411. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Summary of the President’s Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin
PARTICIPANTS
- President Jimmy Carter
- Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
- Ambassador Samuel Lewis, United States Ambassador to Israel
- Alfred H. Moses, Special Adviser to the President
- David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)
- Prime Minister Menachem Begin
- Ambassador Ephraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
- Yehiel Kadishai, Director, Prime Minister’s Bureau
- Yehuda Avner, Adviser to the Prime Minister
- Reuven Hecht, Adviser to the Prime Minister
- General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
- Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister
- Jacob Nehushtan, Minister, Embassy of Israel
- Eitan Bentsur, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
(Between 11:05 a.m. and 11:37 a.m., the President and Prime Minister met alone in the Oval Office.2 The following took place in the Cabinet Room beginning at 11:38 a.m.).
The President said that he and the Prime Minister had talked about a number of items when they were alone; some they would relate to their associates in private; many dealt with the Prime Minister’s contribution in an historical way to enhance peace on earth. We have strengthened ties between our two great democratic countries. He is grateful to the Prime Minister—and to everyone else at the table. The Prime Minister had taken constructive and courageous actions. He (the President) had spent a large part of his political life on these issues, and there is a new prospect for peace. He is grateful for the opportunity, and it is his strong intention to continue doing so. Israel will find that the new U.S. administration mirrors his (the President’s) commitment, on bilateral relations and on peace, between Israel and Egypt and Israel and its other neighbors. This includes continuing to work to achieve full autonomy promised for the West Bank and Gaza; and providing security for Israel. He hopes that the Israeli government will pursue this with the same enthusiasm as has characterized its efforts until now. The Prime Minister and he recalled that the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty represent solemn commitments, which go beyond the identity of whoever is in office in the three countries. They should and will be binding on the peoples and governments; and not cast aside and abandoned. There are no good alternatives: the intrusion of other countries is not beneficial; the going back to a convening of a Geneva conference under UN auspieces would not be beneficial; the weakening of Resolution 242 commitments would not be beneficial.
Concerning progress in bilateral U.S.-Israeli relations, it is recognized here that there is real importance to U.S. security in Israeli-U.S. friendship. This is an important development; it may not have begun in the last four years, but it has certainly been strengthened. Public opinion here shows that support for Israel is valued by our people, and is strong. He and the Prime Minister had talked of the need for con[Page 1373]tinued sharing of intelligence information between our countries. There is need to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons—to countries like Libya, Iraq, and Pakistan. The U.S. has taken the lead on this issue, so far. When he sees Governor Reagan next week, he will impress upon him the importance of this issue.
On the question of a possible summit, this has been left in a tentative state. The Prime Minister is willing to proceed if it is advisable. He (the President) wants to see what both Sadat and Reagan think. We should proceed cautiously here. It is important to see the peace process go on. His overall sense is one of gratification and gratitude. The Prime Minister is a courageous leader, who worked with him (the President) in achieving much.
The Prime Minister said thank you very much indeed. He says as a friend, as he did in the Oval Office, that he feels deeply impressed with the spirit of democracy here, and that in such a way the President had accepted the decision of the people. American democracy is an example to others. He has deep appreciation for it—and it has been an example for a long time, for the U.S. and for the world. There is beauty in democracy, and it shows civil courage.
He wants to express the gratitude of Israel, that in President Carter’s tenure, Israel’s national security has been strengthened; there were the Camp David Accords, and the Egypt-Israel treaty. These are great achievements. The Camp David Accords have two parts—and are in effect an international treaty. The President of the United States witnessed the signing—all three leaders signed them. One part has come to fruition, in the peace treaty reached with the President’s help. Now normalization is taking place. There are some difficulties; but in the near future there will be another meeting in Cairo on the autonomy process. Maybe there will be a summit. He and the President have agreed that, as the transition period goes on, he (the Prime Minister) will accept any decision of the President on a summit. If the President wants to have a summit in these ten weeks, and if Sadat agrees, then this is all right, but it is the President’s decision. There are voices here that consider the Camp David Accords a document to be discarded, and look elsewhere for ideas. Where are these ideas? This sets a bad example for other nations. What value therefore would there be in a treaty? This would be injurious for all; and he (the Prime Minister) believes that Sadat agrees. Israel stands behind the Camp David Accords, and wants to bring them to fruition. There will be differences—and these will be important sometimes. Each party sees that it is taking the right approach. This is natural. But we can clarify the issues. And we have proved we can reach further agreement. When it appeared we were losing agreement, it was caught in mid-air, we brought it to earth and signed an agreement. Israel stands by the Camp David Accords, [Page 1374] and by free negotiations with the three nations. We should continue with these efforts. He will wait for the President to decide on a summit. If the President will let him know what he decides, he will accept it.
