405. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts1
249328. Subject: U.S. Policy Review on Syria.
1. (S-entire text).
2. At an inter-agency group meeting on September 82 Washington agencies reviewed U.S. policy toward Syria and the implications for U.S. interests of the Assad regime’s problematic future. What follows reflects the meeting’s consensus about the prognosis for the Assad regime and how we can best position ourselves to protect our interests over what is clearly an uncertain future for Syria. Selected addressees will be receiving specific instructions to follow up recommended actions with host governments.
3. The I–G meeting produced broad consensus on following:
A. U.S. and Syrian interests:
—Key U.S. interests with respect to Syria are tied to U.S. regional objectives of avoiding Arab-Israeli hostilities and promoting a comprehensive settlement, denying the USSR greater access to and control over Syrian policy, and achievement of an acceptable resolution of Lebanon’s problems. We also have a strong interest in minimizing the risks that Syria will be drawn irrevocably into association with a constellation of radical Arab forces (most particularly Iraq) which could pose major dangers for the stability of the Gulf.
—U.S. endorsement and promotion of the Camp David approach to an Arab-Israeli settlement has led most Syrians to believe that the U.S. has paid inadequate attention to Syria’s vital interests (recovery of the Golan, a Palestinian settlement that will protect Syrian interests and enhance Syrian influence in the region, and a resolution of the Lebanese crisis which will safeguard Syria’s security interests and predominate [Page 1354] influence in Lebanon). Since these are essentially regional issues, they are not rpt not susceptible to bilateral solutions.
—The U.S. commitment to the Camp David process as the context for negotiations will continue to limit our ability in the near term to address Syrian interests in a manner sufficiently forthcoming to alter Syrian estrangement from the U.S. The one exception may be on Lebanon where Syrian and U.S. interest in maintaining stability and preventing partition continue to coincide.
B. Assad regime’s future and probable successors:
—Though no one can predict how long the Assad regime will survive, it is clear that it is dying. Barring assassination, the transition process is likely to be a lengthy affair and the dynamics involved in Assad’s struggle to hang on will strongly circumscribe his ability to respond pragmatically or positively to areas of primary interest to the U.S. In any case, we cannot count on Assad to act with the originality and pragmatism which characterized his rule in earlier years.
—In order of likelihood successor regimes would probably be: (a) a regime dominated by the Alawite hierarchy, but without the Assad brothers, (b) an Alawite/Sunni coalition, (c) a Sunni-dominated regime. A radical Muslim seizure of power is a remote possibility.
C. Implications for U.S. interests:
—From the standpoint of U.S. interests none of the anticipated successors would be preferable to Assad.
—Among them, however, an Alawite-Sunni coalition would probably be preferable and enjoy the best prospects for stability. It would stand the best chance of restoring confessional peace by redressing Sunni majority grievances while protecting minority Alawite/Christian interests. It would probably pursue the most moderate policies among the potential successors.
—An Alawite succession would be the most dangerous. A post-Assad Alawite regime would be ideological, tough, and have the strongest ties to the USSR among the potential contenders for power. A Sunni regime might well move to reduce Soviet influence. It would, however, meet resistance from the Alawite and Christian minorities in seeking to redress Sunni grievances at the expense of Alawite privilege. These tendencies would be accentuated to the degree that a Sunni regime found itself beholden to the radical Muslim Brotherhood for support.
D. U.S. policy
—The best posture for the U.S. at this time with respect to the succession struggle is one of neutrality and non-involvement. Despite a clear preference for Assad, it is unlikely that the U.S. can affect his staying power. At the same time, although we believe that a Sunni/
[Page 1355]Alawite coalition would be the preferable successor from our standpoint, we lack the ability to influence the succession and efforts by us to do so could actually operate against U.S. preferences. Any effort now by the U.S. to support or encourage one of the groups arrayed against the regime would risk our remaining working relations with Assad without acceptable assurances that we would have influence with Assad’s ultimate successor.
