address this adequately, because it did not know what was involved.

The President said yes, this is what he is saying.

King Hussein said that Jordan passed maps to Egypt to help it avoid mistakes. Is there a way to say that what happened between Egypt and Israel exists, and take a fresh start on the rest? Camp David is telling people to fit into a formula which does not meet their needs. It brings into question the end results Jordan is asking about. The Palestinians do not know what rights they will secure at the end of the day—the future.

The President said that nothing in Camp David contradicts what His Majesty wants in the future.

King Hussein and the Prime Minister said that they understood.

The Prime Minister said that asserting the demands of the Palestinians is difficult for them to do under occupation.

The President said that we know what they want, and want to get there. But there is no mechanism to get there, if they will not participate. For Jordan and the Palestinians, if you are not in the talks until the goal is clear, and is 100% of what you want—then there will be no progress. Sadat knew what he wanted; he (Sadat) said so to Begin: withdrawal. Begin didn’t want that, and wanted to keep the settlements. But world and Israeli opinion was with Sadat. Begin yielded, and said that the Knesset should decide. He (the President) believes that Begin is difficult. He has spent as much time with Begin as with his (the President’s) wife—since each hour with Begin is magnified a hundred fold (laughter)!

We should remember that there will be other Israeli leaders after Begin—and he (the President) will be President. Also, the people of Israel want peace. Its public opinion indicates that, if settlements were an obstacle to peace, the overwhelming majority are opposed to them. Now there is no way for moderate leaders or public opinion in Israel to believe that Palestinian leaders demand rights: e.g. an independent state, a confederation, or Israel’s getting out. Demanding these is all right. But no one is designated to work with Dayan, Yadin, us or Egypt—with the private backing of His Majesty and Jordan—to say what they want. They should ask. How do they induce Israel to withdraw, and to realize a solution? There is no entity to deal with—no moderate responsible voice. That is all he (the President) asks. He is not asking the Palestinians to sit down and say they accept Camp David. He is asking Egypt, the PLO, and His Majesty to get the mayors to speak publicly, to say that they represent the Palestinians and this is what they want and how they will go about getting it. It will not be easy; there will be obstacles. He hopes His Majesty will think about this, and talk with the mayors and Arafat about it. If they see an opening leading towards a 100% solution, they can talk about how to proceed to realize their dreams, etc. This is what we need, and don’t have it. Their position now is all or nothing.

King Hussein said that he can go back and carry these thoughts and ideas. Could they succeed or not? He is not sure. Jordan had never appealed for an engagement of a group from the West Bank and Gaza.

The President said that they (the Palestinians) think there is opposition to it.

King Hussein asked whether his friends (i.e. the U.S.) could think—if there is a lack of real progress—about a fresh start, including everyone.

The President said that a “fresh start” is easy to say and hard to do—it would take us back to where we were three years ago. There are hard problems. Even the Arabs could not agree among themselves. Should the Soviets be in? This is impossible.

The Prime Minister said that the emphasis before was on procedure, not on substance.

The President said that that is what we got.

The Prime Minister said that if we can get an idea—of self-determination—then the PLO and others could not resist. But to ask them to commit themselves to a dead end—the autonomy talks—would abridge their right to self-determination.

The President said that there is no abridgment on the final status of territories, after five years.

The Prime Minister asked about Israel’s intentions.

The President said he didn’t know.

The Prime Minister said that for the Palestinians, it would only be five years of legitimacy for Israel, while it absorbed the West Bank and Gaza. Jordan knows Begin and those who went before him.

The President said he was not trying to defend them.

The Prime Minister said that the Arabs were on the receiving side. There is a long record. Begin tries to negate U.S. pressure, and engages in the appearance of talking, while building settlements. Look at the record. We need to broaden the basis for the Palestinians to assemble and talk—only in the context of eventual self-determination.