The President said that, in the meantime, we should not discuss it publicly. He does not want it thought that we are taking a unilateral decision. He will talk with Sadat and Reagan. It is likely there will not be a summit, but maybe there could be one, if it is appropriate.
The Prime Minister agreed.
The President said he wants to find out what Reagan thinks of an early meeting with the Prime Minister and Sadat (post-Inauguration). If he (Reagan) reacts positively, this would be the best alternative. He (the President) will explore this quietly.
Secretary Muskie said that he wanted to express his own appreciation for the opportunity to be involved, for a few months, with efforts to keep Camp David going, under difficult circumstances. He appreciates all the cooperation he has received. He compliments both leaders on their historical achievement, and expressed his thanks to both of them—and especially to the Prime Minister—for their understanding.
The Prime Minister said thank you.
Dr. Brzezinski said that he will soon be a private citizen, and hopes to visit Israel, and play a decisive game of chess with the Prime Minister!
The President said he understood that Dr. Brzezinski and the Prime Minister are still tied!
The Prime Minister said that Dr. Brzezinski could come to Israel to play chess with him. But why only one decisive game? (laughter) At Camp David, the score was two-to-two, and was inconclusive. They were interesting games; but he (the Prime Minister) needs more training! (laughter) The games that Dr. Brzezinski and he had played were the first he had played since he was arrested by the Russian Secret Service in 1940. It had been 38 years since he had played chess.
Dr. Brzezinski said that the Prime Minister had said this at the beginning of their first chess game at Camp David, and he (Dr. Brzezinski) had been suitably unnerved by the historic significance of it. But at the end, Mrs. Begin had said to him (Dr. Brzezinski) that it was wonderful that they were playing, because Menachem loves to play chess!
The Prime Minister said that that is right, but he hadn’t! It had been a hobby when he was a boy. You don’t forget how to play. But he needs training—a fact demonstrated because Dr. Brzezinski had beaten him twice! (laughter). Dr. Brzezinski does play very well.
Ambassador Linowitz said that he wanted to join in expressing personal gratitude for the chance to serve the President on these issues. [Page 1375] This was the most difficult, interesting, satisfying and frustrating experience of his life. It included his share of heartburn.
Ambassador Evron said that Ambassador Linowitz sometimes gave heartburn to others, as well! (laughter)
Ambassador Linowitz said that he wished he had! He had played a small part—but was immensely grateful. There is one point, which he raised last night with the Prime Minister. He (Ambassador Linowitz) would be personally unhappy if the process came to a close on Inauguration Day, without a record of what had been done, either a joint summary—such as the Memorandum of Understanding or other document—or a report. He hopes that there can be agreement to do this, for the record for the next administration and for history. It would show we were slowly making progress towards implementing the Camp David agreement.
The President said that this would please him. The optimum would be a joint report they could agree upon. Alternatively, Ambassador Linowitz could give him a unilateral report, with a copy to the others for the record.
Ambassador Linowitz said that we tried this with the Memorandum of Understanding; but predictably there had been problems. He had wanted us to be able to say: here we are.
The President asked why not try to have an assessment made of the progress that has been made, and delineate outstanding items and areas of disagreement. This might be done at the November 17th meeting.3 If not, he will ask Ambassador Linowitz for a report.
The Prime Minister said that if it is a problem of a common assessment by the three countries, and a matter of summing up the negotiations, that could cause some unresolved questions to be brought up. He would favor a document on what we have achieved. Some time was indeed lost, but there are achievements. He will need to consult his colleagues on the idea. He would prefer as much agreement as possible.
Ambassador Linowitz said that he would be happy to try preparing a draft.
The President said that we will try.
The Prime Minister said that it should be positive: what we achieved—for example, that for 32 years there was a state of war and five wars. Officially there were four wars, but non-officially there were [Page 1376] five, since there were hundreds of casualties on both sides from the war of attrition.4 Then we could see achievement—as recorded in the preamble to the Egypt-Israel treaty, and in normalization—for the first time in 32 years in the Middle East: such a thing doesn’t happen! Some of the things could be stated on autonomy, but not all. A tripartite declaration? He would consult his friends.
The President said certainly. Ambassador Linowitz will try a draft on the three countries, and will give it to the Prime Minister to accept or change. He would like to turn over to Reagan what we see as the progress and the problems. (He then invited the Prime Minister to join him outside with the press).
(The meeting concluded at 12:01 p.m.).
- Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(10/80–12/80). Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter’s handwritten notes related to this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 4/79–11/81.↩
- See Document 410. A memorandum of conversation for this portion of the meeting has not been found.↩
- A summary of the November 17 trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian meeting was sent in telegram 25364 from Cairo, November 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2004)↩
- Reference is to the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition that took place along the Suez Canal largely from March 8, 1969, when Nassar renounced the ceasefire ending the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, to August 7, 1970. For documentation on the War of Attrition, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.↩