398. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

SUBJECT

  • Scenario for the Autonomy Talks (U)

At Tab A is a memorandum Chris prepared, based on a meeting2 I held yesterday on the way forward on the autonomy talks. It lays out a scenario for getting the talks restarted—one which, however, is highly dependent on reactions by both Sadat and Begin. Sol concurs in this approach. (S)

If you approve it, we would like to begin implementation immediately, since Roy Atherton may be seeing Sadat as early as tomorrow morning,3 and his being able to lay out our thinking to Sadat could be critical in shaping the Egyptian reaction to the recent Begin letter. The Egyptians are already talking of Sadat’s responding to Begin tomorrow, in view of the Israelis’ having published the Begin letter. (S)

The letter to Sadat which you requested (Tab B)4 would not be delivered, under the proposed scenario, until the last week of August; thus it can be revised further in light of developments. At that time, you might want to write it out longhand. (S)

If the proposed scenario worked, there could be as many as three public events in the near future to demonstrate that the peace process is moving forward:

—public announcement of continuing bilateral technical talks (late August);

—announcement in three capitals, during Sol’s next trip, on restarting the talks (early September); and

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—a possible Begin-Sadat Summit (late September/early October), with high-level participation from here, where in my judgment Ed Muskie would be the ideal person. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the scenario presented in the memorandum from Christopher at Tab A, and provide comments on the draft letter to Sadat at Tab B.5

Tab A

Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Christopher) to President Carter6

SUBJECT

  • Working Toward a Resumption of the Autonomy Negotiations

Attached is a draft letter to Sadat, along the lines you requested. It has the concurrence of Sol and Zbig. I am sending a copy of the draft letter to Ed Muskie in New York, together with this memorandum.

Sol, Zbig and I feel that the letter would be most effective if it came at a time after some preliminary work had been done in the capitals by our Ambassadors. The following sequence of steps appears to us to be the one offering the best prospects for success.

1. As an immediate first step, Roy Atherton will make it clear in Cairo that before the Egyptians send a further letter to Begin, he wishes to meet with Sadat. He will urge Sadat not to engage in further polemics but rather to use his reply to try to open doors for an eventual resumption of the talks. Our second objective with Sadat on this occasion would be to give him a sense of the timing of the sequence of steps that we have in mind as outlined below. In doing so, Roy would make it clear that while we were not pressing for an immediate resumption of formal trilateral negotiations, we want to continue work on the Heads of Agreement through publicly announced bilateral meetings with each side, and perhaps some technical-level trilateral meetings if Sadat will agree to them, until formal negotiations are resumed. Because of [Page 1336] the religious holidays, Roy may not be able to see Sadat until the end of this week (August 15–16).

2. Concurrent with the approach to Sadat, we would ask Sam Lewis to see Begin and explore whether there is any flexibility for an Israeli gesture that would make it easier for Sadat to resume the negotiations. (We would take care in our contacts with Sadat not to imply we are promising to deliver something from the Israelis.) At present the possibilities strike us as being: (a) some gesture on the Palestinian front, e.g. an expression of willingness to meet with moderate Palestinians and allow them to articulate their objectives; (b) an Israeli concession that could enable us to show real progress on the Heads of Agreement; and, (c) the remote possibility that Begin might be willing to postpone the transfer of his office to East Jerusalem.

3. After we have had a chance to assess the results of these contacts, Atherton would deliver a pre-positioned letter from you along the lines of the attached draft on or about August 25–26. The letter would pave the way for a trip by Sol to the area in the first week of September.

4. Sol would go with the purpose of clinching an understanding with Sadat about resuming formal trilateral negotiations. If he is successful, Sol could report to you by telephone7 during his visit and an announcement of a resumption of talks could be made in Washington, Cairo and Jerusalem simultaneously.

5. If all of this works out, a further possibility might be to try to arrange a summit meeting between Begin and Sadat shortly thereafter, with Sol or possibly Ed attending for the U.S.

A number of general considerations led us to think that the above sequence of steps made the most sense:

Sadat will be easier to bring around if we have given him a bit of time to maintain his present posture in terms of domestic Egyptian and Arab public opinion, and if he does not appear to be bowing immediately to U.S. pressure. With the passage of some time, he will be better able to blur the fact that he has gotten little or nothing from the Israelis.

—As long as we have Begin’s office move to East Jerusalem hanging over our heads, it will be an added obstacle in persuading Sadat to agree to a resumption of the negotiations. The timing of the steps suggested above gives us time to explore with Begin what the possibilities are for dealing with this problem. If we can’t get Begin to agree to postpone this step for a significant period of time, the next best thing would be for him to get it over with quickly (although we would of course not make that suggestion to Begin).

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—An announcement of a resumption of the negotiations in early or mid-September might be the optimum timing from many standpoints.

—Finally, we all felt it would be wiser if Sol did not make his trip until the ground has been prepared and we have a reasonable basis for thinking Sadat can be persuaded to resume the negotiations. Having Sol go prematurely would only expose a visible failure if in fact we were unable to persuade Sadat to come back in.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: 8/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter wrote “Zbig. J” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.
  2. A Senior Level Meeting, attended by Brzezinski, Christopher, Linowitz, Saunders and Hunter, took place in the White House Situation Room from 2:58 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. on August 11. A memorandum of conversation of this meeting was not found. A set of handwritten notes, likely prepared by Hunter, recording the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 6, Autonomy Talks: Senior Level 8/11/80 Meeting: 8/80.
  3. Atherton met with Sadat in Alexandria on August 18. Atherton summarized the meeting in telegram 18065 from Cairo, August 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1557)
  4. Attached but not printed.
  5. Carter approved the recommendation and added a handwritten note: “But hold the letter text until I approve it later. J.”
  6. Secret. Christopher was acting for Muskie who was in Maine.
  7. See Document 402.