The President said that Jordan and the PLO see self-determination differently. The difficulty (between them) is that Jordan does not espouse publicly an independent Palestinian state—and he believes Jordan doesn’t want it. Assad said two years ago that this was the worst thing that could happen, but doesn’t say so publicly, because of Rabat.⁹ Therefore self-determination is a phrase in Israeli minds meaning an independent Palestinian state. In Jordanian minds, it means federation with Jordan. His (the President’s) preference is Jordan’s—confederation of the West Bank with Jordan. He had told the Israelis this. He has no group of West Bank leaders to present their case to the American people and himself, demanding the right of free assembly, to express their views and demand the right to vote, to choose a congress, and to take over administering their own affairs. No one is recognized to make these demands. He is asking the Jordanians to help it evolve.

The Prime Minister said that without Begin, Israel might let the Palestinians assemble. How can it be done? His Majesty is ready to talk to them (the Palestinians). But if they are not allowed to assemble in peace, with an elected body, how can it be done?

Ambassador Linowitz said that this issue has not come up in that form in the autonomy talks.

The President said (to Ambassador Linowitz) to forget Camp David (i.e. as the context). How can we get the limits removed?

Ambassador Linowitz said that let the Palestinians announce that they will be involved, with a mechanism to get their views, and ask for an assembly. We can support them in that.

The Prime Minister said that the U.S. says the Palestinians should participate in Camp David: this is a non-starter.

The President said he does not believe they have to do it that way; we can get around it.

The Prime Minister said that if that is just a future course of action, then all right—but it will be necessary to get Begin to allow it. They (Jordan) will ask.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Jordan should tell Israel it is doing this, and is taking responsibility for a peaceful assembly.

The Prime Minister said that Jordan cannot be responsible; it does not control the Palestinians.

Ambassador Linowitz said the Israelis would see this as a basis for insurance.

The Prime Minister said that the Israelis are in control—there would be no real problems. The Palestinians will say that they want self-determination, and to elect machinery to talk with the U.S. and others, on machinery to reach self-determination. There will be no difficulty in doing that. But this has to be an untied process not linked to autonomy.

Ambassador Veliotes asked whether the Prime Minister would exclude that this group could talk with us on autonomy.

The Prime Minister said that they would seek to talk to the U.S.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we talk with some mayors, now. If a mechanism were set up on the West Bank to articulate positions, however, they would say they want an independent Palestinian state; they would say they would talk with us about an independent Palestinian state. That, in practice, is what they would do.

The President asked: then what?

Dr. Brzezinski said that they would then say let’s talk outside of the Camp David framework. To be sure, we would have a fresh start, but that would take us back to three years ago. What the Prime Minister is doing is trying to get started a political approach which will derail the Camp David Accords.

The Prime Minister said that one has seen this situation so many times, as with Zimbabwe and Mugabe,¹⁰ who now seems a peaceful man: myths get exploded. He (the Prime Minister) is arguing that the majority living on the West Bank know that if they talk about an independent Palestinian state, the U.S. would say no; but if the discussion were about self-determination, that permits everything. It keeps options open. But the five-year transition means that the end is closed: the Palestinians would get only rights like the post office and sanitation.

Dr. Brzezinski said that we have a process that is for Arab aspirations. The other party—Israel—wants to incorporate the West Bank. This can’t happen, but we need to see Israel’s legitimate security needs. The outlook in Israel on the Palestinians in the last 3 or 4 years has undergone tremendous change. Lots of Israelis now see the reality of the Palestinians—e.g. General Harkabi. Camp David is a mechanism to get Israel to make concessions in practice. It can translate demands into reality. But if the demands are articulated in their totality, it will derail the process and set it back.

The Prime Minister asked what changes there had been in Begin and Shamir.

Dr. Brzezinski recounted his discussion with Begin at Camp David, when Begin had told him that his (Begin’s) arm would fall off and his eye would fall out before he would give up the Sinai settlements. But 10 days later, Begin agreed that a number of them should be dismantled. He (Begin) accepted autonomy for the West Bank; now we are trying to make that a reality. In five years more, it will be possible to translate an intolerable reality towards accommodation. But to start a new process would mean going back three years.