—While remaining out of Syria’s internal struggle, the U.S. should take steps to protect our interests in this transition period by conducting ourselves in a manner that will maximize U.S. ability to work with Assad for now and with whatever regime emerges after him. In general, this will mean a policy tailored—within the constraints imposed by our broader regional objectives—to keep our distance from Assad while stressing U.S. interest in, and support for legitimate Syrian national interests. Specifically, our objective will be to stress with Syrians and selected third parties our determination to remain uninvolved in Syria’s domestic political struggle and our long-range interest in maintaining Syria as an independent, moderate state.
E. After the regime changes
—Following a change of regime, we would have a limited but urgent agenda with Syria’s new leaders. At the earliest possible moment, we would want to assure:
—(A) a cooperative relationship on Lebanon;
—(B) maintenance of the Golan disengagement agreement and Olive Harvest arrangements; and,
—(C) the safety of American official personnel, private citizens and facilities in Syria.
—In addition, we would want to make clear that Syria continues to have a Western option and to discourage any move that would take Syria toward a significantly closer relationship with the USSR.
—In the right circumstances, we would also want to consider tangible ways to underscore the U.S. interest in a constructive relationship with the successor regime. It is possible that conditions would make an offer of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance appropriate. We might also consider emergency financial and economic assistance in cooperation with other governments.
F. Syria-Libya merger
—The September 10 unity declaration3 by Assad and Qadhafi took place after the I–G meeting and was, therefore, not discussed. It is De[Page 1356]partment’s preliminary view, however, that this step does not alter the conclusions from the meeting.
4. For Cairo: By septel4 you will receive instructions on how to respond to Cairo 18176.5
5. For Jidda and Damascus: I–G meeting produced consensus that Saudis are the one moderate Arab power with real influence in Damascus now and under likely successor regimes. We will shortly be sending you an instruction to raise the Syrian situation with the Saudis in an effort to begin sharing our perception about, and interests in Syria’s future. In the meantime, we would appreciate Jidda’s best in-house assessment of the Saudi-Syrian relationship, including Saudi interests and objectives, points of actual or potential friction, and forms of Saudi assistance to regime and/or its opponents. Conversely, we would welcome Damascus’ comments on Syrian perception of Saudi connection.
6. For Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Beirut and Baghdad: We are pouching for Ambassador copy of the discussion paper6 which served as the basis for the I–G meeting discussions. We could welcome comments and suggestions about paper, as well as conclusions from I–G meeting.
7. For all addressees: This cable is for your information only and should not be discussed with host government officials at this time. Given the sensitivity and completeness of this report posts should also ensure that any comment to Department is sent in Nodis channel.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Syria: 8–11/80. Secret; Immediate; Special Encryption; Nodis. Sent to Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, and Tel Aviv. Sent for information Immediate to London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Jim Collins (NEA/ARN); cleared by W. Nathanial Howell (NEA/ARN), Draper, George Q. Lumsden (NEA/ARP), Kirby, Sick, Joseph V. Montville (INR/NESA), and in NEA/EGY and CIA; approved by Draper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143–0750) Sick wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the telegram: “Syria: OK. (ZB “reluctantly” cleared—see ER item) ¶ 2 added at my request.” Brzezinski indicated his approval of the telegram on a September 11 action memorandum sent to him from Hunter, adding a handwritten note: “reluctantly. I still wonder if needed.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Syria: 8–11/80)↩
- No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.↩
- Syria and Libya proclaimed on September 10 that they had become a single state. The declaration stated: “This unified state will be the base and means of confronting the Zionist presence and the means of liberating Palestine.” (John Kifner, “Libya and Syria Sign Merger Agreement,” The New York Times, September 11, 1980, p. A7)↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Not found.↩
- The discussion paper, produced by the Department of State in response to a July 22 request from Brzezinski, was forwarded to Brzezinski under an August 21 covering memorandum from Tarnoff. In the covering memorandum, Tarnoff stated that the Department of State believed “the situation in Syria justifies the convening of an IG meeting” which the Department would convene. Copies of the paper and the covering memorandum are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 74, Syria: 7/77–1/81.↩