The Prime Minister said that the problem is that this view assumes the process of Camp David occurs in a vacuum. Begin sabotages it. They need something explicit on the end result—i.e. self-determination. With the vacuum, one party is in control, and tries to sabotage. There is a need for a mechanism guaranteeing fulfillment in the right directions—either self-determination at the end, or allowing an assembly in the West Bank and Gaza, with a platform shaped by two guidelines: self-determination and security for Israel.

The President said they had discussed this subject enough. He would summarize: first, some Israeli positions are not acceptable to Jordan. These can be negotiated, though some would not change—e.g. Jerusalem. Palestinian mayors can say that self-determination is their position, and they will not change, but are willing to negotiate to achieve that goal. This doesn’t have to be under Camp David; they can say what they need. Only 1% of the American people know that the Palestinians cannot assemble and talk. But if there were a group of representatives of the Palestinians who could say they insist on an alternative—self-determination—we want them there as soon as possible. First is the need for them to peaceably assemble. If Jordan says, all right, it does not accept the Camp David Accords, but will help create a peaceful assembly, this kind of rhetoric would help us make progress. Without it, Israel is firm on the West Bank; Egypt tries, poorly, to speak for the Palestinians; and we try to get Israel out of the West Bank, etc.—without any way to deal with the Palestinians.

Secretary Muskie said the first phase of Camp David—the Egypt-Israel treaty—the Jordanians say is a fact and will continue. The second phase—Palestinian rights negotiations—are stalled because there is an absent party. We can make it a fresh start by following the President’s idea. How else can we get to talk? Jordan says to give up on the talks for another approach. Negotiations are needed. Two parties are already talking; but the third is not there. Which is more likely to work: an ongoing process or a new one which is not conceived? This is the choice. It is difficult to do the talks bilaterally with Egypt, so the talks are stalled; the Palestinians are not there or represented there. That can be a fresh start. The President has shown that the process of evolution can work. We will persist in trying to bring the parties in, to get a new perception. Israel is concerned with security; the Palestinians are concerned with self-determination. Fundamental rights must be kept separate; it can’t be done in a grand effort; only dealing with the nitty gritty can work. The powers and responsibilities of the Self-Governing Authority are largely resolved—though the tough ones are left. We need to work out answers to five issues, or the talks will fail. If they do, will a fresh start be possible?

The Prime Minister answered yes. The talks don’t have to fail. He doesn’t say they are finished. But one should allow a parallel course, for the Palestinians to articulate their demands outside a formula which closes the road to the future. The Israeli occupiers must relax their repressive policies for this. Without it, who can articulate a reasonable platform? If an alternative road is open—if the idea of self-determination is allowed—then the Israelis will get used to it.

King Hussein said he knows the President was disappointed on Camp David about the lack of participation. He (the President) knows that Jordan was out of the picture until the Camp David results were announced. Jordan sent its questions¹¹ to help in dealing with the other Arabs. If Jordan had gotten in, without knowing the end results, then the very danger Israel sees of a radical state would not be more real on the West Bank; but a similar threat would emerge on the East Bank—as a wedge threatening the entire area. Instead, Jordan kept in touch. The promises in the past were not fulfilled. Jordan knows the President’s sincerity and his desire to see a solution. Jordan managed to keep the Arabs together, but there are almost two camps. There are other problems on Jordan: Afghanistan, etc. Regarding the PLO, Jordan has bridges. With Iraq, Jordan has dramatically improved relations. Regarding Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, Jordan talks with all of them now. It hopes to play a constructive role; it wants peace and stability. The Jordanians will go back and talk to the PLO. They have covered it time and again: Jordan wants something to help move forward beyond this point. The Egypt-Israel treaty is something that has been achieved. But the Palestinian problem is still there—in Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank. Soon, there will be the next Arab summit in Jordan.

The President asked when.

King Hussein said: November. Soon, on the economic level of the Arab world, they will need to talk to the oil producers, regarding the future, and to see if there is a way of changing them. He sees they have not charted a course, but an erratic one. The next phase is the summit: trying to regroup in the area. They will talk, but retain their identity; will others say that Jordan goes too far?

He will talk to the PLO, maybe in New York before he leaves. The Europeans are worried; he hopes they will be involved. The Soviet Union is not important; it only needs to know where we are going. Jordan can prevail on the reasonable elements among the Palestinians. He will not promise that he can deliver, with things as vague as they are. With Egypt and Israel in Camp David, everything was clear. On the Palestinian side, it was not clear. Therefore Jordan posed its questions. He wants the U.S. to understand totally where Jordan stands. Our objectives are one and the same. But how can we move? He wants to move as fast as possible.

The President said that what he would like for His Majesty to say—after consulting with the PLO, the Palestinian people, and the other Arabs—is to acknowledge that the U.S. will not abandon Camp David. His Majesty can deplore this if it [he] wants—he hopes he (His Majesty) will not condemn it; and His Majesty can say that the ultimate goal of Camp David is too limited. But second, please say that the Palestinians must have a voice in our affairs: a free assembly, the vote, the right to take over administration of the occupied territories, a congress to speak for the Palestinians, and that the ultimate goal—which is different from others’—will be pursued and not abandoned. This would be a step forward. He hopes that the code words could be avoided.

King Hussein said that there is one difficulty: Israel wants sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem.

The President said no, they prefer West Bank sovereignty, but this is for negotiating. Some Palestinians are for an independent Palestinian state; and some are for a confederation with Jordan. No one has to relinquish demands for a final solution. He wants His Majesty to say that the Palestinians must have a voice, a free assembly, the vote, the right to choose a body to represent them, and to state their ultimate goals and say they will work for them. He (the President) hopes that His Majesty will not condemn the Camp David process, but say that he (His Majesty) will not speak in favor of it or join it, but the Palestinians in the area must have a way to express themselves. This would add a new dimension, although it might not succeed. Palestinian leaders do not need to acknowledge acceptance of Camp David; but Egypt, Israel and he, himself will not abandon Camp David.

We can work in harmony. If His Majesty says this, that would be good. Please consult with us; and have the Jordanian foreign minister and prime minister come back and talk with Muskie, Linowitz, and with him. Perhaps Jordan will say that it didn’t work, or that the PLO said to say that, but please report and we will see how we can proceed. He wants to explore how to break the deadlock.

(The meeting ended at 12:09 p.m.)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 37, Serial Xs—(5/80–6/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.
2. Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio) was one of the Mercury Seven astronauts. He was the first U.S. citizen to orbit the Earth on February 20, 1962.
3. See footnote 8, Document 384.
4. Reference is to the G–7 Economic Summit Conference, which took place in Tokyo June 28–29, 1979.
5. On May 14–15, Habib met with Hussein and senior Jordanian officials as part of his four day mission to help resolve riparian issues arising from the Maqarin Dam/Yarmouk river project. Habib had earlier met with Begin and senior Israeli officials May 12–13. A full summary of Habib’s mission and his meetings with both the Israelis and Jordanians is in telegram 3260 from Amman, May 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800241-0698)
6. Not further identified and not found.
7. See footnote 3, Document 379.
8. See Document 334.
9. The Arab League Summit Conference, held at Rabat, Morocco, in October 1974, was attended by leaders from 20 Arab countries. On October 28, the conference voted unanimously for the creation of an independent Palestinian state anywhere “on Palestinian land that is liberated” from Israeli control. Additionally, the conference recognized the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” (Henry Tanner, “Arab Leaders Issue Call for a Palestinian State; Arafat Given Main Role,” The New York Times, October 28, 1974, p. 1)
10. Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union and Zimbabwean Prime Minister from April 1980.
11. See Document 64.